High Court Division · Statutory Original Jurisdiction
Legend World Tank PTE v Multinational Shipping Co. Ltd. and others
Arbitration Application 30/2025 · Decided 12 July 2026
Legend World Tank PTE, which had replaced a Singapore company as principal under an agency agreement with Multinational Shipping Co. Ltd., alleged that the local agent had failed to return 107 tank containers. It began SIAC arbitration in Singapore and applied under section 7A of the Arbitration Act, 2001 for interim measures to stop the containers being scrapped, sold or moved. The respondents objected that the Larger Bench in Accom Travels and Tours v Oman Air SAOC had held sections 7, 7A and 10 inapplicable to foreign-seated arbitrations, save at the enforcement stage. The court expressed the view that section 7A confers a supportive, not supervisory, jurisdiction available in aid of foreign-seated arbitrations, and that Accom had overlooked the Appellate Division's ECOM decisions. It nevertheless held that a Single Bench cannot disregard a Larger Bench decision on that ground. Bound by Accom, it dismissed the application as not maintainable, without deciding the merits, and vacated the interim order.
- Q1
Whether the High Court Division can grant interim measures under section 7A of the Arbitration Act, 2001 in aid of an arbitration seated outside Bangladesh.
- Q2
Whether a Single Bench may decline to follow the Larger Bench decision in Accom Travels and Tours v Oman Air SAOC on the ground that it overlooked binding Appellate Division authority.
- In the court's view, section 7A of the Arbitration Act, 2001 confers a limited, ancillary and protective jurisdiction, distinct from supervisory jurisdiction, which could operate on persons or property in Bangladesh in aid of a foreign-seated arbitration.
- In the court's view, the reference in section 7A to enforcement of awards under section 45, which concerns foreign awards, shows that Parliament contemplated interim protection where the arbitration is seated abroad.
- The court observed that the majority in Accom relied on Unicol Bangladesh without considering the Appellate Division's ECOM decisions, which held Unicol pro tanto overruled and applied section 10 in aid of a foreign-seated arbitration.
- The court expressed the view that, where a specific statutory mechanism exists under section 10, recourse to inherent jurisdiction under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as in Accom, is neither necessary nor warranted.
- A Single Bench cannot disregard or decline to follow a binding Larger Bench decision of the High Court Division merely because it did not consider a relevant authority; reconsideration lies with the Appellate Division or a Bench of co-equal or larger strength.
- Being bound by Accom, the court held an application under section 7A in aid of a Singapore-seated arbitration not maintainable.
Since the arbitration agreement in the present case designates Singapore as the juridical seat of arbitration, the binding ratio laid down in Accom precludes the exercise of jurisdiction under section 7A of the Act, 2001.
In the court’s own words.
Arbitration Application 30/2025, as published by the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. 30 pages, with paragraph numbers for citing.
1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BANGLADESH
HIGH COURT DIVISION
(STATUTORY ORIGINAL JURISDICTION)
Present:
Mr. Justice Md. Toufiq Inam
Arbitration Application No. 30 of 2025.
An application under Section 7A Arbitration Act,
2001 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908.
And
IN THE MATTER OF:
Legend World Tank PTE,
…….Petitioner.
-Versus-
Multinational Shipping Co. Ltd., and others.
…….. Respondents.
Mr. Mohammed Forrukh Rahman, Advocate with
Mrs. Shahinoor Alam, Advocate
………For the petitioner.
Mr. M. Saquibuzzaman, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Mirza Ragib Hasnat, Advocate
………. For the Respondent Nos. 1 & 2.
Judgment Delivered On 12th July 2026.
Md. Toufiq Inam, J.
11. By this application under section 7A of the Arbitration Act,
22001 ("the Act, 2001"), the Petitioner seeks, inter alia, interim
3protective measures restraining Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 from
4treating the 107 tank containers as scrap or from destroying,
5damaging, selling, leasing, transferring, moving, or otherwise
6dealing with the said tank containers or any other imported
assets of the Petitioner, in aid of the arbitral proceedings agreed
7upon between the parties.
8The Background Facts 2. The petitioner's case, as set out in the Arbitration Application,
9is that pursuant to an Agency Agreement dated 07.02.2020
10executed between Respondent No. 1 and Legend Logistics
11(Asia) Ltd., a company incorporated in Singapore (the
12"Principal"), Respondent No. 1 obtained a Local Agent Licence
13under the Customs Agents (Licensing) Rules, 2016 and
14commenced operations as the Principal'sexclusive local agent in
15Bangladesh. Subsequently, by a Novation Agreement dated
1603.06.2024 executed among Legend World Tank Pte. Ltd. (the
17petitioner)and Legend Logistics (Asia) Ltd., the petitioner was
18substituted as the Principal in place of Legend Logistics (Asia)
19Ltd., with all rights and obligations under the Agency
20Agreement vesting in the petitioner. 3. The dispute arose in November 2024 when the Respondent
21No.1 allegedly failed to return 107 tank containers and failed to
22disclose their whereabouts or provide information regarding
23their status or storage charges. The Petitioner thereafter issued a
24demand notice dated 05.12.2024 seeking release of the tanks,
25while Respondent No. 1, by a legal notice dated 13.12.2024,
26claimed USD 75,279.68 towards alleged unpaid storage charges
27and other outstanding dues. By a further legal notice dated
2829.01.2025, the Petitioner called upon Respondent No. 1 to
29disclose the whereabouts of tank containers and to return them
30forthwith.
314. It is further alleged that Article 14 of the Agency Agreement
32provides for arbitration in Singapore under the Rules of the
33Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC).
34Accordingly, on 18.08.2025, the Petitioner commenced SIAC
35Arbitration No. 465 of 2025 against Respondent No. 1 by
36filing a Notice of Arbitration. The Petitioner contends that
37Respondent No. 1's Response to the Notice of Arbitration, filed
38before SIAC on 06.04.2026, demonstrates that the Arbitral
39Tribunal had not yet been constituted, as Respondent No. 1
40stated at paragraph 69 that it was "prepared to engage with
41Claimant to effect a joint nomination of a sole arbitrator in
42accordance with Rule 21 of the SIAC Rules." On that basis, the
43Petitioner submits that this Court continues to have jurisdiction
44to grant interim measures under the Arbitration Act, 2001, and
45further alleges that Respondent No. 1 made false statements
46regarding the status and disposal of the tank containers. 5. At the time of admission, this Court directed Respondent Nos. 1
47and 2 to disclose the exact location of the 107 tank containers
48and any other imported assets of the Petitioner in their custody,
49and to submit a report specifying all charges relating to their
50safe custody within one month. This Court also restrained
51Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 from treating the tank containers as
52scrap or from destroying, damaging, selling, leasing,
53transferring, moving, or otherwise dealing with the same or any
54other imported assets of the Petitioner pending disposal of the
55arbitral proceedings for a period of three months. Hence, the
56Petitioner has prayed for continuation of interim protection in
57aid of the agreed arbitral proceedings.
58Threshold Question 6. At the very threshold, Mr. M. Saquibuzzaman, learned senior
59Advocate appearing for respondent No. 1, upon filling an
60application, raises a preliminary objection as to the
61maintainability of the present application. He submits that the
62issue is no longer res integra in view of the majority decision of
63the Larger Bench in Accom Travels and Tours v. Oman Air
64SAOC, reported in 27 BLC 596, wherein it was held that
65sections 7, 7A and 10 of the Act, 2001 are inapplicable to
66foreign-seated arbitrations, except that interim measures under
67section 7A may be granted only at the stage of enforcement of a
68foreign arbitral award. Since the arbitration agreement in the
69present case designates Singapore as the juridical seat of
70arbitration, he contends that the present application under
71section 7A is not maintainable and that the said decision of the
72Larger Bench is binding upon this Court.
73Petitioner’s Standpoints 7. In reply, Mr. Mohammed Forrukh Rahaman, learned Advocate
74appearing with Mrs. Sahinoor Alam and Mr. Abdur Rahman
75Junaid appearing for the petitioner, submit that the majority
76decision of the Larger Bench in Accom is contrary to the
77legislative object underlying the Arbitration Act, 2001. He
78contends that, by introducing section 7A through the
79Amendment Act of 19.02.2004, the Legislature consciously
80empowered the Court to grant interim measures before or
81during arbitral proceedings or until enforcement of the award.
82According to the learned Senior Advocate, section 7A confers
83only a limited ancillary and protective jurisdiction to preserve
84the subject matter of the dispute and does not amount to the
85exercise of supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitral
proceedings. He therefore argues that an application under
86section 7A is maintainable notwithstanding that the parties have
87chosen a foreign seat of arbitration, and that the contrary view
88adopted by the Larger Bench, confining the operation of section
897A to domestically seated arbitrations (except at the stage of
90enforcement of a foreign award), is founded upon an erroneous
91interpretation of the legislative scheme of the Act. 8. He submits that the majority decision of the Larger Bench in
92Accom no longer represents the prevailing law, having been
93rendered per incuriam. He contends that the Larger Bench
94reached its conclusion without considering the binding
95decisions of the Appellate Division in Mosharaf Composite
96Textile Mills Ltd. v. ECOM Agroindustrial Corp. Ltd., reported
97in 4 SCOB (2015) AD 28, and the subsequent judgment dated
9811.07.2017 passed in Civil Review Petition No. 213 of 2015. In
99the review judgment, the Appellate Division expressly held that
100Unicol Bangladesh Ltd. v. Maxwell Engineering Works Ltd., 56
101DLR (AD) 166, stood pro tanto overruled. Since the majority
102decision in Accom was founded substantially upon Unicol
103without noticing or considering the binding pronouncements in
104ECOM, the very jurisprudential foundation of the decision,
105according to Mr. Rahman, stands displaced. He therefore
106submits that Accom was rendered per incuriam, no longer
107represents the prevailing law on the subject, and consequently
108does not bind this Court. 9. It is submitted that the decisions of the Appellate Division in
109ECOM recognise that the choice of a foreign arbitral seat does
110not, by itself, exclude the jurisdiction of the courts of
111Bangladesh to render judicial assistance under the Arbitration
Act, 2001. In support of this proposition, he also relies upon
112Crown Maritime Co. Ltd. v. Royal Boskalis Westminster NV, 16
113BLC 140, wherein this Court held that section 7A may be
114invoked in aid of a foreign-seated arbitration for preservation of
115assets situated within Bangladesh. He further contends that
116modern international arbitration jurisprudence recognises the
117jurisdiction of national courts to grant interim protective
118measures in support of foreign-seated arbitrations where the
119assets or property requiring protection are located within the
120forum State. He also refers to the proceedings before the
121Appellate Division in Italian Thai Development Public
122Company Limited v. The Export-Import Bank of India (Civil
123Petition for Leave to Appeal No. 1828 of 2024, judgment dated
12401.09.2024), wherein interim protection was continued until the
125first sitting of the arbitral tribunal in Singapore. According to
126him, although the Appellate Division did not finally determine
127the scope of section 7A, it did not affirm the restrictive
128interpretation adopted by the High Court Division, thereby
129leaving the question open for determination in an appropriate
130case. On these grounds, he submits that this Court possesses
131jurisdiction under section 7A to grant interim protection in aid
132of the foreign-seated arbitration and accordingly prays for
133allowing the application. 10. On the merits, he submits that Respondent No. 1, having
134expressly consented to the arbitration agreement and
135participated in the SIAC proceedings without disputing the
136jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, cannot now deny its
137contractual obligations or evade interim measures in aid of
138arbitration. It is contended that the disputes concerning the
139custody, whereabouts and return of the tank containers arise
directly out of or in connection with the Agency Agreement and
140the Novation Agreement, and are matters to be determined by
141the arbitral tribunal. Pending such determination, the Petitioner
142submits that this Court is empowered to preserve the subject
143matter of the dispute by granting appropriate interim protection
144so as to ensure that the arbitral proceedings are not rendered
145nugatory or the eventual award, if any, frustrated.
146Respondent’s Contentions 11. Mr. M. Saquibuzzaman, learned Advocate appearing for
147Respondent No. 1, opposes the application. He submits that, by
148virtue of the Novation Agreement dated 03.06.2024, which
149became effective on 13.07.2024, Respondent No. 1 was
150discharged from all rights, obligations and liabilities arising
151under the Agency Agreement dated 07.02.2020. According to
152him, with effect from 13.07.2024, the petitioner was substituted
153as the Principal and assumed all contractual rights and
154obligations under the Agency Agreement, whereupon
155Respondent No. 1 ceased to have any contractual relationship or
156continuing liability towards the petitioner in respect of matters
157arising prior to the effective date of the novation. He further
158submits that, according to the petitioner's own case, the
159whereabouts of the tank containers had become unknown
160between February and March 2024, well before the Novation
161Agreement took effect on 13.07.2024. In such circumstances,
162any loss, disappearance or non-availability of the tank
163containers, if at all, occurred before the petitioner acquired the
164contractual rights and obligations under the Novation
165Agreement. It is, therefore, contended that the petitioner cannot
166maintain any claim against Respondent No. 1 in respect of
events which allegedly occurred prior to the novation.
167Accordingly, he prays that the application be dismissed. 12. He also submits that the choice of a foreign seat carries with it
168the consequence that supervisory jurisdiction vests exclusively
169in the courts of the seat, and permitting recourse to section 7A
170would impermissibly extend the territorial operation of the
171Arbitration Act beyond the limits prescribed by section 3. He,
172therefore, prays that the application be dismissed.
173Discussion and Reasoning 13. As the preliminary objection goes to the very root of the
174maintainability of the present application and centres upon the
175correctness, scope and applicability of the Larger Bench
176decision in Accom, it is necessary to notice the principles laid
177down therein. By a majority of 2:1, the Larger Bench held
178thatby virtue of sections 3(1) and 3(2) of the Arbitration Act,
1792001, the provisions of the Act, other than sections 45, 46 and
18047, are inapplicable where the seat of arbitration is outside
181Bangladesh. Consequently, sections 7, 7A and 10 have no
182application to foreign-seated arbitrations, except that interim
183measures under section 7A may be granted only at the stage of
184enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. Nevertheless, despite
185the inapplicability of section 10, the civil court ought to have
186stayed the suit in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under
187section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“CPC”), and
188referred the parties to arbitration in accordance with their
189arbitration agreement. 14. The principal question that falls for determination is whether an
190application under section 7A of the Act, 2001 is maintainable
where the parties have agreed to a foreign seat of arbitration.
191The resolution of this question depends upon the proper
192construction of section 7A read together with the scheme,
193object and legislative purpose of the Act, 2001. It is well settled
194that a statutory provision must not be construed in isolation.
195Every provision is to be interpreted in the context of the statute
196as a whole so that each part is given meaningful effect and the
197legislative purpose is advanced rather than defeated. 15. Having heard the learned Advocates for the parties and
198considered the decisions cited by the parties, together with the
199subsequent development in the Appellate Division, this Court
200considers it appropriate to examine the issues under the
201following heads before expressing its views.
202I. Effect of the Non-Obstante Clauses in Sections 7 and 7A 16. By the Arbitration (Amendment) Act, 2004 (Act No. II of
2032004), which came into force on 19.02.2004, Parliament
204inserted section 7A into the Arbitration Act, 2001, thereby
205creating an independent statutory jurisdiction in the High Court
206Division to grant interim measures. Section 7A was inserted in
207the Act 2001 on 19.02.2004 as-
208“[৭ক। ( ১) ধাযা ৭এ মাাককছুই থাকুকনা ককন, ক্ষগণ কবন্ন বাবফ ম্মত না ইবর,
209ককান বক্ষয আবফদবনয কেকক্ষবত াকরী কামধাযা
য চরাকারীন ককিংফা তৎূবফ য অথফা
210ধাযা ৪৪ ফা ৪৫ এয অধীন াকরী কযাবেদাদ কামকয
য না ওো মন্ত
য আন্তজযাকতক
211ফাকণজ্জিক াকরবয কক্ষবে াইবকার্য কফবাগ এফিং অনিানি াকরবয কক্ষবে আদারত
212কনম্নফকণতয কফলবে আবদ েদান ককযবত াকযবফ, মথা:
213(ক) নাফারক ফা অেকৃকতস্থ ফিজ্িয বক্ষ াকরী কামধাযা
য কযচারনায জনি
অকববাফক কনবোগ;
214(খ) াকরী চুজ্িয অন্তবুি
য ককান কফলেফস্তু কাবফ অন্তবুি
য ককান ভারাভার ফা
215ম্পকিয অন্তফতীকারীন
য কপাজত ফা কফক্রে ফা অনি ককান িংযক্ষণভূরক
216ফিফস্থা গ্রণ; (গ) ককানক্ষ কতৃক
য াকরী কযাবেদাদ কামকয
য ককযফায কক্ষবে েকতফন্ধকতা ৃষ্টিয
217রবক্ষি ককান ম্পকি স্তান্তয ককিংফা স্থানান্তবযয উয কনবলধাজ্ঞা; (ঘ) াকরী কামধাযায
য অন্তবুি
য ককান কফলেফস্তু কাবফ অন্তবুি
য ককান ভারাভার ফা
218ম্পকি আর্ক, িংযক্ষণ, কযদন,
য কচোেন, পবর্ািংগ্র, কপাজতকযণ, তথি
219ও নভুনা িংগ্র, মবফক্ষণ,
য যীক্ষণ ফা াক্ষি গ্রণ ককযফায জনি এফিং
220তদুবেবি ককান বক্ষয দখরকৃত বূ কভ ফা ইভাযবত েবফবয জনি কম ককান
221ফিজ্িবক ক্ষভতা অণ;
য
222(ঙ) অন্তফতীকারীন
223য কনবলধাজ্ঞা; (চ) কযকবায কনবোগ; এফিং (ছ) আদারত অথফা াইবকার্য কফবাবগয কনকর্ মুজ্িিংঙ্গত ফা মথামথ েতীেভান ে
224এইরূ অনি কম ককান অন্তফতীকারীন
য িংযক্ষণভূরক ফিফস্থা গ্রণ।
225(২) ককান আইনগত কামধাযায
য কফলবে আদারত ফা াইবকার্য কফবাবগয কমইরূ
226ক্ষভতা যকোবছ উ-ধাযা (১) এয অধীন আবদ েদাবনয কক্ষবে ও আদারত ফা,
227কক্ষেভত, াইবকার্য কফবাবগয কই রূ ক্ষভতা থাককবফ। (৩) উ-ধাযা ( ১) এয অধীন োপ্ত আবফদন ম্পবকয আদারত ফা াইবকার্য কফবাগ
228কতৃক
229য আবদ েদাবনয ূবফ অয
য ক্ষবক কনাষ্টর্ েদান ককযবত ইবফ:
230তবফ তযথাবক কম, আদারত ফা, কক্ষেভত, াইবকার্য কফবাগ মকদ এই ভবভ য ন্তুি
231ে কম, ককান কফলবে তাৎক্ষকণক আবদ েদান কযা না ইবর অন্তফতীকারীন
য
232ফিফস্থা গ্রণ িংক্রান্ত উবেি ফিথ য ইবফ, তাা ইবর উিরূ কনাষ্টর্ েদাবনয
233েবোজন ইবফনা। (৪) আদারত ফা াইবকার্য কফবাগ মকদ এই ভবভ য ন্তুি ে কম, ককান কফলবে উ-ধাযা
234(১) এয অধীন কামক্রভ
য গ্রবণয ক্ষভতা াকরী ট্রাইফুিনাবরয নাই অথফা
235ট্রাইফুিনার ধাযা ২১ এয অধীন িংকিি কফলবে আবদ েদাবন ফিথ যইোবছ, তাা
236ইবর আদারত ফা, কক্ষেভত, াইবকার্য কফবাগ, এই ধাযায অধীন আবদ েদান
237ককযবত াকযবফ।
(৫) এই ধাযায অধীন েদি ককান আবদ আদারত ফা, কক্ষেভত, াইবকার্য কফবাগ,
মথাথ ভবন
য ককযবর ফাকতর, কযফতযন ফা িংবাধন ককযবত াকযবফ।
238(৬) উ-ধাযা ( ১) এয অধীন েদি ককান আবদ িংকিি ককান কফলবে ক্ষভতা োপ্ত
ককান াকরী ট্রাইফুিনার ককিংফা অনি ককান েকতষ্ঠান ফা ফিজ্িকতৃক
য উি কফলবে
ককান আবদ েদান কযা ইবর, কই কফলবে আদারত ফা, কক্ষেভত, াইবকার্য
কফবাগ কতৃক
য েদি আবদ ম্পূণ য ককিংফা কক্ষেভত উি আবদবয িংকিি
অিং কফবল অকামকয
য ইবফ।]”
23917. The non-obstante clauses employed in sections 7 and 7A are
240materially different and must be given their due significance.
241Section 7 opens with the words, "Notwithstanding anything
242contained in any other law for the time being in force,"
243thereby giving the Arbitration Act, 2001 overriding effect over
244all other laws governing judicial proceedings. Section 7A,
245however, does not override "any other law"; instead, it begins
246with the words, "Notwithstanding anything contained in
247section 7." By specifically overriding section 7 itself,
248Parliament created an express exception to the general
249jurisdictional scheme contained in that provision. 18. The legislative intent is therefore clear. While section 7
250embodies the general principle of limited judicial intervention
251in matters covered by an arbitration agreement, section 7A
252preserves a distinct and independent jurisdiction of the High
253Court Division to grant interim protective measures. Had
254Parliament intended section 7A to be controlled entirely by
255section 7, there was no necessity to commence the provision
256with an “overriding clause.” The opening words of section 7A
257indicate that the jurisdiction conferred therein is exceptional
258and self-contained, enabling the Court to grant interim relief in
aid of arbitration notwithstanding the general limitations
259contained in section 7. Any interpretation that renders the non-
260obstante clause in section 7A redundant would be contrary to
261the settled principle that every word employed by the
262legislature must, so far as possible, be given meaning and
263effect.
264II. Legislative Intent Behind the Introduction of Section 7A 19. The language of section 7A clearly demonstrates that
265Parliament intended to create a jurisdiction distinct from the
266Court's supervisory powers over arbitration. The provision
267begins with a non-obstante clause and authorises the High
268Court Division to grant interim measures "before or during
269continuance of the proceedings or until enforcement of the
270award under section 44 or 45." Read as a whole, section 7A
271confers a continuous protective jurisdiction extending from the
272period before the commencement of arbitral proceedings,
273throughout the arbitration, and continuing until the award is
274enforced. The reference to section 45 is particularly significant,
275for that provision deals exclusively with the recognition and
276enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Parliament therefore
277expressly contemplated that interim protection may be required
278in Bangladesh even where the arbitration is seated abroad. 20. The nature of the jurisdiction conferred by section 7A is equally
279significant. Unlike sections 12, 15 and 16 of the Act, which
280empower the Court to appoint, remove or substitute arbitrators
281and thereby exercise supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitral
282process, section 7A neither authorises the Court to regulate the
283conduct of arbitration nor to determine the merits of the dispute.
284Its function is purely ancillary and protective. It enables the
285Court to preserve the subject matter of the dispute, maintain the
286status quo, secure assets and prevent irreparable prejudice until
287the arbitral tribunal is constituted, or, if already constituted, is
288in a position to grant appropriate relief. In exercising
289jurisdiction under section 7A, the Court neither supplants the
290arbitral tribunal nor assumes control over the arbitration; it
291merely safeguards the efficacy of the arbitral process. 21. This reflects the well-recognised distinction between
292supervisory jurisdiction and supportive jurisdiction in
293modern arbitration law. Supervisory jurisdiction concerns
294matters such as the constitution of the tribunal, challenges to its
295jurisdiction, procedural supervision and the setting aside of
296awards, and ordinarily belongs to the courts of the juridical
297seat. Supportive jurisdiction, by contrast, assists the arbitral
298process by preserving assets, maintaining the status quo or
299securing evidence without interfering with the tribunal's
300authority or adjudicating the parties' substantive rights. Section
3017A embodies this latter jurisdiction. It is designed to ensure that
302the arbitral proceedings, and the eventual award, are not
303rendered ineffective by the dissipation of assets or alteration of
304the status quo. 22. The practical purpose of section 7A reinforces this
305interpretation. In a foreign-seated arbitration, the need for
306interim protection may arise before the arbitral tribunal is
307constituted, during the arbitral proceedings, or after the award
308has been rendered but before it is recognised and enforced in
309Bangladesh under section 45. During any of these stages, assets
situated within Bangladesh may be dissipated or transferred,
310thereby frustrating the enforcement of the eventual foreign
311award. By empowering the High Court Division to grant
312interim measures until enforcement under section 45,
313Parliament ensured that effective judicial assistance remains
314available throughout the life cycle of the arbitral process
315without conferring supervisory control over the foreign
316arbitration itself.
317III. The Significance of the Preamble of the Act, 2001 23. The object of section 7A becomes clearer when it is read in the
318light of the Preamble to the Arbitration Act, 2001. Unlike the
319repealed Arbitration Act, 1940, which was enacted merely to
320consolidate and amend the law relating to arbitration in
321Bangladesh, the 2001 Act has a much wider legislative purpose.
322Its Preamble states that the Act is intended to consolidate and
323amend the law relating to domestic arbitration, international
324commercial arbitration, the recognition and enforcement of
325foreign arbitral awards, and matters connected therewith. Thus,
326Parliament deliberately expanded the scope of the legislation
327beyond domestic arbitrations to embrace international
328commercial arbitration and the enforcement of foreign awards.
329The expression "and matters connected therewith" further
330indicates that the Act was intended not only to regulate arbitral
331proceedings seated in Bangladesh but also to provide judicial
332assistance wherever necessary to ensure that arbitration remains
333an effective dispute resolution mechanism. 24. This legislative shift is reflected in section 7A. Unlike the 1940
334Act, which was based upon extensive judicial supervision of
arbitration, the 2001 Act adopts the modern approach of limited
335judicial intervention coupled with judicial support. Section 7A
336does not confer supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitral
337proceedings. Its purpose is to enable the Court to preserve the
338subject matter of the dispute, protect the rights of the parties
339and ensure that the arbitral process is not rendered ineffective
340before the tribunal can act or before the award is enforced.
341Interpreting section 7A as a provision intended to support,
342rather than supervise, arbitration is therefore consistent not only
343with the language of the section itself but also with the broader
344legislative objective reflected in the Preamble of the Arbitration
345Act, 2001.
346IV. Whether Section 3 Excludes the Operation of Section 7A 25. The principal question is whether section 3 of the Arbitration
347Act, 2001 excludes the operation of section 7A where the
348juridical seat of arbitration is outside Bangladesh. Section 3
349undoubtedly prescribes the general territorial application of the
350Act by providing that it applies where the place of arbitration is
351in Bangladesh, subject to the exceptions contained in sub-
352section (2). However, section 3 cannot be construed in
353isolation. It must be read harmoniously with the substantive
354provisions of the Act so that each provision is given its intended
355operation. It is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that
356a general provision should not be construed so as to defeat or
357render ineffective a later and more specific provision enacted
358by Parliament. 26. Properly construed, section 3 does not itself confer or withdraw
359judicial jurisdiction. Rather, it defines the territorial reach of the
360Act. The Court's jurisdiction is conferred by the substantive
provisions of the Act, including sections 7A, 10, 12, 15, 16, 42,
36145 and 46. The question, therefore, is not what section 3 says in
362isolation, but how it is to be reconciled with the specific
363jurisdiction created by section 7A. 27. If section 3 were interpreted as absolutely excluding the
364operation of section 7A whenever the arbitration is seated
365outside Bangladesh, the express words employed by Parliament
366in section 7A—"ধাযা৪৪ফা৪৫এযঅধীনাকরীবযাবেদাদকামকযনাওোম
য ন্ত"
য
367("until enforcement of the award under section 44 or 45")—
368would be deprived of any practical effect. Section 45 deals
369exclusively with the recognition and enforcement of foreign
370arbitral awards. Parliament could not have expressly referred to
371section 45 if it intended section 7A to remain wholly
372inapplicable throughout the life of a foreign-seated arbitration.
373Such a construction would render the reference to section 45
374largely redundant, contrary to the settled principle that every
375word employed by Parliament must, so far as possible, be given
376meaning and effect. 28. In the respectful view of this Court, the more harmonious
377reconciliation of the two provisions is that section 3 lays down
378the general territorial application of the Act, whereas section 7A
379creates a limited and independent protective jurisdiction of the
380High Court Division. That jurisdiction extends to three stages
381of the arbitral process, namely: (i) before the commencement of
382arbitral proceedings; (ii) during the pendency of the arbitral
383proceedings; and (iii) after the award has been made until its
384enforcement, including the enforcement of a foreign arbitral
385award under section 45. In exercising jurisdiction under section
3867A, the High Court Division neither supervises nor interferes
with the foreign arbitral proceedings. Its role is confined to
387preserving the subject matter of the dispute and maintaining the
388efficacy of the arbitral process so that the eventual award is not
389rendered nugatory by the dissipation of assets or alteration of
390the status quo. 29. This interpretation is reinforced by the nature of the jurisdiction
391conferred under different provisions of the Act. Supervisory
392jurisdiction under sections 12, 15 and 16 naturally follows the
393juridical seat because those provisions regulate the arbitral
394process itself. Enforcement jurisdiction under sections 42 to 46
395depends upon whether the award is domestic or foreign. Section
3967A, however, serves a fundamentally different legislative
397purpose. It confers a supportive jurisdiction designed to
398preserve property or rights within Bangladesh so that the
399arbitral proceedings, wherever seated, are not frustrated. The
400location of the arbitration determines supervisory control; it
401does not necessarily preclude judicial assistance directed solely
402towards preserving the efficacy of the arbitral process.
403V. Legislative Intent and Harmonious Construction of the Act 30. Having considered the rival submissions and the authorities
404cited at the parties, this Court is of the view that the controversy
405cannot be resolved by reading section 3 in isolation. The Act,
4062001 must be construed as a coherent and integrated legislative
407scheme in which every provision is given its proper meaning
408and effect. It is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that
409a statute should be read as a whole and that no provision should
410be construed in a manner that renders another provision
411redundant, ineffective or devoid of practical operation.
41231. The legislative object of the Act is reflected in its Preamble,
413which declares that it was enacted to consolidate and amend the
414law relating to domestic arbitration, international commercial
415arbitration, the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral
416awards and matters connected therewith. Unlike the repealed
417Arbitration Act, 1940, the 2001 Act was designed to regulate
418not merely domestic arbitration but the broader framework of
419international commercial arbitration. Although the Preamble
420cannot control the plain words of the statute, it remains an
421important aid in ascertaining legislative intent where two
422constructions are reasonably possible. 32. The legislative history of section 7A reinforces that purpose.
423The Arbitration Act, 2001, as originally enacted, contained no
424provision empowering the Court to grant interim measures.
425Parliament consciously introduced section 7A by the
426Amendment Act of 2004, thereby conferring upon the High
427Court Division a limited jurisdiction to preserve the subject
428matter of arbitration before the commencement of proceedings,
429during their continuance and until enforcement of the award.
430The evident object of the amendment was to ensure that arbitral
431proceedings are not frustrated by the dissipation of assets or
432alteration of the status quo before effective relief becomes
433available. 33. The language employed in section 7A is itself a compelling
434indicator of that legislative intent. Parliament authorised the
435High Court Division to grant interim measures "before or
436during continuance of the proceedings or until enforcement
437of the award under section 44 or 45." The express reference
to section 45 is of particular significance because that provision
438deals exclusively with the recognition and enforcement of
439foreign arbitral awards. If section 7A were wholly inapplicable
440whenever the arbitration is seated outside Bangladesh,
441Parliament's specific reference to section 45 would serve little
442practical purpose. Such a construction would offend the settled
443principle that every word employed by the legislature must, so
444far as possible, be given meaning and effect. 34. The structure of the Act further demonstrates that Parliament
445has deliberately conferred different kinds of jurisdiction upon
446the Court. Sections 12, 15 and 16 confer supervisory
447jurisdiction over the arbitral process itself. Sections 42 to 46
448regulate the recognition, enforcement and setting aside of
449arbitral awards. Section 7A, however, performs an altogether
450different function. It neither regulates the conduct of arbitration
451nor determines the merits of the dispute. Its purpose is confined
452to preserving assets, maintaining the status quo and protecting
453the efficacy of arbitration until the arbitral tribunal or the
454enforcing court is able to grant effective relief. 35. Once this distinction between supervisory jurisdiction and
455supportive jurisdiction is appreciated, the relationship between
456sections 3 and 7A becomes considerably clearer. Section 3 lays
457down the general territorial application of the Act. It does not,
458by itself, create or extinguish the substantive jurisdictions
459conferred elsewhere in the statute. Whether a particular
460provision is governed by the territorial limitation in section 3
461necessarily depends upon the nature and purpose of the
462jurisdiction created by that provision. Supervisory powers
ordinarily follow the juridical seat; supportive jurisdiction,
463however, may legitimately operate upon persons or property
464situated within Bangladesh without interfering with the foreign
465arbitral process. 36. This construction accords with the practical realities of
466international commercial arbitration. Commercial disputes
467frequently involve assets situated in jurisdictions other than the
468agreed arbitral seat. Unless the courts of the jurisdiction where
469those assets are located are able to grant temporary protective
470measures, the eventual award may become incapable of
471effective enforcement. An order under section 7A operates only
472upon persons or property within Bangladesh. It neither
473regulates the foreign arbitration, nor intrudes upon the tribunal's
474authority, nor determines any issue on the merits. It merely
475preserves the status quo until the arbitral tribunal is able to
476exercise its own jurisdiction or the award is enforced. 37. Accordingly, a harmonious construction of sections 3, 7A and
47745 leads to the conclusion that section 3 defines the general
478territorial application of the Act, whereas section 7A creates a
479limited, ancillary and protective jurisdiction enabling the High
480Court Division to preserve the subject matter of the dispute
481until the arbitral award, including a foreign award enforceable
482under section 45, is recognised and enforced in Bangladesh.
483Such an interpretation gives meaningful effect to every
484provision of the Act, advances the legislative object underlying
485the 2001 Act and preserves the distinction between judicial
486assistance and supervisory jurisdiction recognised in modern
487international arbitration law.
488VI. TheView in Accom and Its Restrictive Construction of
489Section 7A 38. Following Unicol, the jurisprudence of the High Court Division
490evolved along two distinct lines. One line of authority adopted a
491restrictive interpretation of the Arbitration Act, 2001 by treating
492Unicol as conclusively limiting the jurisdiction of the
493Bangladeshi courts in respect of foreign-seated arbitrations. In
494Uzbekistan Airways, the High Court Division, relying
495principally on Unicol, held that section 10 of the Act, 2001 was
496inapplicable where the seat of arbitration lay outside
497Bangladesh. The majority decision in Accom substantially
498followed the same approach. With profound respect, however,
499the majority appears to have accorded overriding significance to
500the territorial provision contained in section 3 of the Act
501without undertaking a separate examination of the language,
502purpose and legislative scheme of section 7A. The jurisdiction
503conferred by section 7A is neither supervisory nor
504interventionist. It does not regulate the conduct of the arbitral
505proceedings or interfere with the authority of the arbitral
506tribunal. Rather, it confers a limited and ancillary jurisdiction
507upon the High Court Division to preserve the subject matter of
508the dispute so that the arbitral process and any eventual award
509are not rendered ineffective. Such protective jurisdiction is
510conceptually distinct from the supervisory jurisdiction
511exercised by the courts of the arbitral seat.
512VII. Effect of the Overlooked Binding Decision 39. The Larger Bench in Accom Travels and Tours v. Oman Air
513SAOC, by a majority of 2:1, held that sections 7, 7A and 10 of
the Arbitration Act, 2001 are inapplicable to foreign-seated
514arbitrations, except that interim measures under section 7A may
515be granted at the stage of enforcement of a foreign arbitral
516award. In arriving at that conclusion, the majority relied
517principally upon Uzbekistan Airways, 10 BLC 614, Civil
518Petition No. 1112 of 2005 and, ultimately, Unicol Bangladesh
519Ltd. v. Maxwell Engineering Works Ltd., 56 DLR (AD) 166.
520However, the majority neither referred to nor considered the
521earlier binding decision of the Appellate Division in Mosharaf
522Composite Textile Mills Ltd. v. ECOM Agroindustrial Corp.
523Ltd., reported in 4 SCOB (2015) AD 28. In ECOM, by
524judgment dated 20.06.2015, the Appellate Division affirmed the
525stay of a suit instituted in Bangladesh so as to enable arbitration
526already pending in Liverpool to proceed in accordance with the
527parties' arbitration agreement. 40. The legal position was clarified even further when the
528Appellate Division, in ECOM, while dismissing Civil Review
529Petition No. 213 of 2015 by judgment dated 11.07.2017,
530expressly considered Unicol Bangladesh and observed:
531"The learned counsel has referred to a decision of this
532Court in Unicol Bangladesh Blocks Thirteen Vs Maxwell
533Engineering Works Ltd., 56 DLR (AD) 166 and submits
534that in that case similar question arose. …… This Court
535did not deal with section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940,
536which is not in resemblance with section 10 of the
537present Ain. Moreover, this Court by a four-member
538Bench has maintained the judgment of the High Court
539Division staying the further proceedings of the suit on the
540reasoning that the parties should proceed with the
arbitration proceedings. In view of the above, this Court
541has pro tanto overruled Unicol Bangladesh."
[Emphasis supplied by this Court]
54241. The expression "pro tanto overruled" signifies that an earlier
543decision is overruled only to the extent that it is inconsistent
544with the later decision and not in its entirety. Thus, by its
545review judgment in ECOM, the Appellate Division expressly
546displaced that part of Unicol Bangladesh Ltd. v. Maxwell
547Engineering Works Ltd., 56 DLR (AD) 166, which held that
548section 10 of the Arbitration Act, 2001 was inapplicable to
549foreign-seated arbitrations. The remaining principles laid down
550in Unicol, insofar as they are not inconsistent with ECOM,
551continue to retain their precedential value. 42. The significance of this development cannot be overstated.
552When the Larger Bench rendered its decision in Accom on
55312.12.2021, Unicol had already ceased, for more than four
554years, to be good law on the applicability of section 10 to
555foreign-seated arbitrations. Notwithstanding that position, the
556majority substantially founded its reasoning upon Unicol
557without noticing either the Appellate Division's judgment in
558ECOM or its subsequent review judgment expressly holding
559that Unicol stood pro tanto overruled. Once the very
560proposition of law for which Unicol was relied upon had
561already been authoritatively displaced by the Appellate
562Division, its continued reliance as the principal foundation for
563interpreting section 10 became open to serious doubt. To that
564extent, the jurisprudential foundation of the majority's
565reasoning in Accom in relation to section 10 stood materially
566weakened.
56743. The ratio of ECOM is clear and unequivocal. The Appellate
568Division upheld the application of section 10 of the Arbitration
569Act, 2001 to stay a suit instituted in Bangladesh in deference to
570arbitration proceedings already pending in Liverpool. In doing
571so, it did not treat the foreign set of arbitration as a bar to the
572exercise of judicial assistance under section 10. Nor did it
573consider section 3 or any other provision of the Arbitration Act
574as restricting the operation of section 10 merely because the
575arbitration was seated outside Bangladesh. The decision
576therefore necessarily rejects the proposition that section 10 is
577confined exclusively to domestic arbitrations. 44. The binding force of ECOM is beyond controversy. As
578observed by Mahmudul Islam in Constitutional Law of
579Bangladesh, a decision of the Appellate Division is binding
580under Article 111 of the Constitution when it "(a) decides a
581question of law, (b) is based on a principle of law, or (c)
582enunciates a principle of law." The interpretation placed by the
583Appellate Division upon section 10 in ECOM is therefore a
584declaration of law binding upon all subordinate courts.
585Consequently, Unicol can no longer be cited as authority for the
586proposition that section 10 is inapplicable to foreign-seated
587arbitrations. 45. However, the omission to consider ECOM is significant
588because the majority judgment in Accom was founded
589substantially on Unicol Bangladesh, 56 DLR (AD) 166. The
590Larger Bench held that sections 7, 7A and 10 of the Arbitration
591Act, 2001 do not apply to foreign-seated arbitrations on the
592basis that section 3 confines the operation of Part I of the Act to
arbitrations seated in Bangladesh. But before Accom was
593decided, the Appellate Division in ECOM had already upheld
594the application of section 10 to stay a suit in Bangladesh in
595favour of arbitration proceedings pending in Liverpool. This
596clearly shows that the existence of a foreign seat does not, by
597itself, exclude all forms of judicial intervention under the
598Arbitration Act. 46. The decisions in ECOM therefore represent an important
599development in the law. They demonstrate that the Arbitration
600Act, 2001 does not invariably make every form of judicial
601intervention dependent on the juridical seat of arbitration.
602Rather, they recognise that there is a distinction between the
603Court's supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitral process and its
604power to provide judicial assistance in support of arbitration.
605That distinction is directly relevant to the proper interpretation
606of section 7A. For this reason, the reasoning adopted in Accom
607deserves reconsideration by a court of competent jurisdiction in
608an appropriate case.
609VIII. Applicability of Section 151 CPC in Place of Section 10 47. Another aspect of the majority decision in Accom which
610requires careful consideration is its conclusion that, although
611sections 7, 7A and 10 of the Act, 2001 were held to be
612inapplicable to foreign-seated arbitrations, the Court could
613nevertheless stay the suit by invoking its inherent jurisdiction
614under section 151 CPC and refer the parties to arbitration in
615accordance with their arbitration agreement.
61648. With profound respect, the majority reasoning in Accom
617appears to contain an inherent inconsistency. Having held that
618section 10, the special statutory provision governing the stay of
619judicial proceedings in favour of arbitration, is inapplicable to
620foreign-seated arbitrations, the majority nevertheless held that
621substantially the same relief could be granted by invoking the
622Court's inherent jurisdiction under section 151 CPC. Thus,
623while denying the applicability of section 10 to stay a suit in
624Bangladesh in aid of a foreign-seated arbitration, the judgment
625permitted the Court to achieve the very same result through its
626inherent powers. If Parliament, as understood in Accom, did not
627intend section 10 to apply to foreign-seated arbitrations, it is
628difficult to appreciate how the identical relief could
629nevertheless be granted under the general provisions of CPC. 49. Such an approach raises a fundamental question of statutory
630interpretation. It is well settled that where Parliament has
631enacted a special statute governing a particular subject, the
632rights and remedies of the parties are to be determined within
633the framework of that statute. The inherent jurisdiction
634preserved by section 151 CPC is intended to supplement the
635law where no specific provision exists; it cannot ordinarily be
636invoked to circumvent, enlarge or achieve indirectly what the
637special statute is taken to prohibit directly. If the territorial
638limitation contained in section 3 excludes the operation of
639section 10, there appears to be no principled basis for avoiding
640that limitation by resorting to section 151. Conversely, if a suit
641may lawfully be stayed under section 151 in aid of a foreign-
642seated arbitration, it becomes difficult to explain why the same
643relief cannot be granted under section 10 itself, the very
644provision enacted by Parliament for that purpose.
64550. The pronouncements of the Appellate Division in ECOM has
646recognised the applicability of section 10 to foreign-seated
647arbitrations and has held that Unicol stands pro tanto
648overruled. In that light, the necessity of resorting to section 151
649disappears altogether. Where Parliament has provided a specific
650statutory mechanism, recourse to the Court's inherent
651jurisdiction should ordinarily be unnecessary. For these reasons,
652this Court is of the respectful view that the reliance placed in
653Accom upon section 151 introduces a doctrinal tension into its
654reasoning which, in the interests of coherence and certainty in
655the law, may merit authoritative reconsideration by a higher
656forum.
657IX. Recent Development in the Italian-Thai Case 51. Moreover, recent development in the Italian-Thai case (Civil
658Petition for Leave to Appeal No. 1828 of 2024, judgment dated
65901.09.2024) is also of considerable significance. Following the
660decision in Accom, the High Court Division dismissed another
661application under section 7A on the ground that the provision
662was inapplicable to a foreign-seated arbitration. However, when
663the matter came before the Appellate Division by way of Civil
664Petition for Leave to Appeal, the Appellate Division continued
665interim protection until the first session of the arbitral tribunal
666in Singapore. In this case, although our Appellate Division did
667not finally determine the scope of section 7A, nonetheless the
668petition was not dismissed on the basis that the High Court
669Division had correctly interpreted section 7A. Finally, it
670disposed of the matter as having become infructuous after the
671arbitral tribunal in Singapore had assumed jurisdiction in terms
672of section 7A(6). The Appellate Division thus consciously
refrained from expressing any opinion on the correctness of the
673interpretation adopted by the High Court Division.
674Consequently, the question whether section 7A is available in
675aid of a foreign-seated arbitration remains open and has yet to
676be authoritatively determined by a reasoned pronouncement of
677the Appellate Division.
678This Court's Respectful View 52. With the utmost respect to the majority decision in Accom, this
679Court finds itself, with great humility, unable to subscribe to the
680reasoning adopted therein. This court is of the considered
681view that sections 7, 7A and 10 of the Arbitration Act, 2001
682are capable of operating in aid of arbitral proceedings even
683where the juridical seat of arbitration is outside
684Bangladesh. Those provisions, properly construed, are
685intended to facilitate and support the arbitral process by
686conferring limited judicial assistance, rather than to exercise
687supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings
688themselves. 53. Viewed from that perspective, the invocation of section 151
689CPC, as in Accom, in lieu of section 10 of the Arbitration Act,
6902001 appears, with respect, to be neither necessary nor
691warranted. Where Parliament has provided a specific statutory
692mechanism under section 10 for the grant of the relief in
693question, recourse to the Court's inherent jurisdiction would
694ordinarily be inappropriate.
695Binding Effect of the Larger Bench Decision 54. The foregoing discussion demonstrates that substantial
696questions have arisen regarding the proper interpretation of
sections 3, 7A and 10 of the Arbitration Act, 2001, particularly
697in light of the subsequent decisions of the Appellate Division in
698the ECOM cases and the judicial approach reflected in the
699Italian-Thaicase. Those authorities appear to recognise that
700supportive judicial intervention in aid of arbitration is
701conceptually distinct from supervisory jurisdiction over arbitral
702proceedings and later enforcement and that such intervention
703may, in appropriate circumstances, coexist with the principle
704that supervisory jurisdiction ordinarily follows the arbitral seat. 55. This Court has also found considerable force in the petitioner's
705submission that section 7A creates a limited protective
706jurisdiction directed towards preserving the efficacy of
707arbitration and not towards supervising the arbitral process.
708Equally persuasive is the submission that a harmonious reading
709of the Arbitration Act, 2001, viewed in the light of its
710legislative history, Preamble and statutory scheme, may
711reasonably admit of an interpretation whereby interim measures
712under section 7A are available in aid of foreign-seated
713arbitrations in respect of persons or property situated within
714Bangladesh.
715The Decision and Order 56. However, the fact that Accom did not consider ECOM does not
716authorise this Court to disregard the decision of the Larger
717Bench. The doctrine of precedent is founded not only upon the
718correctness of legal reasoning but also upon the necessity of
719maintaining certainty, consistency and institutional discipline in
720the administration of justice. Although this Court has, with
721utmost respect, expressed its reservations regarding certain
722aspects of the reasoning adopted by the majority in Accom, it is
not open to a Single Bench to disregard or decline to follow a
binding decision of a Larger Bench of the High Court Division
on that ground alone. Whether Accom continues to represent the
correct interpretation of sections 7A and 10, is a matter which
can be authoritatively reconsidered only by the Appellate
Division or by a Bench of co-equal or larger strength.
57. Accordingly, in faithful observance of the doctrine of stare
decisis and the settled principles of judicial discipline
governing Benches of coordinate jurisdiction, this Court
remains bound by the majority decision in Accom Travels and
Tours v. Oman Air SAOC. Since the arbitration agreement in
the present case designates Singapore as the juridical seat of
arbitration, the binding ratio laid down in Accom precludes the
exercise of jurisdiction under section 7A of the Act, 2001.
58. Consequently, the present application is not maintainable. It is,
therefore, dismissed, without entering into the merits of the
controversy and without prejudice to the petitioner's right to
pursue such remedy as may be available before the competent
arbitral tribunal or any other forum in accordance with law.
59. The interim order passed earlier is hereby recalled and vacated.
However, there shall be no order as to cost.
(Justice Md. Toufiq Inam)
723Ashraf/ABO.
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