Supreme Court Judgments, Summarised

by Barrister Tahmidur Rahman | Nov 3, 2026

Summary

The pre-emptor, claiming as a co-sharer, filed a case in 1996 under section 96 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950 to pre-empt a transfer of land by his brother to pre-emptee No. 1 by a deed dated 17.02.1987. He said he first learnt of the transfer from a tenant on 05.11.1996, obtained a certified copy of the deed on 11.11.1996 and filed on 20.11.1996. The Assistant Judge, Chowgachha, Jashore allowed pre-emption on 31.10.2022, but the Additional District Judge, 5th Court, Jashore held the case time-barred on 27.04.2025. In revision, the High Court Division found that the appellate court had not controverted the trial court's reasons, had not independently assessed the evidence and had relied on a distinguishable Appellate Division decision. The pre-emptor had proved his date of knowledge, no section 89 notice had been served, and mutation without notice was not a proper separation under section 117. The Rule was made absolute and the trial court's order restored.

Issues

  1. Whether a pre-emption case filed more than nine years after the transfer was barred by limitation where no notice under section 89 had been served and the pre-emptor proved his date of knowledge.
  2. Whether the appellate court could reverse the trial court's findings without controverting its reasons or independently reassessing the evidence.
  3. Whether an R.S. record or mutation in the pre-emptee's name defeated the pre-emptor's claim as a co-sharer.
Key points

  • Where no notice under section 89 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950 has been served, the period for filing a pre-emption case is reckoned from the pre-emptor's knowledge of the transfer, and the pre-emptor here discharged his initial burden by cogent and reliable evidence that he filed within time.
  • Knowledge of a transfer may be of two kinds: initial knowledge derived from a named person, and confirmed knowledge derived from obtaining the certified copy of the deed.
  • An appellate court that reverses the trial court without controverting its reasons, without independently reassessing the evidence and by relying on a factually distinguishable decision commits an error warranting interference in revision.
  • Separation of a khatian by mutation without serving notice on the co-sharer, in view of section 117 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950, is not a proper separation in the eye of law.
  • An R.S. record prepared and published in the opposite party's name while a pre-emption case is pending does not, if that case ends unsuccessfully, confer legal entitlement on that party.
  • In revision under section 115(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure the Court does not reappraise evidence merely because another view is possible, but may interfere where reversing findings rest on misreading or non-consideration of material evidence or an error of law causing failure of justice.

I am of the view that the R.S. record prepared and published in the opposite party's name while a pre-emption case is pending does not, if that case ends unsuccessfully, confer legal entitlement on that party.

From the judgment, Justice Abdur Rahman
Law considered

State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950, section 96State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950, section 89State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950, section 117Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, section 115(1)

Call the Dhaka office+880 1708 000660WhatsApp · message usMessage our team
Message TRW on WhatsApp