High Court Division · Statutory Original Jurisdiction
SVC Jhilmil Residential BD Limited v Rajdhani Unnayan Kartipakkha (RAJUK) and others
Arbitration Application 7/2026 · Decided 12 July 2026
SVC Jhilmil Residential BD Limited, the project company for a public-private partnership housing project at Jhilmil, Dhaka, applied under section 7A of the Arbitration Act, 2001 to restrain RAJUK from terminating the PPP Contract and encashing a Tk. 1,000,000,000 performance bank guarantee pending arbitration seated in Singapore. The Attorney General objected that the Larger Bench in Accom Travels and Tours v Oman Air SAOC, 27 BLC 596, had held sections 7, 7A and 10 inapplicable to foreign-seated arbitrations except at the enforcement stage. Examining the non-obstante clause in section 7A, its reference to section 45 and the distinction between supervisory and supportive jurisdiction, the court expressed the view that these provisions can operate in aid of foreign-seated arbitrations, that Accom had overlooked the Appellate Division's ECOM decisions holding Unicol pro tanto overruled, and that Accom's resort to section 151 CPC was unnecessary. Nevertheless, a Single Bench cannot disregard a binding Larger Bench decision, so the application was rejected in limine without entering into the merits.
Application rejected in limine as not maintainable
- Q1
Whether an application for interim measures under section 7A of the Arbitration Act, 2001 is maintainable where the juridical seat of arbitration is outside Bangladesh.
- Q2
Whether a Single Bench may decline to follow the Larger Bench decision in Accom Travels and Tours v Oman Air SAOC because it did not consider binding Appellate Division authority.
- Section 7A of the Arbitration Act, 2001 confers a limited, ancillary and protective jurisdiction that supports arbitration and is distinct from the supervisory jurisdiction that ordinarily follows the juridical seat.
- In the court's view, section 3 defines the general territorial application of the Act, and the express reference in section 7A to enforcement under section 45 indicates that interim measures may be available in aid of foreign-seated arbitrations for persons or property in Bangladesh.
- The majority in Accom did not consider the Appellate Division's decisions in Mosharaf Composite Textile Mills Ltd v ECOM Agroindustrial Corp Ltd, which held Unicol pro tanto overruled, and its resort to section 151 CPC in place of section 10 appeared neither necessary nor warranted.
- A Single Bench cannot disregard or decline to follow a binding decision of a Larger Bench of the High Court Division, which can be reconsidered only by the Appellate Division or a Bench of co-equal or larger strength.
- Being bound by Accom, and the arbitration being seated in Singapore, the court held the section 7A application not maintainable and rejected it without prejudice to any other remedy.
it is not open to a Single Bench to disregard or decline to follow a binding decision of a Larger Bench of the High Court Division on that ground alone.
In the court’s own words.
Arbitration Application 7/2026, as published by the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. 31 pages, with paragraph numbers for citing.
1IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BANGLADESH
2HIGH COURT DIVISION (STATUTORY ORIGINAL JURISDICTION)
Present:
3Mr. Justice Md. Toufiq Inam
4Arbitration Application No. 07 of 2026.
5An application under Section 7A of the Arbitration
6Act, 2001.
And
7IN THE MATTER OF:
8SVC Jhilmil Residential BD Limited
…….Petitioner.
-Versus-
9Rajdhani Unnayan Kartipakkha (RAJUK),
10represented by its Chairman, RAJUK Bhaban,
11RAJUK Avenue, Dhaka 1000 and others.
12…….. Respondents.
13Mr. Masood R. Sobhan, Senior Advocate with
14Mr.Sheikh Mohammad Morshed, Senior Advocate
15with
16Mr. Md. Kamal Hossain Mehazi,
17Mr. Md. Fuad Hassan Khan, and
18Ms. Jennifer Mymoon Billah,
19Ms. Jusmin Sultana,
20Md. Shahadat Hossain, Advocates
21………For the petitioner.
22Mr. Md. Ruhul Quddus Kazal, Attorney General,
23with
24Mr. Mohammad Arshadur Rouf, Additional
25Attorney General, with
26Mr. Omar Sadat, Senior Advocate
………. For the Respondent No. 1.
The 12th July 2026.
27Md. Toufiq Inam, J. 1. By this application under section 7A of the Arbitration Act,
282001 (“the Act 2001), the petitioner seeks, inter alia, admission
29of the application and interim measures restraining the
30respondent from terminating the contract and from encashing
31the bank guarantee pending arbitration.
32The Background Facts 2. The petitioner is a project company incorporated for
33implementation of the project titled "Construction of High-Rise
34Residential Apartment Buildings for Low and Middle-Income
35Groups at Jhilmil Residential Project, Dhaka" under a Public-
36Private Partnership (PPP) arrangement. According to the
37petitioner, it is substantially owned and controlled by foreign
38entities, namely BNG Global Holdings SDN BHD, Malaysia
39and Jiangxi Construction Engineering (Group) Corporation
40Ltd., China, and the dispute accordingly constitutes an
41international commercial arbitration within the meaning of
42section 2(c)(iii) of the Act, 2001. 3. Pursuant to an Invitation for Bid dated 25.01.2017 issued by
43Rajdhani Unnayan Kartripakkha (RAJUK) under the Public
44Procurement Guidelines for PPP Projects, 2016, the bid
45submitted by the petitioner's major shareholder was accepted
46and a Letter of Award was issued on 14.10.2017. Thereafter, on
4716.11.2017, the parties executed the PPP Contract for
48implementation of the project.The petitioner contends that,
49under the PPP Contract, the performance bank guarantee was to
become operative from the "Appointed Date", that is, the date
50on which all conditions precedent were fulfilled or waived.
51Although the petitioner fulfilled its contractual obligations and
52satisfied the conditions precedent on its part, the respondent
53allegedly failed to perform its reciprocal obligations, including
54the appointment of the Independent Panel, with the result that
55the Appointed Date never occurred. Nevertheless, at the
56insistence of the respondent, the petitioner furnished the
57aforesaid bank guarantee on 22.07.2018 for Tk.1,000,000,000/-,
58which has since been periodically extended and presently
59remains valid until 21.07.2026. 4. According to the petitioner, it invested substantial foreign
60equity in the project and completed various preparatory works,
61including soil investigations, sub-structural and architectural
62designs, and other site development activities. The
63implementation of the project, however, was delayed due to the
64COVID-19 pandemic and disputes subsequently arose
65regarding the parties' respective obligations under the PPP
66Contract. While the petitioner was requesting the respondent to
67proceed with implementation of the project and appoint the
68Independent Panel, the respondent, by notice dated 18.02.2024,
69alleged non-fulfilment of the conditions precedent. The
70petitioner denied those allegations, asserting that it was the
71respondent who had failed to discharge its contractual
72obligations. Thereafter, by letter dated 29.01.2025, the
73respondent informed the petitioner that no decision could be
74taken as the matter had become sub judice because of the
75pendency of Writ Petition No. 13170 of 2024.
765. The petitioner further alleges that it has recently learnt from
77reliable sources that the respondent is contemplating
78encashment of the bank guarantee without lawful authority and
79without prior notice. Clause 31.3.1 of the PPP Contract
80provides that all disputes arising out of or in connection with
81the contract shall be resolved by arbitration under the Act,
822001, while clause 31.3.2 designates Singapore as the juridical
83seat of arbitration. In pursuance of the arbitration agreement,
84the petitioner appointed its nominee arbitrator on 15.04.2026
85and initiated the arbitral process. Pending constitution of the
86arbitral tribunal and the arbitral proceedings, the petitioner has
87invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under section 7A of the
88Arbitration Act, 2001 seeking interim protection against
89encashment of the bank guarantee.
90Threshold Question 6. Atthe very threshold, Mr. Md. Ruhul Quddus Kazal, learned
91Attorney General appearing for RAJUK- respondent No. 1,
92raises a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the
93present application. He submits that the issue is no longer res
94integra in view of the majority decision of the Larger Bench in
95Accom Travels and Tours v. Oman Air SAOC, reported in 27
96BLC 596, wherein it was held that sections 7, 7A and 10 of the
97Act, 2001 are inapplicable to foreign-seated arbitrations, except
98that interim measures under section 7A may be granted only at
99the stage of enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. Since the
100arbitration agreement in the present case designates Singapore
101as the juridical seat of arbitration, the learned Attorney General
102contends that the present application under section 7A is not
maintainable and that the said decision of the Larger Bench is
103binding upon this Court. 7. He further submits that, even otherwise, the petitioner is not
104entitled to any interim protection as the prima facie case and
105balance of convenience and inconvenience does not lie in its
106favour. According to him, the petitioner is merely a sham or
107special-purpose company having no substantial assets or
108independent financial standing, whereas the performance bank
109guarantee was furnished to secure the petitioner's contractual
110obligations under the PPP Contract. He argues that any restraint
111upon its encashment would seriously prejudice the public
112interest and the implementation of the project, while no
113irreparable loss would be caused to the petitioner if the
114contractual mechanism is allowed to operate in accordance with
115its terms.
116Petitioner’s Standpoints 8. In reply, Mr. Masood R. Sobhan and Mr. Sheikh Mohammad
117Morshed, learned Senior Advocates appearing for the petitioner,
118submit that the majority decision of the Larger Bench in Accom
119is contrary to the legislative object underlying the Arbitration
120Act, 2001. He contends that, by introducing section 7A through
121the Amendment Act of 19.02.2004, the Legislature consciously
122empowered the Court to grant interim measures before or
123during arbitral proceedings or until enforcement of the award.
124According to the learned Senior Advocate, section 7A confers
125only a limited ancillary and protective jurisdiction to preserve
126the subject matter of the dispute and does not amount to the
127exercise of supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitral
proceedings. He therefore argues that an application under
128section 7A is maintainable notwithstanding that the parties have
129chosen a foreign seat of arbitration, and that the contrary view
130adopted by the Larger Bench, confining the operation of section
1317A to domestically seated arbitrations (except at the stage of
132enforcement of a foreign award), is founded upon an erroneous
133interpretation of the legislative scheme of the Act. 9. They submit that the majority decision of the Larger Bench in
134Accom no longer represents the prevailing law, having been
135rendered per incuriam. He contends that the Larger Bench
136reached its conclusion without considering the binding
137decisions of the Appellate Division in Mosharaf Composite
138Textile Mills Ltd. v. ECOM Agroindustrial Corp. Ltd., reported
139in 4 SCOB (2015) AD 28, and the subsequent judgment dated
14011.07.2017 passed in Civil Review Petition No. 213 of 2015. In
141the review judgment, the Appellate Division expressly held that
142Unicol Bangladesh Ltd. v. Maxwell Engineering Works Ltd., 56
143DLR (AD) 166, stood pro tanto overruled. Since the majority
144decision in Accom was founded substantially upon Unicol
145without noticing or considering the binding pronouncements in
146ECOM, the very jurisprudential foundation of the decision,
147according to the learned Senior Advocate, stands displaced. He
148therefore submits that Accom was rendered per incuriam, no
149longer represents the prevailing law on the subject, and
150consequently does not bind this Court. 10. It is submitted that the decisions of the Appellate Division in
151ECOM recognise that the choice of a foreign arbitral seat does
152not, by itself, exclude the jurisdiction of the courts of
153Bangladesh to render judicial assistance under the Arbitration
Act, 2001. In support of this proposition, he also relies upon
154Crown Maritime Co. Ltd. v. Royal Boskalis Westminster NV, 16
155BLC 140, wherein this Court held that section 7A may be
156invoked in aid of a foreign-seated arbitration for preservation of
157assets situated within Bangladesh. He further contends that
158modern international arbitration jurisprudence recognises the
159jurisdiction of national courts to grant interim protective
160measures in support of foreign-seated arbitrations where the
161assets or property requiring protection are located within the
162forum State. He also refers to the proceedings before the
163Appellate Division in Italian Thai Development Public
164Company Limited v. The Export-Import Bank of India (Civil
165Petition for Leave to Appeal No. 1828 of 2024, judgment dated
16601.09.2024), wherein interim protection was continued until the
167first sitting of the arbitral tribunal in Singapore. According to
168him, although the Appellate Division did not finally determine
169the scope of section 7A, it did not affirm the restrictive
170interpretation adopted by the High Court Division, thereby
171leaving the question open for determination in an appropriate
172case. On these grounds, he submits that this Court possesses
173jurisdiction under section 7A to grant interim protection in aid
174of the foreign-seated arbitration and accordingly prays for
175allowing the application. 11. On the merits, the learned Senior Advocates submit that the
176petitioner has already invested substantial foreign capital in
177implementation of the project and that serious disputes have
178arisen regarding fulfilment of the conditions precedent,
179appointment of the Independent Panel, reciprocal contractual
180obligations of the parties, and the delay occasioned by
supervening events, including the COVID-19 pandemic.
181According to them, the petitioner has raised substantial and
182bona fide issues as to whether the contractual obligations,
183including the bank guarantee, ever became operative in the
184absence of the "Appointed Date" and whether the respondent's
185own failure to perform its reciprocal obligations prevented the
186occurrence of that event. They further submit that, in
187accordance with the arbitration agreement, the petitioner has
188already appointed its nominee arbitrator on 15.04.2026 and
189initiated the arbitral process. The relief sought from this Court
190is, therefore, of a limited and temporary nature. The petitioner
191does not seek adjudication of the parties' contractual rights or
192interference with the merits of the dispute. It merely seeks
193preservation of the status quo by restraining encashment of the
194bank guarantee until the arbitral tribunal at the agreed foreign
195seat is constituted and assumes jurisdiction, whereupon it may
196seek appropriate interim measures from the tribunal itself.
197Respondent’s Contentions 12. Mr. Mohammad Arshadur Rouf, learned Additional Attorney
198General and Mr.Omar Sadat, learned Senior Advocate
199appearing for the respondent No1, oppose the application and
200submit that Article 25 of the agreement expressly empowers the
201respondent to terminate the contract upon the occurrence of the
202defaults specified therein. An order restraining termination
203would, in effect, prevent the respondent from exercising a
204contractual right expressly reserved under the agreement.
205Granting such relief would amount to rewriting the contract and
206prejudging the merits of the dispute.
20713. They further argue that similarly a bank guarantee constitutes
208an independent and autonomous contract between the issuing
209bank and the beneficiary. Courts should not interfere with its
210invocation except in exceptional cases of established fraud of
211an egregious nature vitiating the underlying transaction or
212where encashment would result in irretrievable injustice. Mere
213disputes that have arisen under the principal contract do not
214furnish a valid ground to restrain encashment. 14. They also submit that the choice of a foreign seat carries with it
215the consequence that supervisory jurisdiction vests exclusively
216in the courts of the seat, and permitting recourse to section 7A
217would impermissibly extend the territorial operation of the
218Arbitration Act beyond the limits prescribed by section 3. They,
219therefore, pray that the application be rejected.
220Discussion and Reasoning 15. As the preliminary objection goes to the very root of the
221maintainability of the present application and centres upon the
222correctness, scope and applicability of the Larger Bench
223decision in Accom, it is necessary to notice the principles laid
224down therein. By a majority of 2:1, the Larger Bench held that
225by virtue of sections 3(1) and 3(2) of the Arbitration Act, 2001,
226the provisions of the Act, other than sections 45, 46 and 47, are
227inapplicable where the seat of arbitration is outside Bangladesh.
228Consequently, sections 7, 7A and 10 have no application to
229foreign-seated arbitrations, except that interim measures under
230section 7A may be granted only at the stage of enforcement of a
231foreign arbitral award. Nevertheless, despite the inapplicability
232of section 10, the civil court ought to have stayed the suit in the
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under section 151of the
233Code of Civil Procedure (“CPC”), and referred the parties to
234arbitration in accordance with their arbitration agreement. 16. The principal question that falls for determination is whether an
235application under section 7A of the Act, 2001 is maintainable
236where the parties have agreed to a foreign seat of arbitration.
237The resolution of this question depends upon the proper
238construction of section 7A read together with the scheme,
239object and legislative purpose of the Act, 2001. It is well settled
240that a statutory provision must not be construed in isolation.
241Every provision is to be interpreted in the context of the statute
242as a whole so that each part is given meaningful effect and the
243legislative purpose is advanced rather than defeated. 17. Having heard the learned Advocates for the parties and
244considered the decisions cited by the parties, together with the
245subsequent development in the Appellate Division, this Court
246considers it appropriate to examine the issues under the
247following heads before expressing its views.
248I. Effect of the Non-Obstante Clauses in Sections 7 and 7A 18. By the Arbitration (Amendment) Act, 2004 (Act No. II of
2492004), which came into force on 19.02.2004, Parliament
250inserted section 7A into the Arbitration Act, 2001, thereby
251creating an independent statutory jurisdiction in the High Court
252Division to grant interim measures. Section 7A was inserted in
253the Act 2001 on 19.02.2004 as-
"[7K| (1) aviv 7-G hvnv wKQyB _vKzKbv †Kb, c¶MY wfbœ fv‡e m¤§Z
254nB‡j, †Kvb c‡¶i Av‡e`‡bi †cªw¶‡Z mvwjmx Kvh©aviv PjvKvjxb wKsev
255Zrc~‡e© A_ev aviv 44 ev 45 Gi Aaxb mvwjmx †iv‡q`v` Kvh©aviv
256PjvKvjxb wKsev Zrc~‡e© A_ev aviv 44 ev 45 Gi Aaxb mvwjmx †iv‡q`v`
257Kvh©Ki bvnIqv ch©¿¹ Av¿¹R©vwZK evwYwR¨K mvwj‡mi †¶‡Î nvB‡KvU© wefvM
258Ges Ab¨vb¨ mvwj‡mi †¶‡Î Av`vjZ ¢ejÀh¢ZÑa wel‡q Av‡`k cª`vb Kwi‡Z
259cvwi‡e, h_vt-
260…………………………………………………………………………………." 19. The non-obstante clauses employed in sections 7 and 7A are
261materially different and must be given their due significance.
262Section 7 opens with the words, "Notwithstanding anything
263contained in any other law for the time being in force,"
264thereby giving the Arbitration Act, 2001 overriding effect over
265all other laws governing judicial proceedings. Section 7A,
266however, does not override "any other law"; instead, it begins
267with the words, "Notwithstanding anything contained in
268section 7." By specifically overriding section 7 itself,
269Parliament created an express exception to the general
270jurisdictional scheme contained in that provision. 20. The legislative intent is therefore clear. While section 7
271embodies the general principle of limited judicial intervention
272in matters covered by an arbitration agreement, section 7A
273preserves a distinct and independent jurisdiction of the High
274Court Division to grant interim protective measures. Had
275Parliament intended section 7A to be controlled entirely by
276section 7, there was no necessity to commence the provision
277with an “overriding clause.” The opening words of section 7A
278indicate that the jurisdiction conferred therein is exceptional
and self-contained, enabling the Court to grant interim relief in
279aid of arbitration notwithstanding the general limitations
280contained in section 7. Any interpretation that renders the non-
281obstante clause in section 7A redundant would be contrary to
282the settled principle that every word employed by the
283legislature must, so far as possible, be given meaning and
284effect.
285II. Legislative Intent Behind the Introduction of Section 7A 21. The language of section 7A clearly demonstrates that
286Parliament intended to create a jurisdiction distinct from the
287Court's supervisory powers over arbitration. The provision
288begins with a non-obstante clause and authorises the High
289Court Division to grant interim measures "before or during
290continuance of the proceedings or until enforcement of the
291award under section 44 or 45." Read as a whole, section 7A
292confers a continuous protective jurisdiction extending from the
293period before the commencement of arbitral proceedings,
294throughout the arbitration, and continuing until the award is
295enforced. The reference to section 45 is particularly significant,
296for that provision deals exclusively with the recognition and
297enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Parliament therefore
298expressly contemplated that interim protection may be required
299in Bangladesh even where the arbitration is seated abroad. 22. The nature of the jurisdiction conferred by section 7A is equally
300significant. Unlike sections 12, 15 and 16 of the Act, which
301empower the Court to appoint, remove or substitute arbitrators
302and thereby exercise supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitral
303process, section 7A neither authorises the Court to regulate the
conduct of arbitration nor to determine the merits of the dispute.
304Its function is purely ancillary and protective. It enables the
305Court to preserve the subject matter of the dispute, maintain the
306status quo, secure assets and prevent irreparable prejudice until
307the arbitral tribunal is constituted, or, if already constituted, is in
308a position to grant appropriate relief. In exercising jurisdiction
309under section 7A, the Court neither supplants the arbitral
310tribunal nor assumes control over the arbitration; it merely
311safeguards the efficacy of the arbitral process. 23. This reflects the well-recognised distinction between
312supervisory jurisdiction and supportive jurisdiction in
313modern arbitration law. Supervisory jurisdiction concerns
314matters such as the constitution of the tribunal, challenges to its
315jurisdiction, procedural supervision and the setting aside of
316awards, and ordinarily belongs to the courts of the juridical
317seat. Supportive jurisdiction, by contrast, assists the arbitral
318process by preserving assets, maintaining the status quo or
319securing evidence without interfering with the tribunal's
320authority or adjudicating the parties' substantive rights. Section
3217A embodies this latter jurisdiction. It is designed to ensure that
322the arbitral proceedings, and the eventual award, are not
323rendered ineffective by the dissipation of assets or alteration of
324the status quo. 24. The practical purpose of section 7A reinforces this
325interpretation. In a foreign-seated arbitration, the need for
326interim protection may arise before the arbitral tribunal is
327constituted, during the arbitral proceedings, or after the award
328has been rendered but before it is recognised and enforced in
Bangladesh under section 45. During any of these stages, assets
329situated within Bangladesh may be dissipated or transferred,
330thereby frustrating the enforcement of the eventual foreign
331award. By empowering the High Court Division to grant
332interim measures until enforcement under section 45,
333Parliament ensured that effective judicial assistance remains
334available throughout the life cycle of the arbitral process
335without conferring supervisory control over the foreign
336arbitration itself.
337III. The Significance of the Preamble of the Act, 2001 25. The object of section 7A becomes clearer when it is read in the
338light of the Preamble to the Arbitration Act, 2001. Unlike the
339repealed Arbitration Act, 1940, which was enacted merely to
340consolidate and amend the law relating to arbitration in
341Bangladesh, the 2001 Act has a much wider legislative purpose.
342Its Preamble states that the Act is intended to consolidate and
343amend the law relating to domestic arbitration, international
344commercial arbitration, the recognition and enforcement of
345foreign arbitral awards, and matters connected therewith. Thus,
346Parliament deliberately expanded the scope of the legislation
347beyond domestic arbitrations to embrace international
348commercial arbitration and the enforcement of foreign awards.
349The expression "and matters connected therewith" further
350indicates that the Act was intended not only to regulate arbitral
351proceedings seated in Bangladesh but also to provide judicial
352assistance wherever necessary to ensure that arbitration remains
353an effective dispute resolution mechanism.
35426. This legislative shift is reflected in section 7A. Unlike the 1940
355Act, which was based upon extensive judicial supervision of
356arbitration, the 2001 Act adopts the modern approach of limited
357judicial intervention coupled with judicial support. Section 7A
358does not confer supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitral
359proceedings. Its purpose is to enable the Court to preserve the
360subject matter of the dispute, protect the rights of the parties
361and ensure that the arbitral process is not rendered ineffective
362before the tribunal can act or before the award is enforced.
363Interpreting section 7A as a provision intended to support,
364rather than supervise, arbitration is therefore consistent not only
365with the language of the section itself but also with the broader
366legislative objective reflected in the Preamble of the Arbitration
367Act, 2001.
368IV. Whether Section 3 Excludes the Operation of Section 7A 27. The principal question is whether section 3 of the Arbitration
369Act, 2001 excludes the operation of section 7A where the
370juridical seat of arbitration is outside Bangladesh. Section 3
371undoubtedly prescribes the general territorial application of the
372Act by providing that it applies where the place of arbitration is
373in Bangladesh, subject to the exceptions contained in sub-
374section (2). However, section 3 cannot be construed in isolation.
375It must be read harmoniously with the substantive provisions of
376the Act so that each provision is given its intended operation. It
377is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that a general
378provision should not be construed so as to defeat or render
379ineffective a later and more specific provision enacted by
380Parliament.
38128. Properly construed, section 3 does not itself confer or withdraw
382judicial jurisdiction. Rather, it defines the territorial reach of the
383Act. The Court's jurisdiction is conferred by the substantive
384provisions of the Act, including sections 7A, 10, 12, 15, 16, 42,
38545 and 46. The question, therefore, is not what section 3 says in
386isolation, but how it is to be reconciled with the specific
387jurisdiction created by section 7A. 29. If section 3 were interpreted as absolutely excluding the
388operation of section 7A whenever the arbitration is seated
389outside Bangladesh, the express words employed by Parliament
390in section 7A—"ধারা৪৪বা৪৫এরঅধীনসালিসীররারেদাদকার্করনাহওোর্
য ন্ত"
য
391("until enforcement of the award under section 44 or 45")—
392would be deprived of any practical effect. Section 45 deals
393exclusively with the recognition and enforcement of foreign
394arbitral awards. Parliament could not have expressly referred to
395section 45 if it intended section 7A to remain wholly
396inapplicable throughout the life of a foreign-seated arbitration.
397Such a construction would render the reference to section 45
398largely redundant, contrary to the settled principle that every
399word employed by Parliament must, so far as possible, be given
400meaning and effect. 30. In the respectful view of this Court, the more harmonious
401reconciliation of the two provisions is that section 3 lays down
402the general territorial application of the Act, whereas section 7A
403creates a limited and independent protective jurisdiction of the
404High Court Division. That jurisdiction extends to three stages of
405the arbitral process, namely: (i) before the commencement of
arbitral proceedings; (ii) during the pendency of the arbitral
406proceedings; and (iii) after the award has been made until its
407enforcement, including the enforcement of a foreign arbitral
408award under section 45. In exercising jurisdiction under section
4097A, the High Court Division neither supervises nor interferes
410with the foreign arbitral proceedings. Its role is confined to
411preserving the subject matter of the dispute and maintaining the
412efficacy of the arbitral process so that the eventual award is not
413rendered nugatory by the dissipation of assets or alteration of
414the status quo. 31. This interpretation is reinforced by the nature of the jurisdiction
415conferred under different provisions of the Act. Supervisory
416jurisdiction under sections 12, 15 and 16 naturally follows the
417juridical seat because those provisions regulate the arbitral
418process itself. Enforcement jurisdiction under sections 42 to 46
419depends upon whether the award is domestic or foreign. Section
4207A, however, serves a fundamentally different legislative
421purpose. It confers a supportive jurisdiction designed to
422preserve property or rights within Bangladesh so that the
423arbitral proceedings, wherever seated, are not frustrated. The
424location of the arbitration determines supervisory control; it
425does not necessarily preclude judicial assistance directed solely
426towards preserving the efficacy of the arbitral process.
427V. Legislative Intent and Harmonious Construction of the Act 32. Having considered the rival submissions and the authorities
428cited at the parties, this Court is of the view that the controversy
cannot be resolved by reading section 3 in isolation. The Act,
4292001 must be construed as a coherent and integrated legislative
430scheme in which every provision is given its proper meaning
431and effect. It is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that
432a statute should be read as a whole and that no provision should
433be construed in a manner that renders another provision
434redundant, ineffective or devoid of practical operation. 33. The legislative object of the Act is reflected in its Preamble,
435which declares that it was enacted to consolidate and amend the
436law relating to domestic arbitration, international commercial
437arbitration, the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral
438awards and matters connected therewith. Unlike the repealed
439Arbitration Act, 1940, the 2001 Act was designed to regulate
440not merely domestic arbitration but the broader framework of
441international commercial arbitration. Although the Preamble
442cannot control the plain words of the statute, it remains an
443important aid in ascertaining legislative intent where two
444constructions are reasonably possible. 34. The legislative history of section 7A reinforces that purpose.
445The Arbitration Act, 2001, as originally enacted, contained no
446provision empowering the Court to grant interim measures.
447Parliament consciously introduced section 7A by the
448Amendment Act of 2004, thereby conferring upon the High
449Court Division a limited jurisdiction to preserve the subject
450matter of arbitration before the commencement of proceedings,
451during their continuance and until enforcement of the award.
452The evident object of the amendment was to ensure that arbitral
453proceedings are not frustrated by the dissipation of assets or
alteration of the status quo before effective relief becomes
454available. 35. The language employed in section 7A is itself a compelling
455indicator of that legislative intent. Parliament authorised the
456High Court Division to grant interim measures "before or
457during continuance of the proceedings or until enforcement
458of the award under section 44 or 45." The express reference
459to section 45 is of particular significance because that provision
460deals exclusively with the recognition and enforcement of
461foreign arbitral awards. If section 7A were wholly inapplicable
462whenever the arbitration is seated outside Bangladesh,
463Parliament's specific reference to section 45 would serve little
464practical purpose. Such a construction would offend the settled
465principle that every word employed by the legislature must, so
466far as possible, be given meaning and effect. 36. The structure of the Act further demonstrates that Parliament
467has deliberately conferred different kinds of jurisdiction upon
468the Court. Sections 12, 15 and 16 confer supervisory
469jurisdiction over the arbitral process itself. Sections 42 to 46
470regulate the recognition, enforcement and setting aside of
471arbitral awards. Section 7A, however, performs an altogether
472different function. It neither regulates the conduct of arbitration
473nor determines the merits of the dispute. Its purpose is confined
474to preserving assets, maintaining the status quo and protecting
475the efficacy of arbitration until the arbitral tribunal or the
476enforcing court is able to grant effective relief.
47737. Once this distinction between supervisory jurisdiction and
478supportive jurisdiction is appreciated, the relationship between
479sections 3 and 7A becomes considerably clearer. Section 3 lays
480down the general territorial application of the Act. It does not,
481by itself, create or extinguish the substantive jurisdictions
482conferred elsewhere in the statute. Whether a particular
483provision is governed by the territorial limitation in section 3
484necessarily depends upon the nature and purpose of the
485jurisdiction created by that provision. Supervisory powers
486ordinarily follow the juridical seat; supportive jurisdiction,
487however, may legitimately operate upon persons or property
488situated within Bangladesh without interfering with the foreign
489arbitral process. 38. This construction accords with the practical realities of
490international commercial arbitration. Commercial disputes
491frequently involve assets situated in jurisdictions other than the
492agreed arbitral seat. Unless the courts of the jurisdiction where
493those assets are located are able to grant temporary protective
494measures, the eventual award may become incapable of
495effective enforcement. An order under section 7A operates only
496upon persons or property within Bangladesh. It neither
497regulates the foreign arbitration, nor intrudes upon the tribunal's
498authority, nor determines any issue on the merits. It merely
499preserves the status quo until the arbitral tribunal is able to
500exercise its own jurisdiction or the award is enforced. 39. Accordingly, a harmonious construction of sections 3, 7A and
50145 leads to the conclusion that section 3 defines the general
502territorial application of the Act, whereas section 7A creates a
limited, ancillary and protective jurisdiction enabling the High
503Court Division to preserve the subject matter of the dispute
504until the arbitral award, including a foreign award enforceable
505under section 45, is recognised and enforced in Bangladesh.
506Such an interpretation gives meaningful effect to every
507provision of the Act, advances the legislative object underlying
508the 2001 Act and preserves the distinction between judicial
509assistance and supervisory jurisdiction recognised in modern
510international arbitration law.
511VI. The View in Accom and Its Restrictive Construction 40. Following Unicol, the jurisprudence of the High Court Division
512evolved along two distinct lines. One line of authority adopted a
513restrictive interpretation of the Arbitration Act, 2001 by treating
514Unicol as conclusively limiting the jurisdiction of the
515Bangladeshi courts in respect of foreign-seated arbitrations. In
516Uzbekistan Airways, the High Court Division, relying
517principally on Unicol, held that section 10 of the Act, 2001 was
518inapplicable where the seat of arbitration lay outside
519Bangladesh. The majority decision in Accom substantially
520followed the same approach. With profound respect, however,
521the majority appears to have accorded overriding significance to
522the territorial provision contained in section 3 of the Act
523without undertaking a separate examination of the language,
524purpose and legislative scheme of section 7A. The jurisdiction
525conferred by section 7A is neither supervisory nor
526interventionist. It does not regulate the conduct of the arbitral
527proceedings or interfere with the authority of the arbitral
528tribunal. Rather, it confers a limited and ancillary jurisdiction
529upon the High Court Division to preserve the subject matter of
the dispute so that the arbitral process and any eventual award
530are not rendered ineffective. Such protective jurisdiction is
531conceptually distinct from the supervisory jurisdiction
532exercised by the courts of the arbitral seat.
533VII. Effect of the Overlooked Binding Decision 41. The Larger Bench in Accom Travels and Tours v. Oman Air
534SAOC, by a majority of 2:1, held that sections 7, 7A and 10 of
535the Arbitration Act, 2001 are inapplicable to foreign-seated
536arbitrations, except that interim measures under section 7A may
537be granted at the stage of enforcement of a foreign arbitral
538award. In arriving at that conclusion, the majority relied
539principally upon Uzbekistan Airways, 10 BLC 614, Civil
540Petition No. 1112 of 2005 and, ultimately, Unicol Bangladesh
541Ltd. v. Maxwell Engineering Works Ltd., 56 DLR (AD) 166.
542However, the majority neither referred to nor considered the
543earlier binding decision of the Appellate Division in Mosharaf
544Composite Textile Mills Ltd. v. ECOM Agroindustrial Corp.
545Ltd., reported in 4 SCOB (2015) AD 28. In ECOM, by
546judgment dated 20.06.2015, the Appellate Division affirmed the
547stay of a suit instituted in Bangladesh so as to enable arbitration
548already pending in Liverpool to proceed in accordance with the
549parties' arbitration agreement. 42. The legal position was clarified even further when the Appellate
550Division, in ECOM, while dismissing Civil Review Petition
551No. 213 of 2015 by judgment dated 11.07.2017, expressly
552considered Unicol Bangladesh and observed:
553"The learned counsel has referred to a decision of this
554Court in Unicol Bangladesh Blocks Thirteen Vs Maxwell
555Engineering Works Ltd., 56 DLR (AD) 166 and submits
556that in that case similar question arose. … This Court did
557not deal with section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940,
558which is not in resemblance with section 10 of the present
559Ain. Moreover, this Court by a four-member Bench has
560maintained the judgment of the High Court Division
561staying the further proceedings of the suit on the
562reasoning that the parties should proceed with the
563arbitration proceedings. In view of the above, this Court
564has pro tanto overruled Unicol Bangladesh."
[Emphasis supplied by this Court]
56543. The expression "pro tanto overruled" signifies that an earlier
566decision is overruled only to the extent that it is inconsistent
567with the later decision and not in its entirety. Thus, by its
568review judgment in ECOM, the Appellate Division expressly
569displaced that part of Unicol Bangladesh Ltd. v. Maxwell
570Engineering Works Ltd., 56 DLR (AD) 166, which held that
571section 10 of the Arbitration Act, 2001 was inapplicable to
572foreign-seated arbitrations. The remaining principles laid down
573in Unicol, insofar as they are not inconsistent with ECOM,
574continue to retain their precedential value. 44. The significance of this development cannot be overstated.
575When the Larger Bench rendered its decision in Accom on
57612.12.2021, Unicol had already ceased, for more than four
577years, to be good law on the applicability of section 10 to
578foreign-seated arbitrations. Notwithstanding that position, the
majority substantially founded its reasoning upon Unicol
579without noticing either the Appellate Division's judgment in
580ECOM or its subsequent review judgment expressly holding
581that Unicol stood pro tanto overruled. Once the very
582proposition of law for which Unicol was relied upon had
583already been authoritatively displaced by the Appellate
584Division, its continued reliance as the principal foundation for
585interpreting section 10 became open to serious doubt. To that
586extent, the jurisprudential foundation of the majority's
587reasoning in Accom in relation to section 10 stood materially
588weakened. 45. The ratio of ECOM is clear and unequivocal. The Appellate
589Division upheld the application of section 10 of the Arbitration
590Act, 2001 to stay a suit instituted in Bangladesh in deference to
591arbitration proceedings already pending in Liverpool. In doing
592so, it did not treat the foreign set of arbitration as a bar to the
593exercise of judicial assistance under section 10. Nor did it
594consider section 3 or any other provision of the Arbitration Act
595as restricting the operation of section 10 merely because the
596arbitration was seated outside Bangladesh. The decision
597therefore necessarily rejects the proposition that section 10 is
598confined exclusively to domestic arbitrations. 46. The binding force of ECOM is beyond controversy. As
599observed by Mahmudul Islam in Constitutional Law of
600Bangladesh, a decision of the Appellate Division is binding
601under Article 111 of the Constitution when it "(a) decides a
602question of law, (b) is based on a principle of law, or (c)
603enunciates a principle of law." The interpretation placed by the
Appellate Division upon section 10 in ECOM is therefore a
604declaration of law binding upon all subordinate courts.
605Consequently, Unicol can no longer be cited as authority for the
606proposition that section 10 is inapplicable to foreign-seated
607arbitrations. 47. However, the omission to consider ECOM is significant
608because the majority judgment in Accom was founded
609substantially on Unicol Bangladesh, 56 DLR (AD) 166. The
610Larger Bench held that sections 7, 7A and 10 of the Arbitration
611Act, 2001 do not apply to foreign-seated arbitrations on the
612basis that section 3 confines the operation of Part I of the Act to
613arbitrations seated in Bangladesh. But before Accom was
614decided, the Appellate Division in ECOM had already upheld
615the application of section 10 to stay a suit in Bangladesh in
616favour of arbitration proceedings pending in Liverpool. This
617clearly shows that the existence of a foreign seat does not, by
618itself, exclude all forms of judicial intervention under the
619Arbitration Act. 48. The decisions in ECOM therefore represent an important
620development in the law. They demonstrate that the Arbitration
621Act, 2001 does not invariably make every form of judicial
622intervention dependent on the juridical seat of arbitration.
623Rather, they recognise that there is a distinction between the
624Court's supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitral process and its
625power to provide judicial assistance in support of arbitration.
626That distinction is directly relevant to the proper interpretation
627of section 7A. For this reason, the reasoning adopted in Accom
deserves reconsideration by a court of competent jurisdiction in
628an appropriate case.
629VIII. Applicability of Section 151 CPC in Place of Section 10 49. Another aspect of the majority decision in Accom which
630requires careful consideration is its conclusion that, although
631sections 7, 7A and 10 of the Act, 2001 were held to be
632inapplicable to foreign-seated arbitrations, the Court could
633nevertheless stay the suit by invoking its inherent jurisdiction
634under section 151 CPC and refer the parties to arbitration in
635accordance with their arbitration agreement. 50. With profound respect, the majority reasoning in Accom
636appears to contain an inherent inconsistency. Having held that
637section 10, the special statutory provision governing the stay of
638judicial proceedings in favour of arbitration, is inapplicable to
639foreign-seated arbitrations, the majority nevertheless held that
640substantially the same relief could be granted by invoking the
641Court's inherent jurisdiction under section 151 CPC. Thus,
642while denying the applicability of section 10 to stay a suit in
643Bangladesh in aid of a foreign-seated arbitration, the judgment
644permitted the Court to achieve the very same result through its
645inherent powers. If Parliament, as understood in Accom, did not
646intend section 10 to apply to foreign-seated arbitrations, it is
647difficult to appreciate how the identical relief could
648nevertheless be granted under the general provisions of the
649CPC.
65051. Such an approach raises a fundamental question of statutory
651interpretation. It is well settled that where Parliament has
652enacted a special statute governing a particular subject, the
653rights and remedies of the parties are to be determined within
654the framework of that statute. The inherent jurisdiction
655preserved by section 151 CPC is intended to supplement the
656law where no specific provision exists; it cannot ordinarily be
657invoked to circumvent, enlarge or achieve indirectly what the
658special statute is taken to prohibit directly. If the territorial
659limitation contained in section 3 excludes the operation of
660section 10, there appears to be no principled basis for avoiding
661that limitation by resorting to section 151. Conversely, if a suit
662may lawfully be stayed under section 151 in aid of a foreign-
663seated arbitration, it becomes difficult to explain why the same
664relief cannot be granted under section 10 itself, the very
665provision enacted by Parliament for that purpose. 52. The pronouncements of the Appellate Division in ECOM has
666recognised the applicability of section 10 to foreign-seated
667arbitrations and has held that Unicol stands pro tanto
668overruled. In that light, the necessity of resorting to section 151
669disappears altogether. Where Parliament has provided a specific
670statutory mechanism, recourse to the Court's inherent
671jurisdiction should ordinarily be unnecessary. For these reasons,
672this Court is of the respectful view that the reliance placed in
673Accom upon section 151 introduces a doctrinal tension into its
674reasoning which, in the interests of coherence and certainty in
675the law, may merit authoritative reconsideration by a higher
676forum.
677IX. Recent Development in the Italian-ThaiCase 53. Moreover, recent development in the Italian-Thai case (Civil
678Petition for Leave to Appeal No. 1828 of 2024, judgment dated
67901.09.2024) is also of considerable significance. Following the
680decision in Accom, the High Court Division dismissed another
681application under section 7A on the ground that the provision
682was inapplicable to a foreign-seated arbitration. However, when
683the matter came before the Appellate Division by way of Civil
684Petition for Leave to Appeal, the Appellate Division continued
685interim protection until the first session of the arbitral tribunal
686in Singapore. In this case, although our Appellate Division did
687not finally determine the scope of section 7A, nonetheless the
688petition was not dismissed on the basis that the High Court
689Division had correctly interpreted section 7A. Finally, it
690disposed of the matter as having become infructuous after the
691arbitral tribunal in Singapore had assumed jurisdiction in terms
692of section 7A(6). The Appellate Division thus consciously
693refrained from expressing any opinion on the correctness of the
694interpretation adopted by the High Court Division.
695Consequently, the question whether section 7A is available in
696aid of a foreign-seated arbitration remains open and has yet to
697be authoritatively determined by a reasoned pronouncement of
698the Appellate Division.
699This Court's Respectful View 54. With the utmost respect to the majority decision in Accom, this
700Court finds itself, with great humility, unable to subscribe to the
701reasoning adopted therein. This court is of the consideredview
702that sections 7, 7A and 10 of the Arbitration Act, 2001 are
capable of operating in aid of arbitral proceedings even
703where the juridical seat of arbitration is outside
704Bangladesh. Those provisions, properly construed, are
705intended to facilitate and support the arbitral process by
706conferring limited judicial assistance, rather than to exercise
707supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings
708themselves. 55. Viewed from that perspective, the invocation of section 151
709CPC, as in Accom, in lieu of section 10 of the Arbitration Act,
7102001 appears, with respect, to be neither necessary nor
711warranted. Where Parliament has provided a specific statutory
712mechanism under section 10 for the grant of the relief in
713question, recourse to the Court's inherent jurisdiction would
714ordinarily be inappropriate.
715Binding Effect of the Larger Bench Decision 56. The foregoing discussion demonstrates that substantial
716questions have arisen regarding the proper interpretation of
717sections 3, 7A and 10 of the Arbitration Act, 2001, particularly
718in light of the subsequent decisions of the Appellate Division in
719the ECOM cases and the judicial approach reflected in the
720Italian-Thai matter. Those authorities appear to recognise that
721supportive judicial intervention in aid of arbitration is
722conceptually distinct from supervisory jurisdiction over arbitral
723proceedings and later enforcement and that such intervention
724may, in appropriate circumstances, coexist with the principle
725that supervisory jurisdiction ordinarily follows the arbitral seat.
72657. This Court has also found considerable force in the petitioner's
727submission that section 7A creates a limited protective
728jurisdiction directed towards preserving the efficacy of
729arbitration and not towards supervising the arbitral process.
730Equally persuasive is the submission that a harmonious reading
731of the Arbitration Act, 2001, viewed in the light of its legislative
732history, Preamble and statutory scheme, may reasonably admit
733of an interpretation whereby interim measures under section 7A
734are available in aid of foreign-seated arbitrations in respect of
735persons or property situated within Bangladesh.
736The Decision and Order 58. However, the fact that Accom did not consider ECOM does not
737authorise this Court to disregard the decision of the Larger
738Bench. The doctrine of precedent is founded not only upon the
739correctness of legal reasoning but also upon the necessity of
740maintaining certainty, consistency and institutional discipline in
741the administration of justice. Although this Court has, with
742utmost respect, expressed its reservations regarding certain
743aspects of the reasoning adopted by the majority in Accom, it is
744not open to a Single Bench to disregard or decline to follow a
745binding decision of a Larger Bench of the High Court Division
746on that ground alone. Whether Accom continues to represent the
747correct interpretation of sections 7A and 10, is a matter which
748can be authoritatively reconsidered only by the Appellate
749Division or by a Bench of co-equal or larger strength.
59. Accordingly, in faithful observance of the doctrine of stare
decisis and the settled principles of judicial discipline
governing Benches of coordinate jurisdiction, this Court
remains bound by the majority decision in Accom Travels and
Tours v. Oman Air SAOC. Since the arbitration agreement in the
present case designates Singapore as the juridical seat of
arbitration, the binding ratio laid down in Accom precludes the
exercise of jurisdiction under section 7A of the Act, 2001.
60. Consequently, the present application is not maintainable and is
rejected in limine, without entering into the merits of the
controversy and without prejudice to the petitioner's right to
pursue any remedy that may be available before the competent
arbitral tribunal or any other forum in accordance with law.
(Justice Md. Toufiq Inam)
750Ashraf/ABO.
Related summaries.
From the record to your case.
Our advocates appear before both divisions of the Supreme Court. These are the practice areas that handle matters like this one.
- Supreme Court practice in BangladeshSlips, mentioning, cause lists and appearances→
- Case JourneysHow a case moves through the courts, step by step→
- Limitation and appeal deadline calculatorKnow your last day to file→
- Curative petitions in BangladeshFinality, article 104 and the case for reform→
- Constitution guideEvery article and amendment, animated→
- Bangladesh legal glossaryBangla and English legal terms, explained→











