Appellate Division
Bangladesh and others v Asaduzzaman Siddiqui and others
Civil Review Petition 751/2017 · Decided 20 October 2024
The Government sought review of the Appellate Division's judgment of 3 July 2017 in Civil Appeal No. 06 of 2017, which had dismissed its appeal against the High Court Division's declaration that the Constitution (Sixteenth Amendment) Act, 2014, providing for removal of Judges by Parliament, was colourable, void and ultra vires. The 2017 operative order expressly restored only clauses (2) to (7) of Article 96, raising doubt over clause (8), which deals with resignation of Judges. At the hearing the Attorney-General pressed only an additional ground on that ambiguity. A six-judge Bench unanimously disposed of the petition with observations. The Chief Justice held that clause (8) had been revived along with the other clauses, that the right of Judges to resign had continued unimpaired since 1972, and that only the Supreme Judicial Council may revisit the Code of Conduct. Article 96 was declared restored in its entirety. In separate opinions, two Judges also expunged political remarks made by the third Judge of the High Court Division Bench.
- Q1
Whether clause (8) of Article 96 of the Constitution, on the right of Supreme Court Judges to resign, stood revived after the appeal in the Sixteenth Amendment case was dismissed, although the operative order of 3 July 2017 expressly restored only clauses (2) to (7).
- Q2
Whether the operative part of the judgment of 3 July 2017 should be clarified to declare Article 96 restored in its entirety.
- Once the appeal against the High Court Division's judgment was dismissed, the Sixteenth Amendment was no longer in force and clauses (2) to (8) of Article 96 were revived.
- The express reference to restoring only clauses (2) to (7) in the 2017 order did not mean that clause (8) was not concomitantly revived, since the resignation provision had continued in the Constitution as clause (4) of the amended Article 96.
- The right of resignation is an entrenched right of constitutional office-holders, and there is no constitutional necessity for singling out Judges of the apex Court to relinquish it; it has continued unimpaired since 1972.
- The Code of Conduct contemplated by Article 96(4)(a) permits growth and change, drawing on the inherent power of only the Supreme Judicial Council to revisit its provisions.
- Per Zubayer Rahman Chowdhury J, the formulation of a Code of Conduct by the Appellate Division in Civil Appeal No. 06 of 2017 exceeded its authority, because that power vests exclusively in the Supreme Judicial Council, which must now formulate the Code afresh.
- To remove any ambiguity in the operative part of the 2017 judgment, clauses 2 to 8 of Article 96 were declared restored in their entirety.
But to dispel any confusion and to obviate any necessary ambiguity and dispute in the operation of the operating part of the impugned judgment, clauses 2-8 of Article 96 are, hereby, declared to be restored in their entirety.
In the court’s own words.
Civil Review Petition 751/2017, as published by the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. 50 pages, with paragraph numbers for citing.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BANGLADESH
APPELLATE DIVISION
Present:
Mr. Justice Syed Refaat Ahmed, Chief Justice.
Mr. Justice Md. Ashfaqul Islam
Mr. Justice Zubayer Rahman Chowdhury
Mr. Justice Syed Md. Ziaul Karim
Mr. Justice Md. Rezaul Haque
Mr. Justice S. M. Emdadul Hoque
1CIVIL REVIEW PETITION NO.751 OF 2017 (From the judgment and order dated 03.07.2017 passed by this Division in Civil Appeal No.06 of 2017 arising out of judgment and order dated 05.05.2016 passed by the High Court Division in Writ Petition No.9989 of 2014). Bangladesh represented by the Cabinet Secretary, . . . Petitioners Cabinet Division, Bangladesh Secretariat, Police Station-Shahbag, Dhaka and others
-Versus-
2Advocate Asaduzzaman Siddiqui and others . . . Respondents For the Petitioners : Mr. Md. Asaduzzaman, Attorney-General, with
Mr. Md. Abdul Jabbar Bhuiyan, Additional
Attorney-General, Mr. Mohammad Arshadur
Rouf, Additional Attorney-General, Mr.
Mohammad Aneek R. Haque, Additional
Attorney-General, Mr. Md. Jahirul Islam Sumon,
Deputy Attorney-General, Mr. Md. Asad Uddin,
Deputy Attorney-General, Mr. Abdullah Al
Mahmud (Masud), Deputy Attorney-General,
Ms. Jamila Momtaz, Deputy Attorney-General,
Mr. S. M. Iftekhar Uddin Mahamud, Deputy
Attorney-General, Mr. A. F. M. Saiful Karim,
Deputy Attorney-General, Mr. Mohammad
Mehedi Hasan, Deputy Attorney-General, Mr.
A.S.M. Mokter Kabir Khan, Deputy Attorney-
General, Mr. Arif Khan, Assistant Attorney-
General, Ms. Fatima Akter, Assistant Attorney-
General, Mr. Md. Zasidul Islam Jony, Assistant
Attorney-General, Mr. Ashadullah Al Galib,
Assistant Attorney-General, Mr. Ekramul Kabir,
Assistant Attorney-General, Mr. Ahammed A.
Khan, Assistant Attorney-General and Mr.
Golam Reza Sadekin, Assistant Attorney-General
instructed by Mr. Haridas Paul, Advocate-on-
Record.
3For the Respondents : Mr. Manzill Murshid, Senior Advocate instructed
by Mr. M. Ashraf-uz-Zaman Khan, Advocate-on-
Record.
4As Amicus Curiae : Mr. Md. Ruhul Quddus, Senior Advocate. Date of hearing and judgment : The 20th October, 2024.
JUDGMENT
5Syed Refaat Ahmed, C.J. : Going to the core of the matter at hand at the very outset, it is noted that in the impugned judgment it has been observed that,
“Since this amendment is ultra vires the constitution, the
provision prevailing before substitution is restored. The
appeal is accordingly dismissed.”
6However, in the operating part of the impugned judgment, this Court observed that-
“Since all but one wrote separate judgments expressing
their separate opinions, we unanimously dismiss the appeal,
expunge the remarks made by the High Court Division as
quoted in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice and also
restore clause (2), (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7) of the Article 96
and also approve the Code of Conduct formulated in the
main judgment”.
7Therefore, it appears from the operating part of the impugned judgment that this Court has restored clauses (2), (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7) of Article 96 and such restoration demonstrates the non-restoration of clause (8) which deals with the resignation of the Judges of the apex Court. Though it does not affect the right of resignation of a Judge of the Supreme Court, yet it may create an unnecessary ambiguity and debate in the legal arena and as such in the operating part of the impugned judgment it should be mentioned that clause (8) of Article 96 is also restored. As such the operating part of the impugned
judgment is required to be reviewed. Hence, it has been proposed to be considered by this Court that because it is apparent on the face of the record that this Court has contributed to an ambiguity by not restoring clause (8) of Article 96 of the Constitution inasmuch as this clause deals with the right of resignation of the Judges of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh which has been a core constituent of Article 96 uninterruptedly since 1972 through to the 16th Amendment of the Constitution, hence, the said clause is required to be expressly restored to remove any kind of ambiguity upon reviewing the impugned judgment.
8Such ambiguity is tantamount to an error on the face of the record as it purports to take away the entrenched right of Judges of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh to resign and, thereby, runs counter to their legal right guaranteed under the Constitution as well as to the prevailing laws of the land including judicial pronouncements, and, as such, has led to this the instant Review Petition to be filed with a prayer for favourable consideration.
9Evidently, prior to the enactment of the Constitution (Sixteenth Amendment) Act, 2014, Article 96 provided for (i) the age of retirement of Judges of the Supreme Court (Article 96(1)), (ii) removal of Judges by the Supreme Judicial Council (Articles 96(2)-96(7)), and (iii) resignation of Judges (Article 96(8)).
10The Constitution (Sixteenth Amendment) Act, 2014 amended Article 96 to include the provision for impeachment by Parliament. By the 16th
Amendment, clauses (2)-(8) of Article 96 were replaced by clauses (2)-(4) as follows:
11“(2) A Judge shall not be removed from his office except by an
12order of the President passed pursuant to a resolution of
13Parliament supported by a majority of not less than two-thirds of
14the total number of members of Parliament, on the ground of
15proved misbehaviour or incapacity/
16(3) Parliament may by law regulate the procedure in relation to a
17resolution under clause (2)and for investigation and proof of the
18misbehaviour or capacity of a Judge.
19(4) A Judge may resign his office by writing under his hand
20addressed to the President.”
21Notably, the new clause (4) relating to resignation of judges has been enacted in exactly the same terms as clause (8) which existed prior to the amendment of Article 96.
22Upon a challenge to the 16th Amendment in Writ Petition No. 9989 of 2014, the High Court Division, by its judgment dated 5.5.2016, declared the Constitution (16th Amendment) Act as ultra vires the Constitution in the following terms:
23„Accordingly, the Rule is made absolute without any order as to
24costs. It is hereby declared that the Constitution (Sixteenth
25Amendment) Act, 2014 (Act No. 13 of 2014) (Annexure-'A' to the
26Writ Petition) is colourable, void and ultra vires the Constitution
27of the People's Republic of Bangladesh.‟ (Asaduzzaman Siddiqui
28and Ors. vs. Bangladesh)
29Thus, clauses (2)-(8) of Article 96 of the Constitution (as existed prior to the 16th Amendment) were revived.
30On 3.7.2017, this Court dismissed the appeal preferred against the judgment of the High Court Division in the following terms:
31„… we unanimously dismiss the appeal, expunge the remarks
32made by the High Court Division as quoted in the judgment of the
33learned Chief Justice, and also restore clause (2), (3), (4), (5), (6)
34and (7) of Article 96 and also approve the Code of Conduct
35formulated in the main judgment‟. (Emphasis added by this Court)
36The underlined portion of the above order of this Court has raised questions as to whether a Judge of the Supreme Court may resign from office. Indisputably, however, this apex Court having dismissed the appeal preferred against the judgment of the High Court Division, the 16th Amendment is no longer in force and clauses (2)-(8) of Article 96 have clearly been revived. It is deemed prudent nevertheless that this Court now pass an order clarifying that the provision for resignation of Judges has always been and remains an entrenched part of the constitutional architecture.
37The fact that this Court specifically referred to restoration of clauses (2)- (7) of Article 96 in its order does not mean that clause (8) of Article 96 has not been concomitantly revived. This Court did not expressly refer to the restoration of clause (8) in specific terms given that the provision for resignation had continued to prevail in the Constitution even in the form of clause (4) of Article 96. Accordingly, there was no need felt possibly to specifically pass an order for restoration by reiteration of the resignation provision in the pre-existing clause (8) which in its own right is an entrenched provision of the Constitution with a provenance dating back to the very promulgation of the Constitution in 1972. As the learned Attorney-General for Bangladesh, Mr. Md. Asaduzzaman submits, this is indeed the core spirit of the additional ground taken in this Review Petition.
38This Court appreciates, that which is not expressly stated may nevertheless be obvious. It is also the case, however, that which is otherwise obvious may at times nevertheless be expressly emphasised. This is doubly true of the entrenched right of resignation ubiquitously present throughout the constitutional framework as a right guaranteed to constitutional office-holders straddling all three organs of the State. Such right refers to the concerned
office-holder‟s freedom to voluntarily leave employment or office upon true will exercised without coercion, restriction, or constraints imposed. It is an essential part of personal autonomy that is constitutionally guaranteed, thereby, allowing for constitutional office-holders to make autonomous decisions about their professional lives conducted under the aegis of the Constitution. There is no overwhelming constitutional or jurisprudential necessity, expediency, or exigency served by singling out Judges of this apex Court for voluntary relinquishment of the unqualified right to resignation when that right remains fully exercisable by constitutional heads of the Executive and the Legislature. By necessary implication, therefore, the right of resignation that has always been available to Judges is now declared to be a constant feature of the Constitution at all material times ensuring the availability and exercise of the right to resignation by Judges. Indeed, the right of resignation has continued unimpaired since 1972.
39There is a common thread too binding all the issues raised in this Review Petition touching also upon the Supreme Judicial Council‟s continued authority, for example, to evaluate and revise, if need be, the content of the Judges‟ Code of Conduct. The said Code as contemplated under the nowrestored clause (4)(a) of Article 96 is foremost an essential component of gauging the sufficiency, and indeed the constitutionality of judicial conduct in a constitution which itself is a living document permitting of perpetual reinvention. In this, much reliance is placed on the competence, authority and power of an independent judiciary to undertake the progressive interpretation of the Constitution. Indeed, this is key to the survival of the Constitution itself. It is also the case that the spirit of the Constitution over and beyond merely the letter of the Constitution gains prominence within such a narrative. Otherwise,
constitutionalism itself is placed at risk. Considered in this context, the Code of Conduct is to be considered as permitting of growth and mutations by drawing on the inherent power of only the Supreme Judicial Council to revisit existing provisions as and when necessary.
40Predicated on the above, Article 96 of the Constitution is, accordingly, restored in its entirety. This Review Petition is, accordingly, disposed of with the observations above. But to dispel any confusion and to obviate any necessary ambiguity and dispute in the operation of the operating part of the impugned judgment, clauses 2-8 of Article 96 are, hereby, declared to be restored in their entirety.
C.J.
41Md. Ashfaqul Islam, J: I concur with the observations expressed by My Lord the Chief Justice. However, I wish to provide some additional comments on the matter under discussion.
42In the judgment on the sixteenth amendment, this Division established a Code of Conduct for the Judges of the Supreme Court, grounded in Article 96 of the Constitution.
43As many as 39 codes have been formulated of which Code No. 38 (a) and (b), to my mind should be discussed in juxtaposition with the Constitution itself.
44Code No. (38)(a) Stipulates:
“If a complaint is received by the Chief Justice from anybody
or any other sources that the conduct of a Judge is
unbecoming of a Judge, that is to say, the Judge is unable to
perform his/her judicial works due to incapacity or
misbehaviour, the Chief Justice shall hold an inquiry into
such activities with other next two senior most Judges of the
Appellate Division and if the Chief Justice or anyone of the
other Judges declines to hold a preliminary inquiry or if the
allegation is against anyone of them, the Judge who is next
in seniority to them shall act as such member and if upon
such inquiry it found that there is prima-facie substance in
the allegation the Chief Justice shall recommend to the
president.”
45And Code No. 38(b) stipulates:
“A complaint against a Judge shall be processed
expeditiously and fairly and the Judge shall have the
opportunity to comment on the complaint by writing at the
initial stage. The examination of the complaint at its initial
stage shall be kept confidential, unless otherwise requested
by the Judge.”
46On the other hand Article 96 (before sixteenth amendment) reads as follows:
“(1) Subject to the other provisions of this article, a Judge
shall hold office until he attains the age of sixty-seven
years.
(2) A Judge shall not be removed from his office except in
accordance with the following provisions of this article.
(3) There shall be a Supreme Judicial Council, in this article
referred to as the Council, which shall consist of the Chief
Justice of Bangladesh, and the two next senior Judges:
Provided that if, at any time, the Council is inquiring into
the capacity or conduct of a Judge who is a member of the
Council, or a member of the Council is absent or is unable
to act due to illness or other cause, the Judge who is next
in seniority to those who are members of the Council shall
act as such member.
47(4) The function of the Council shall be –
(a) to prescribe a Code of Conduct to be observed by
the Judges; and
(b) to inquire into the capacity or conduct of a Judge
or of any other functionary who is not removable from
office except in like manner as a Judge.
48(5) Where, upon any information received from the
Council or from any other source, the President has
reason to apprehend that a Judge –
(a) may have ceased to be capable of properly
performing the functions of his office by reason of
physical or mental incapacity, or
(b) may have been guilty of gross misconduct, the
President may direct the Council to inquire into the
matter and report its finding.
49(6) If, after making the inquiry, the Council reports to the
President that in its opinion the Judge has ceased to
be capable of properly performing the functions of his
office or has been guilty of gross misconduct, the
President shall, by order, remove the Judge from
office.
50(7) For the purpose of an inquiry under this article, the
Council shall regulate its procedure and shall have, in
respect of issue and execution of processes, the same
power as the Supreme Court.
51(8) A Judge may resign his office by writing under his hand
addressed to the President.”
52On a reading of the aforesaid 38(a) and (b) it can be seen that the provisions of Article 96 before sixteenth amendment of the Constitution in respect of Supreme Judicial Council have been incorporated therein almost “Mutatis Mutandis” of the said Article.
53The provisions excerpted appear to discuss the confidentiality of complaints and procedures involving the Supreme Judicial Council. It notes that the examination of complaints at their initial stage should remain confidential unless the judge specifies otherwise. It then references Article 96 of the Constitution, highlighting that provisions related to the Supreme Judicial Council, as they existed before the sixteenth amendment, have been included in current practices “mutatis mutandis.” This phrase implies that the necessary changes have been applied to adapt the old provisions to the current context. Essentially, the procedures or standards of Article 96 were preserved but modified as needed to fit new legal frameworks following the amendment.
54When Article 96 before sixteenth amendment of the Constitution has itself clearly suggested what should be the structural modes of Supreme Judicial Council, there is no justification of inducting almost in a similar language and meaning the said 38(a) and (b) as Codes in the Code of Conduct formulated in the sixteenth amendment Judgment.
55The amendment’s attempt to replicate the framework, as seen in the said Codes 38(a) and (b), raises questions about the necessity and purpose of such overlapping provisions. This redundancy could lead to conflict in interpretation and implementation, ultimately impacting the independence of the judiciary. It brings to light a deeper question if whether such amendments align with the original Constitution intact or if they encroach upon the judicial safeguards envisioned in Article 96. To make it simpler, it can be said that before the Sixteenth Amendment, Article 96 of the Constitution already provided guidelines for the structure of the Supreme Judicial Council to ensure judicial
accountability. Adding similar Rules in the judgment, as in Codes 38(a) and (b) seems unnecessary and may create confusion, potentially leading to conflicts in how the rules are understood and applied, thus affecting the independence of the judiciary.
56It certainly has a curtailing effect on Article 96 of the Constitution.
57The implications of such overlapping provisions extend beyond mere procedural redundancies; they pose a substantive challenge to the judiciary’s autonomy. Article 96 of the Constitution serves as a cornerstone in maintaining this balance, ensuring that the judiciary operates free from undue influence while remaining accountable. However, any additional judicial pronouncements that replicate or override its provisions might inadvertently dilute its authority, creating ambiguities in its interpretation and application. Therefore, it is imperative to critically examine the overlaps to safeguard the sanctity and independence of the judiciary.
58The Review Petition is thus disposed of.
J.
59Zubayer Rahman Chowdhury, J: While agreeing with the judgment proposed to be delivered by the learned Chief Justice, I wish to include certain observations of my own.
60As the facts of the case have been detailed in the judgment proposed to be delivered by the learned Chief Justice, I refrain from repeating the same. Suffice to say that this judgment endeavours to settle a long standing dispute as to whether the power of removal of Judges of the Supreme Court should
vest in the hands of the Members of Parliament or the Supreme Judicial Council, as was the case before the Constitution (Sixteenth Amendment) Act, 2014 (hereinafter referred to as Sixteenth Amendment) was brought into force.
61Civil Appeal No. 06 of 2017 was dismissed by the Appellate Division, upholding the judgment passed by the High Court Division in Writ Petition No. 9989 of 2014 making the Rule absolute, declaring the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution as unconstitutional, thereby restoring sub-Articles (2), (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7) of Article 96. However, no pronouncement was made with regard to sub-Article (8) relating to resignation of Judges. The omission by this Division to include sub-Article (8) of Article 96 of the Constitution in the operating part of the judgment dated 03.07.2017 has led to the filing of the instant Review Petition at the instance of the Government.
62The issue that we are called upon to decide is short – whether sub- Article (8) of Article 96 of the Constitution, which relates to the resignation of the Judges of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, is liable to be restored. The answer is in the affirmative.
63Generally understood, resignation implies cessation or discontinuation of service. The act of resignation is a unilateral act on the part of the person concerned, thereby formally bringing to an end the relationship between the Authority and the person concerned. It forms an integral part of the terms and conditions of service and, in my view, is so fundamentally entrenched in the terms and conditions of service that it cannot be constricted or abrogated, even by the State.
64Prior to the pronouncement of the judgment in the Sixteenth Amendment case, the power to remove Judges of the Supreme Court vested in the Supreme Judicial Council, comprising of the learned Chief Justice and the next two senior most Judges of the Appellate Division. However, the law was amended in 2014 and the Members of Parliament were given the power and authority to remove the Judges of the Supreme Court.
65What was the essence of the Sixteenth Amendment case? In my view, it was an attempt by a despotic and fascist Government to wrest the power of removal of Judges from the Supreme Judicial Council and vest them in the hands of the Parliament, thereby putting the independence of Judges at stake. In other words, if a Judge, in the course of discharging his function, would incur the wrath or disfavour of the Government, he/she could be removed from office by the stroke of a pen by the Members of the Parliament. Can such a situation be allowed or accepted in a democratic society? The answer, in my considered view, as has also been stated by my learned brothers in their respective judgments, is an emphatic ‘No’.
66The independence of judiciary is the ‘sine qua non’ of the Rule of law, which forms the basis of any democratic society. The judiciary serves as an important organ of the state to ensure the Rule of law. The mechanism of vesting the authority of removal of Judges with the Parliament erodes the confidence of the general public in the judiciary. It is, therefore, imperative that in discharging their functions, the tenure of Judges has to be ensured for proper dispensation and administration of Justice. Unless the tenure is
secured, a Judge is likely to feel inhibited by the threat of ‘the sword of Damocles’ hanging over his/her head.
67Under our constitutional scheme, it is the Supreme Judicial Council which has been vested with the authority to formulate the Code of Conduct for the Judges of the Supreme Court. However, while disposing of Civil Appeal No.06 of 2017, the learned Chief Justice, in his rather elaborate judgment, formulated the Code of Conduct to be followed by the Judges of the Supreme Court, stating as under :
“With a view to avoiding any misgiving and confusion, we
reformulate the Code of Conduct in exercise of powers under
article 96 as under :” (emphasis added)
68In my considered view, this was well beyond the scope of this Division for the simple reason that the authority to formulate the Code of Conduct has been vested exclusively with the Supreme Judicial Council, as evident from Clause (3) and Clause (4) of Article 96, which reads as under:
(3) “There shall be a Supreme Judicial Council, in this article
referred to as the Council, which shall consist of the Chief
Justice of Bangladesh, and the two next senior Judges:
Provided that if, at any time, the Council is inquiring into
the capacity or conduct of a Judge who is a member of the
Council, or a member of the Council is absent or in unable
to act due to illness or other cause, the Judge who is next
in seniority to those who are members of the Council shall
act as such member.
(4) The function of the Council shall be-
(a) to prescribe a Code of Conduct to be observed by the
Judge; and”
( emphasis added)
69Although the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court comprises of the Judges who also form the Supreme Judicial Council, yet the Supreme Judicial Council is distinct and separate from the Appellate Division. Therefore, the formulation of the Code of Conduct by the learned Chief Justice appears to be in excess of the authority vested in this Division. This is obviously an error apparent on the face of the record.
70Accordingly, I am inclined to hold that the Code of Conduct, as formulated by the learned Chief Justice while delivering the judgment in C.A. No.06 of 2017, cannot be taken to have been formulated as per Article 96 (4) of the Constitution. Resultantly, in view of the restoration of the Supreme Judicial Council, it is now incumbent upon the Council to formulate the Code of Conduct afresh.
71Accordingly, the Review Petition stands disposed of with the observations made hereinabove.
J.
72Syed Md. Ziaul Karim, J: I respectfully agree with the observations made by My Lord the Chief Justice. However, I would like to add some few words of my own on the issue.
Airticle-96
73The Judges removal mechanism.
74The Rule of law is a basis feature of the constitution and the precondition of the rule of law is an in dependent judiciary
which will administer justice according to law. One of the essential conditions of the independence of judiciary is security of tenure.
75With a view to avoiding any confusion we formulate the code of conduct in exercise of powers under article 96 which reads as hereunder:-
Code of Conduct
76(1) A Judge should participate in establishing,
maintaining, and enforcing high standards of conduct,
and should personally observe those standards so that
the integrity and independence of the judiciary is
preserved.
77(2) A Judge should respect and comply with the
constitution and law, and should act at all times in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the
judiciary.
78(3) A Judge should not allow family, social, or other
relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment.
A Judge should not lend the prestige of the judicial
office to advance the private interests of others: nor
convey or permit others to convey the impression that
they are in a special position to influence the Judge.
79(4) A Judge should be faithful to and maintain professional
80competence in the law, and should not be swayed by
81partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism. (5) A Judge should be patient dignified, respectful, and
82courteous to litigants, lawyers, and others with whom
83the Judge deals in an official capacity, and should
84require similar conduct of those officers to the Judge's
85control. Including lawyers to the extent consistent with
86their role in adversarial system. (6) A Judge should dispose of promptly the business of the
87court including avoiding inordinate delay in delivering
88Judgments/orders. In no case a Judgment shall be
89signed later than six months of the date of delivery of
90Judgment. (7) A Judge should avoid public comment the merit of a
91pending or impending Court case. (8) A Judge shall disqualify himself/ herself in a
92proceeding in which the Judge's impartiality might
93reasonably be questioned. (9) A Judge shall disqualify himself/ herself to hear a
94matter/cause where he served as lawyer in the matter
95in controversy, or with whom the Judge previously
96practiced during such association as a lawyer
97concerning the matter, or the Judge or such lawyer has
98been a material witness
(10) A Judge shall not hear any matter if he/her knows or
99if he/she is aware or if it is brought into his/her notice
100that, individually or as a fiduciary, the Judge or the
101Judge's spouse or children have a financial interest in
102the subject matter in controversy or is a party to the
103proceeding, or any other interest that could be affected
104substantially. (11) A Judge requires a degree of detachment and
105objectivity in judicial dispensation and he is duty
106bound the oath of office. (12) A Judge should practice a degree of aloofness
107consistent with the dignity his office. (13) A Judge should not engage directly or indirectly in
108trade or business, the by himself or in association with
109any other person. (14) A Judge must at all times be conscious that he is
110under the public gaze there should be no act or
111omission by him which is unbecoming of his office and
112the public esteem in which that office is held. (15) A Judge should not engage in any political activities,
113whatsoever in the country and abroad. (16) A Judge shall disclose his assets and liabilities, if
114asked for, by the Chief Justice. (17) Justice must not only be done but must also be seen to
115be done. The behavior and conduct of a member the
116higher judiciary must reaffirm people's faith in the
impartiality of the judiciary. Accordingly, any act of
117Judge, whether in official or persona capacity, which
118erodes the credibility of this perception has to be
119avoided (18) Close association with individual members of the Bar,
120particularly those who practice in the same court, shall
121be eschewed. (19) A Judge should not permit any member of his
122immediate family, such a spouse, son, daughter, son-
123in-law or daughter-in-law or any other close relative, if
124a member of the Bar, to appear before him or even be
125associated in any manner with a cause to be dealt with
126by him. (20) No member of his family, who is a member of the Bar,
127shall be permitted to use the residence in which the
128Judge actually resides or other facilities for
129professional work. (21) A Judge shall not enter into public debate or express
130his views in public on political matters or on matters
131that are pending or are likely to arise for judicial
132determination. (22) A Judge is expected to let his judgments speak for
133themselves. He shall not give interview to the media. (23) A Judge shall disqualify himself or herself from
134participating in any proceedings in which the Judge is
135unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it
may appear to a prudent man that the Judge is unable
136to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings
137include, but are not limited to, instances where the
138Judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party
139or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
140concerning the proceedings. (24) A Judge shall ensure that his or her conduct is above
141reproach in the view of a reasonable observer. (25) The behavior and conduct of a Judge must reaffirm the
142people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary. (26) A Judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
143impropriety in all of the Judge's activities. (27) As a subject of constant public scrutiny. a Judge must
144accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
145burdensome by the ordinary citizens and should do so
146freely and willingly (28) A Judge shall, in his/her personal relationship with
147individual members of the legal profession who practice
148regularly in the Judge's court, avoid situations which
149might reasonably give rise to the suspicion or
150appearance of favoritism or partiality. (29) A Judge shall not participate in the determination of a
151case in which any member of the Judge's family
152represents a litigant or is associated in any manner
153with the case.
154(30) A Judge shall not allow the use of the Judge's
155residence by a member of the legal profession to receive
156clients or other members of the legal profession. (31) A Judge shall not allow his/her family to maintain
157social or other relationship improperly to influence any
158judicial matter pending in his/her court. (32) A Judge shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial
159office to advance the private interests of the Judge, a
160member of the Judge’s family or of anyone else, nor
161shall a Judge convey or permit others to convey the
162impression that anyone is in a special position
163improperly to influence the Judge in the performance of
164judicial duties. (33) A Judge shall not practice law or maintain law
165chamber while he is holding judicial office. (34) A Judge and members of the Judge's family, shall
166neither ask for, nor accept, any gift, bequest, loan or
167favor in relation to anything done or to be done or
168omitted to be done by the Judge in connection with the
169performance of judicial duties. (35) A Judge shall maintain order and decorum in all
170proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified
171and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses,
172lawyers and others with whom the Judge deals in an
173official capacity. The Judge shall require similar
174conduct from legal representatives, court staff and
others subject to the Judge's influence, direction or
175control. (36) A Judge shall not engage in conduct incompatible with
176the diligent discharge of judicial duties. (37) A Judge shall sit in and rise from the court in time
177without fail and in case the Chief Justice notices that a
178Judge does not utilize the time allocated for judicial
179works, the Chief Justice shall intimate the Judge by
180writing to maintain the court's time and despite such
181notice if the Judge does not rectify, such conduct be
182treated as misconduct and he/she will be dealt with in
183accordance with law. (38) (a) If a complaint is received by the Chief Justice from
184anybody or any other sources that the conduct of a
185Judge is unbecoming of a Judge, that is to say, the
186Judge is unable to perform his/her judicial works due
187to incapacity or misbehavior, the Chief Justice shall
188hold an inquiry into such activities with other next two
189senior most Judges of the Appellate Division and if the
190Chief Justice or any one of the other Judges declines to
191hold a preliminary inquiry or if the allegation is against
192any one of them, the Judge who is next in seniority to
193them shall act as such member and if upon such
194inquiry it found that there is prima- facie substance in
195the allegation the Chief Justice shall recommend to the
196president.
197(b) A complaint against a Judge shall be processed
198expeditiously and fairly and the Judge shall have the
199opportunity to comment on the complaint by writing at
200the initial stage. The examination of the complaint at its
201initial stage shall be kept confidential, unless otherwise
202requested by the Judge.
203(c) All disciplinary action shall be based on established
204standards of judicial conduct.
20539. The above Code of Conduct and the ethical values to be
206followed by a Judge, failing which, it shall be
207considered as gross misconduct.
208In all respect I am of the view that Sixteenth Amendment is a colourable legislation and is violative of separation of powers among the 3 (three) organs of the State, namely, the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary and independence of the Judiciary as guaranteed by Articles 94(4) and 147(2), two basic structures of the Constitution and the same are also hit by Article 7B of the Constitution.
209Therefore both the Divisions rightly declared that the Constitution (Sixteenth Amendment) Act, 2014 (Act No.13 of 2014) is colourable, void and ultra-vires the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh.
210Consequently, the instant Civil Review Petition is disposed of with the observations made above.
J.
211Md. Rezaul Haque, J: I respectfully agree with the observations made by My Lord the Chief Justice. However, I would like to add a few lines of my own on the issue.
212Without repeating the provisions before the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution (as quoted earlier in this judgment) and what this amendment has done to the Constitution, I would like to focus on the significance of reviewing this Amendment in order to protect the solemnity and decisiveness of separation of power which is essential for ensuring the independent, impartial and fair functions of the three organs of the State upholding and standing on the same confidence of dignity, power and authority they hold under the Constitution maintaining mutual respects, margins and fine line amongst themselves.
213At this juncture, conceiving and agreeing with the deliberations of the Hon‟ble Chief Justice of Bangladesh and respecting my brother Judges, I would like to take this opportunity to add some of my thoughts given the importance of this case in order to protect and uphold the dignity and integrity of the justice delivery system by the judges amongst others.
214The following questions peep into our mind while discussing about the removal of Judges of the apex Court. If the Judges are not able to protect themselves, then how will they be able to protect the interests of the litigants who come to the court as of their last hope against the wrongs and unfairness they have suffered? If the Judges have to live with fear of losing their jobs at the will of other organ of the State, namely, the Parliament except their superior and independent authority consisting of senior Judges, then how can they act fairly and impartially? This sort of protection is an inherent entitlement of the Judges to make them feel free and independent, because without an
independent mind and authority, none can act and function independently, impartially and fairly for rendering justice to the litigants having no personal nexus with the Judges.
215However, the independence of judiciary does not connote that a Judge will be immune from any responsibility for whatever he does. Judicial independence without accountability may be fruitless and therefore, judicial independence essentially involves the concept of judicial accountability of the Judges. In order to ensure accountability of the Supreme Court Judges, Code of Conduct was formulated at casual intervals. Removal of a Judge from his office for proved misconduct and misbehavior falls to a great extent within the purview of judicial accountability. Removal of a Judge from his office has proximate nexus with the independence of judiciary since in most of the cases Judges have to work in a critical situation and their righteous act may even incur criticism from vested quarters. In order to establish effective check and balance between independence of judiciary and judicial accountability provision for removal of the Judges from their office should be a unique one so that independence of judiciary is ensured while removing judges who are in violation of their oath or become physically or mentally unfit to perform as a Judge. Clause 2 of Article 96 of the Constitution as substituted by section 2 of the Constitution (Sixteenth Amendment) Act, 2024 articulates that a Judge shall not be removed from his office except by an order of the President passed pursuant to a resolution of Parliament supported by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total number of members of Parliament, on the ground of proved misbehavior of incapacity. This provision may not address the situation where misbehavior or incapacity of a Judge has been proved but the Parliament failed to pass a resolution supported by a majority of not less than two-thirds of
the total members of the Parliament. It is because of political rivalry prevalent in our country it may happen that a resolution for removal of a Judge of the Supreme Court may not be passed simply because of political consideration. Independence of Judiciary may seriously be questioned if the Judge with proved misbehavior or incapacity continues his office for failure of Parliament to take resolution. The establishment of Supreme Judicial Council for enquiring into the incapacity or misconduct of a Judge of the Supreme Court for his removal by the President for proved misconduct or incapacity accords more with the constitutional scheme of Separation of Powers.
216The relevant provisions of law before the Sixteenth Amendment provides for taking action against any Judge of the Supreme Court who is in violation of his oath or becomes physically or mentally unfit to perform as a Judge after enquiry report being submitted to the President by the Supreme Judicial Council which ordinarily comprises the Chief Justice of Bangladesh and two other Senior most Judges of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. But surprisingly the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution did make it dependent on some other organs of the State, which is equal to undermining the independent authority of the judiciary as an organ of the State.
217Under the scheme of the Constitution of the People‟s Republic of Bangladesh, all the three organs are of equal significance and importance. None is subordinate to the others. All the three organs must act harmoniously in order to serve and protect the people who are the supreme authority of the land. But through the Sixteenth Amendment, the judiciary was made subservient to the other organs, which is ipso facto unconstitutional and is also undesirable and unacceptable.
218The Executive, the Judiciary and the Legislature are the three organs of the State, who are supposed to be independent and dependent at the same time upon each other maintaining and respecting each one‟s boundaries and functions. All the organs are constitutionally duty-bound to serve the people. Therefore, it is not about supremacy of each organ but about ensuring functions properly so that people are served in accordance with law. It should be the prime consideration of all organs of the State that people shall not suffer due to establishing each one‟s hegemony over others.
219Establishing hegemony of one organ over other is a common phenomenon in our country and the common people are the direct victims of it. Therefore, subjugating one organ to another is an act against the will of the people and our Constitution as well. Unfortunately, the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution has done no justice to that will, rather it has done the opposite exactly. Thus, there is no plausible reason to uphold the same. Both the Divisions of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh have rightly declared the Sixteenth Amendment unconstitutional and ultra vires the Constitution.
220It is worth mentioning here that the learned Judge of the High Court Division being the third Judge of the Bench delivered dissenting opinion about the Sixteenth Amendment. He, while delivering dissenting opinion, made some remarks which in my view do not have reasonable nexus with the facts in issue of the writ petition. Those remarks fall within the purview of obiter dicta. Obiter dicta have significance and it can be persuasive and provide guidance for future cases.
221Obiter dictum is a latin phrase that means “something said in passing”. Obiter dictum is a judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion,
but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential [Black‟s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition, page 569]. Obiter dictum is something said by the way, a cursory remark; a comment made by a judge which, though carrying weight, does not bear directly on the case in hand and therefore need not influence the decision (law) [The Chambers Dictionary, 10th Edition, page 1039].
222Though those remarks are obiter dicta, deserves to be examined for their tendency to undermine the authority of the Appellate division and invite debate involving controversial political matters.
223The learned Judge stated, Ò‡gRi †Rbv‡ij wRqvDi ingvb evK evKzg K‡i ÿgZv wb‡q wb‡jb Z_v ivóªcwZi c` `Lj Ki‡jb|ÑÑÑÑÑÑ| wePvicwZ Avey mvB` ‡P․ayix , cÖavb wePvicwZ Avey mv`vZ †gvnv¤§` mv‡qg, ‡gRi †Rbv‡ij wRqvDi ingvb Msiv †`‡k wbe©vwPZ cÖwZwbwa _vKv m‡Ë¡I A¯¿ Ges A‣ea Kj‡gi †LvPvq wbe©vwPZ RvZxq msm`‡K †f‡½ WvKvZ‡`i gZ A‣eafv‡e †Rvic~e©K RbM‡Yi ÿgZv WvKvwZ K‡i `Lj K‡ib| ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ| GKRb gyw³‡hv×v n‡q †gRi †Rbv‡ij wRqvDi ingvb gyw³hy‡×i we‡ivax Z_v ¯^vaxbZvwe‡ivax ivRvKvi, Avje`i, Avj-kvgm Ges Rvgvqv‡Z Bmjvgx‡K G‡`‡k cybe©vmb K‡ib| Zv‡`i‡K ivRbxwZ Kivi AwaKvi †`b| Zv‡`i‡K bvMwiKZ¡ †`b| (‡h bvMwiKZ¡‡K Avgv‡`i Z_vKw_Z RvgvqvZx Ges ¯^vaxbZv we‡ivax gvbwmKZvi wePviKiv •ea e‡jb)Ó|
224Mr. Ziaur Rahman was a sector commander and the chief of „Z‟ Force during our historic war of liberation. He fought at the frontline with outmost courage for the cause of the nation despite incarceration of his wife and sons during war of liberation. The words ÒWvKvZ‡`i gZÓ and ÒWvKvwZ K‡iÓ are extremely uncalled for in relation to him since the sentences quoted above do not have any bearing upon the merit of the case in hand. Moreover, those remarks were passed without objective consideration of the circumstances prevailing at that time for which the same appear to be political in nature and derogatory to judicial norms. We find support from two decisions of the
Supreme Court of India on the point that a Judge‟s liberty to pass any comment is not unbridled and derogatory remarks ought not to be made against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration unless it is absolutely necessary for the decision of the case to criticize on their conduct.
225In the case of The Chief Election Commissioner of India Vs. M.R. Vijayabhaskar and Others, reported in AIR 2021 SC 2238, it was observed-
“The duty to preserve the independence of the judiciary and to
allow freedom of expression of the judges in court is one end of
the spectrum. The other end of the spectrum, which is equally
important, is that the power of judges must not be unbridled and
judicial restraint must be exercised, before using strong and
scathing language to criticize any individual or institution. In
balancing these two ends, the role of superior courts is especially
relevant. This Court must strike a balance between reproaching
the High Courts or lower Courts unnecessarily, so as to not
hamper their independent functioning. This Court must also
intervene where judges have overstepped the mark and breached
the norms of judicial propriety.”
226In the case of A.M. Mathur Vs. Pramod Kumar Gupta, reported in AIR 1990 SC 1737, it was observed-
“We concede that the Court has the inherent power to act freely
upon its own conviction on any matter coming before it for
adjudication, but it is a general principle of the highest importance
to the proper administration of justice that derogatory remarks
ought not to be made against persons or authorities whose conduct
comes into consideration unless it is absolutely necessary for the
decision of the case to animadvert on their conduct.”
227The remarks that Ziaur Rahman gave citizenship to Jamat undermines the authority of the Appellate Division since citizenship of Golam Azam was ultimately determined by the judgement of the Appellate Division in the case
of Bangladesh Vs. Golam Azam and Others, reported in 3 BLT (AD) 3. The Judgement of the Appellate Division is binding upon the High Court Division as per Article 111 of the Constitution and a remark, by a Judge of the High Court Division, of such a kind that Ziaur Rahman gave citizenship to Jamat i.e. Golam Azam is derogatory to judicial norms which undermines the authority of highest Court of this Land.
228In any service, everyone has an inherent right to resign. None can be compelled to carry on in the service against his/her free will. Therefore, the restoration of the provision regarding the resignation from the service by a Judge of the Supreme Court under Article 96(8) of the Constitution, as has been observed by the Hon‟ble Chief Justice is a needed one.
229Resultantly, endorsing the final observations of the Lord Chief Justice, this Review Petition is disposed of restoring Article 96 of the Constitution in its entirety with the observations made above. The derogatory remarks described hereinbefore passed by the learned Judge of the High Court Division being the third Judge of the Bench are, hereby, expunged.
J.
230S.M. Emdadul Hoque, J: I have gone through the proposed judgment of my Lord, the learned Chief Justice, and those of the other learned brothers. I fully concur with the decision arrived at unanimously in disposing of the Review Petition with observation. But I want to take an opportunity to express my own view on the matter.
231The instant Review Petition has been filed for reviewing the judgment and order dated 03.7.2017 passed by this Division in Civil Appeal No. 06 of 2017 dismissing the Appeal thereby affirming the judgment and order dated
05.5.2016 passed by a Larger Bench of the High Court Division in Writ Petition No. 9989 of 2014 making the Rule absolute. Advocate Asaduzzaman Siddiqui along with others filed the said Writ Petition challenging the Sixteenth Amendment Act, 2014 for declaring the same colourable, void and ultra vires the Constitution.
232It appears from the record that the petitioner, Government filed the instant Review Petition relying on 94 grounds but at the time of hearing of the Review Petition, the learned Attorney-General appearing for the petitioner made his submission only on the following additional ground:
“Because it is apparent on the face of the record that this Division
has committed illegality causing an ambiguity in not restoring
sub-Article (1) and (8) of Article 96 of the Constitution inasmuch
as those sub-Articles deal with the retirement age and the right of
resignation of the Judges of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of
Bangladesh which are core issues of Article 96 of the Constitution
since 1972 and hence the said sub-Articles are required to be
restored to remove any kind of ambiguity upon reviewing the
impugned judgment.”
233The principles of Separation of Powers, Rule of Law, and Judicial Independence form the foundation of the Constitution. Judicial Independence is crucial for upholding the Rule of Law as mandated by the Constitution. Judicial independence should not be interpreted as an absence of responsibility for a judge‟s conduct. Without accountability, judicial independence fails to uphold the true meaning of justice. Consequently, judicial independence fundamentally encompasses the principle of judicial accountability.
234The judges of the constitutional court have sworn to uphold the Constitution. As a consequence, the accountability of judges holds significant
importance. The Supreme Judicial Council bears the significant responsibility of ensuring that judges of the superior courts remain dedicated to the Code of Conduct, thereby maintaining their accountability to the Constitution.
235The Supreme Judicial Council will deal with the allegations against the Supreme Court judges over incapacity or misconduct. The council comprising the Chief Justice and two other senior judges of the Appellate Division to inquire into such allegations and make necessary recommendations to the president for action. This function is not only vested to looking into the matter of the judges of the Supreme Court but also for any other surrounding functionary who is removable from office except in like manner as judges.
236The original 1972 Constitution did not include any provision for Supreme Judicial Council. In the original Constitution, it was provided that a judge could be removed on the grounds of misbehavior or incapacity by an order of the President only when the order was supported by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total number of the members of the Parliament. However, the Fourth Amendment in 1975 revoked Parliament‟s power and transferred the authority to remove judges to the President.
237In 1978, following a martial law proclamation, the President‟s power to remove judges was limited, and the Supreme Judicial Council was established which includes the Chief Justice and the two most senior judges of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. Subsequently, it was confirmed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution in 1979. As the Constitution grants this power to the judges themselves, it is their responsibility to develop a Code of Conduct and to make rules for pioneering the transparent inquiry accordingly.
238Primarily, the Code of Conduct was formulated in 1977. However, on May 7, 2000, further a new Code of Conduct was formulated by the Supreme Judicial Council. This revised Code emphasized the importance of adherence to it for the effective functioning of the judiciary. The aim was to ensure accountability and foster public confidence in the higher Judiciary.
239Article 96 (before the Sixteenth Amendment) reads as follows:
"(1) Subject to the other provisions of this article, a Judge shall
hold office until he attains the age of sixty-seven years.
(2) A Judge shall not be removed from his office except in
accordance with the following provisions of this article.
(3) There shall be a Supreme Judicial Council, in this article
referred to as the Council, which shall consist of the Chief Justice
of Bangladesh, and the two next senior Judges:
Provided that if, at any time, the Council is inquiring into the
capacity or conduct of a Judge who is a member of the Council, or
member of the Council is absent or is unable to act due to illness
or other cause, the Judge who is next in seniority to those who are
members of the Council shall act as such member.
(4) The function of the Council shall be –
(a) to prescribe a Code of Conduct to be observed by the
Judges; and
(b) to inquire into the capacity or conduct of a Judge or of
any other functionary who is not removable from office
except in like manner as a Judge.
(5) Where, upon any information received from the Council or
from any other source, the President has reason to apprehend that
a Judge –
(a) may have ceased to be capable of properly performing
the functions of his office by reason of physical or mental
incapacity, or
(b) may have been guilty of gross misconduct, the
President may direct the Council to inquire into the
matter and report its finding.
(6) If, after making the inquiry, the Council reports to the
President that in its opinion the Judge has ceased to be capable of
properly performing the functions of his office or has been guilty
of gross misconduct, the President shall, by order, remove the
Judge from office.
(7) For the purpose of an inquiry under this article, the Council
shall regulate its procedure and shall have, in respect of the issue
and execution of processes, the same as the Supreme Court.
(8) A Judge may resign his office by writing under his hand
addressed to the President.”
240On a plain reading of the now-restored clause (4) of Article 96, it is found that it empowers the Supreme Judicial Council to formulate a Code of Conduct for judges of the higher Judiciary, and the Supreme Judicial Council has to ensure the accountability of the judges, through the Code of Conduct to be observed by the Judges. Judicial accountability refers specifically to obedience to the Code of Conduct formulated under the Constitution.
241The Code of Conduct has been promulgated by this Court. However, according to the provisions of Articles 103 and 105 of the Constitution, this Court can frame any Code of Conduct. Nonetheless, since sub-article 4 of Article 96 of the Constitution explicitly grants this authority to the Supreme Judicial Council. Therefore, in my opinion, it is the Supreme Judicial Council that must hold the absolute authority to formulate the Code of Conduct and to make rules for pioneering the transparent inquiry and investigation against the Judges of the Supreme Court. In this instant case, my Lord Honourable Chief Justice has taken the view that:
“There is a common thread too binding all the issues raised in
this Review Petition touching also upon the Supreme Judicial
Council‟s continued authority, for example, to evaluate and
242revise, if need be, the content of the Judges‟ Code of Conduct.
243The said Code as contemplated under the now-restored clause
244(4)(a) of Article 96 is foremost an essential component of
245gauging the sufficiency and indeed the constitutionality judicial
246conduct in a constitution which itself is a living document
247permitting of perpetual reinvention. In this, much reliance is
248placed on the competence, authority and power of an
249independent judiciary to undertake the progressive
250interpretation of the Constitution. Indeed, this is key to
251the survival of the Constitution itself. It is also the case that the
252spirit of the Constitution over and beyond merely the letter of the
253Constitution gains prominence within such a narrative.
254Otherwise, constitutionalism itself is placed at a risk. Considered
255in this context the Code of Conduct to be considered in this
256context the Code of Conduct to be considered relevant permits of
257growth and mutations drawing on the inherent power of the
258Supreme Judicial Council to revisit existing provisions as and
259when necessary.
260Predicated on the above, Article 96 is, accordingly, restored in
261its entirety. This Review Petition is, accordingly, disposed of with
262the observations above. But to dispel any confusion and to
263obviate any necessary ambiguity and dispute in the operation of
264the operating part of the impugned judgment, clauses 2-8 of
265Article 96 are, hereby, declared to be in their entirety.”
266I fully concur with the view of my Lord Honourable Chief Justice.
267On perusal of the 16th Amendment judgment, it is reasonably noticeable that though some remarks made in the judgment of the High Court Division about the members of parliament have been expunged, the remarks of the third judge i.e., Justice Md. Ashraful Kamal of the judgment in the High Court Division about the political and historical context remained intact.
268However, during the hearing of this Review Petition, learned Attorney- General Md. Asaduzzaman mentioned that the part of the third judge‟s remarks in the judgment of the High Court Division was considered Obiter Dictum.
269In the given backdrop, we need to look into the meaning of the term Obiter Dicta (often referred to simply as dicta or obiter), which is the plural form of Obiter Dictum.
270Black’s Law Dictionary defines obiter dicta in the following way-
271“[“Something said in passing”] A judicial comment made
272during the course of delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is
273unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not
274precedential (though it may be considered persuasive)- Often
275shortened to dictum or, less commonly, obiter.” [Black's Law
276Dictionary, p. 1100(17th ed. 1999)] and “Judicial dictum”
277meaning- “An opinion by a court on a question that is directly
278involved, briefed, and argued by a counsel, and even passed by
279the court, but that is not essential to the decision.” [Black's Law
280Dictionary, p. 465 (17th ed. 1999)]
281The Law Lexicon provides that-
282“1. An obiter dictum is a remark made or opinion expressed by a
283judge, in his decision upon a cause, „by the way‟ that is
284incidentally or collaterally and not directly upon the question
285before the court; or it is any statement of law enunciated by the
286judge or court merely by way of illustration, argument, analogy
287or suggestion.” 2. A saying by the way, an opinion of a judge not
288necessary to the judgment given of records, in contradistinction
289to a judicial dictum, which is necessary to the judgment. 3. An
290“obiter dictum” as distinguished from ratio decidendi is an
291observation by the court on a legal question suggested in a case
292before it but not arising in such a manner as to require a
293decision. Such an obiter may not have a binding precedent but it
cannot be denied that it is of considerable weight” [The Law
Lexicon with Maxims, p. 792, 1st ed. 2016]
294According to Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary-
“Obiter dicta are what the words literally signify, namely,
statements by the way. If a judge thinks it desirable to give his
opinion on some point which is not necessary for the decision of
the case, that, of course, has not the binding weight of the
decision of the case, and the reasons for the decision.” [Stroud‟s
Judicial Dictionary, p. 1741, sixth ed.]
295The Lexicon the encyclopedic Law Dictionary provides the following-
“An opinion of law not necessary to the decision. In the course
of a suit, many incidental questions arise indirectly connected
with the main question for consideration, the observation on
such questions whether casual or of collateral relevance are
known as “obiter dicta” or simply known as dicta.” [The
Lexicon The encyclopedic Law Dictionary, p. 1230, 3rd ed. 2012]
296Under English common law, a judgment consists of two components: ratio decidendi and obiter dicta. The ratio decidendi is binding, while obiter dictum is considered persuasive but not obligatory. A judicial statement is considered ratio decidendi only if it directly addresses the key facts and legal issues of the case. Statements that are non-essential, or that relate to hypothetical situations or unrelated legal matters, are classified as obiter dictum. Obiter dictum refers to remarks or observations made by a judge that, although included in the court‟s opinion, are not essential to the court‟s ruling. In a judicial opinion, obiter dictum may include comments made for illustration, analogy, or argument. Obiter dictum does not influence the judicial decision, even if it accurately reflects the law.
297So, from the above discussion, it is quite clear that the Obiter Dictum does not have any authority or binding force on other courts but it can be cited as persuasive authority in future litigation.
298The subject matter of Obiter dictum can include discussions of hypothetical facts, cases, or laws. However, to avoid further persuasion in any future litigation or any discussions it is proper to mention that a judge should not comment on any political matter in his judgment as it reflects his political or personal views, thus affecting the independence of the judiciary.
299Now we need to have a glimpse of the situation prevailed in the aftermath of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. The Fourth Amendment was passed in January, 1975 altering and destroying the basic and essential features of the original Constitution. Renowned lawyer Mahmudul Islam described the situation in his book titled “Constitutional Law of Bangladesh”, 3rd edition at page 24 which is extracted below:
“In January, 1975 the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act,
1975 was passed transforming the Constitution beyond any
resemblance with the original. Part VIA was incorporated
prescribing that there would be only one political party in the
State, thereby rendering a severe blow to the democratic set up of
the Constitution and paved the way for military dictatorship.
Art.102(1) which conferred power on the High Court Division to
enforce the fundamental rights was repealed and by an amendment
of art. 44 Parliament was empowered to establish by law a
constitutional court, tribunal or commission for enforcement of
the fundamental rights. The parliamentary form of government
was replaced by a form of government which was an apology of a
presidential form as the normal checks and balances of a
presidential form of government were not incorporated. A
provision was made for a Vice-President who was to be appointed
300by the President. The President became the repository of the
301executive power of the Republic which he would exercise with the
302assistance of ministers selected by him. The President was
303empowered to appoint the Prime Minister and other ministers
304from among the members of Parliament or persons qualified to be
305elected as members of Parliament. The President would preside
306over the meetings of the Council of Ministers, and the Prime
307Minister and all other ministers would hold office during the
308pleasure of the President. The Ministers had the right to speak and
309take part in the proceedings of Parliament. But they were not
310entitled to vote unless they were members of Parliament. The
311Judges of the Supreme Court were made removable by the
312President on the ground of misbehaviour or incapacity. The
313provision for consultation with the Chief Justice in respect of the
314appointment of puisne Judges of the Supreme Court was repealed.
315The control in respect of subordinate courts and judges was taken
316away from the Supreme Court and vested in the President. The
317system introduced was a mishmash of parliamentary and
318presidential forms of government and the upshot was that the
319President emerged as the all-powerful authority in the Republic.”
320Chief Justice Mustafa Kamal in his book titled “Bangladesh Constitution: Trends and Issues” at page 39 commented in the following-
321“The Fourth Amendment made a drastic inroad into the
322independence and jurisdiction of the judiciary, which has been
323considered in Chapter II. A one-party State was established. The
324person holding office as President immediately before this
325amendment ceased to hold the office and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
326entered upon the office of President from the commencement of
327the Fourth Amendment Act, as if elected to that office.”
328Thus, the Fourth Amendment brought a devastating effect to the original basic structure of the constitution. Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League was formed to the exclusion of all other parties. All newspapers and periodicals
except a designated few lost their declaration. The President was made the owner of supreme power of the state and the democracy lost its existence. The power of removal of Judges of the Supreme Court was vested to the President. In the said way, the independence of judiciary was posed under a serious threat.
329On 15th August, 1975 President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was assassinated and Mr. Khandaker Moshtaque Ahmed assumed the office of the President placing the whole country under Martial Law. In Bangladesh Martial Law was imposed twice first, on the 15th August, 1975 and secondly, on the 24th March, 1982. By a Proclamation dated 20th August, 1975 though the Constitution was not suspended the same was made subservient to the Martial Law Proclamation and the Martial Law Regulations and Orders. All courts, including the Supreme Court, were divested of any power to call in question or declare void or illegal the said Martial Law Proclamation, Regulation.
330On the 3rd November, 1975 there was a coup under the leadership of Khaled Mosharrof and the then Army Chief Major General Ziaur Rahman was removed from his office and he was taken to the house arrest. On 6th November, 1975, Mr. Khandaker Moshtaque Ahmed left office of President to the Chief Justice of Bangladesh, Mr. Justice A. M. Sayem. On 7th November, 1975 the soldiers along with the support from the general masses through the Sipahi–Janata Revolution freed Ziaur Rahman from house arrest. On 8th November, 1975 the Second Proclamation was declared by virtue of which Mr. Justice A. M. Sayem assumed the powers of Chief Martial Law Administrator for the effective enforcement of Martial Law and Parliament was dissolved with effect from the 6th November, 1975.
331By third Proclamation on 29th November, 1976 Mr. Justice Sayem relinquished the Office of the Chief Martial Law Administrator in favour of Major General Ziaur Rahman. On 21st April, 1977 Mr. Justice Sayem resigned from the office of President and appointed Major General Ziaur Rahman as the President. While Major General Ziaur Rahman continued to hold the two offices together lifted Martial Law by a Proclamation dated 7th April, 1979.
332At this juncture, I need to shed light on the discussion regarding doctrine of necessity in the context of assumption of power by Major General Ziaur Rahman.
333Mahmudul Islam observed in his book titled “Constitutional Law of Bangladesh”, 3rd edition at page 106 in the following-
334“Principle of necessity: We have seen that unconstitutional acts
335were found legal on application of the principle of necessity. The
336principle, in its application to constitutional law, which are
337otherwise illegal or not permitted by the constitution be held legal
338if done bona fide under the stress of necessity with intention to
339preserve the constitution, the State or the society. In Reference by
340Governor General Munir (1955) 7DLR(FC) 395 CJ after quoting
341from the statement of Lord Mansfield in R. v. Stratton,(1779) 21
342St. Tr. 1045.
343Observed –
“The principle clearly emerging from this address of Lord
Mansfield is that subject to the condition of absoluteness,
extremeness and imminence, an act which would otherwise
illegal becomes legal if it is done bona fide under the stress
of necessity, the necessity being referable to an intention to
preserve the constitution, the State or the Society and to
prevent it from dissolution, and affirms Chitty‟s statement
that the necessity knows no law and the maxim cited by
Bracton that necessity makes lawful which otherwise is not
lawful. Since the address expressly refers to the right of a
private person to act in necessity, in the case of Head of the
State justification to act must a fortiori be clearer and more
imperative.”
For smooth transition to a lawful government it may be necessary
to condone some of the actions of the usurper, but there is no
necessity of condoning the illegality of promulgation of laws by
the usurper. Furthermore, it should be noted that a constitution of
a democratic polity confers power of making law only on the
legislature and the legislature may under certain conditions
discussed earlier in this chapter delegate the legislative power to
specified authority and any law not made by the legislature or its
delegate is ultra vires the constitution. Imparting validity to such
law would amount to infringing the basic feature of the
constitution, namely, supremacy of the constitution, which neither
Parliament can do, nor the court can pronounce. Lord Pearce and
Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Choudhury were right in narrowly
setting the limit of condonable actions. There is no forensic reason
to go beyond what Lord Pearce and Justice Iftikhar Muhammad
Choudhury considered valid on the application of the principle of
necessity.”
344Regarding the Fourth Amendment Chief Justice Mostafa Kamal aptly said in his book (supra) at page 54-
“It is thus a great irony of history that while the elected
representatives of the people in a democratic dispensation banned
all political parties except one, it was a Judge and later a General,
who, under the cover of Martial Law, restored the multi-party
system.”
345It is not gainsaying that the third Judge‟s opinion in relation to the 16 th Amendment case passed by the High Court Division has no binding effect. However, they may be referred to as obiter dicta. In the said context, it is essential to mention some of his observations which are made regarding
controversial political and historical issues. Accordingly, some of the observations made by the third Judge, Mr. Justice Ashraful Kamal are extracted below-
346ÒGKw`‡K exi ev½vjx RvZxq gyw³ msMÖv‡g AvZ¥wb‡qvM I cÖvY DrmM© K‡iwQ‡jb
347Aciw`‡K cvwK¯Ívbx nvbv`vi evwnbxi mv‡_ GK †hvM n‡q Avgv‡`i †`‡ki Rvgvqv‡Z
348Bmjvgx evsjv‡`k `jwU Ges Zvi mg_©Kiv ¯^vaxbZvi we‡ivaxZv K‡i‡Q|
349c„w_exi Ggb †Kvb †`k Lyu‡R cvIqv hv‡e bv †hLv‡b †m †`‡ki wKQy msL¨K Rb‡Mvôx
350Zv‡`i ¯^vaxbZvi we‡ivaxZv K‡i‡Q| GKgvÎ Avgv‡`i GB evsjv‡`k e¨wZµg|
351Dc‡ii ivqwU ch©v‡jvPbv Ki‡j GUv Kvu‡Pi gZ cwi¯‥vi †h, gyw³hy‡×i mgq Avgv‡`i
352†`‡ki wKQy msL¨K e¨w³, Rb‡Mvôx Ges `j, hvi †bZ„‡Z¡ wQj Rvgvqv‡Z Bmjvgx
353evsjv‡`k, Avgv‡`i †`‡ki ¯^vaxbZvi we‡ivaxZv K‡i Ges cvwK¯Ív‡bi •mb¨evwnbx‡K
354mn‡hvwMZv K‡i‡Q| Gi †P‡q `yfv© Mv †`k Avi Av‡Q wKbv- Avwg Rvwb bv| GLb aiv
355hvK H ¯^vaxbZvwe‡ivax Rb‡Mvôxi ga¨ †_‡K †Kvb GKRb‡K mycÖxg †Kv‡U© wePvicwZ
356wb‡qvM Kiv nj| GLb Zv‡K hw` msweav‡‡bi e¨vL¨v cÖ`vb Kivi Rb¨ ejv nq Zvn‡j
357wZwb msweavb‡K †Kvb Avw½‡K e¨vL¨v we‡kølY Ki‡eb? Aek¨B wZwb Zvi
358¯^vaxbZvwe‡ivax gb gvmwbKZvi Avw½‡KB Avgv‡`i GB gnvb cweÎ msweavb‡K
359e¨vL¨v Ki‡eb| evsjv‡`‡ki ¯^vaxbZv we‡ivax gb gvbwmKZv m¤úbœ GB ai‡bi
360wePviK Avgiv AZx‡Z †`‡LwQ|
361¯^vaxbZvi Pvi `k‡KiI AwaKKvj AwZevwnZ nIqvi ciI †Kb evsjv‡`‡ki RbMb
362¯^vaxbZvwe‡ivax wPšÍv †PZbvi wePviK †`L‡e? 30 j¶ gyw³‡hv×vi i‡³i Dci
363`vwo‡q ¯^vaxbZvwe‡ivax RvgvqvZx wePvicwZiv †Kb envj _vK‡e? †Kb ivRvKvi
364wePvicwZ envj _vK‡e? †Kb Avje`i wePvicwZ envj _vK‡e? †Kb wÎk j¶ ev½vjx
365nZ¨vKvix I `yB j¶ gv †ev‡bi m¤£g niYKvix RvgvqvZx wePvicwZiv envj _vK‡e?
366Avgv‡`i exi gyw³‡hv×viv wK GB Rb¨ hy× K‡iwQj?
367evsjv‡`‡ki RbMY‡K ab¨ev` Zviv Gevi Avgv‡`i‡K ¯^vaxbZvwe‡ivax Z_v
368RvgvqvZgy³ Z_v ivRvKvigy³ RvZxq msm` Dcnvi w`‡q‡Qb| †mB gnvb RvZxq
369msm‡`i wbKU RbM‡bi PvIqv wePvi wefvM †_‡K ¯^vaxbZvwe‡ivax, ivRvKvi,
370Avje`i Ges Rvgvqv‡Z Bmjvgx bvgK ivR‣bwZK `jwUi Av`‡k© wek¦vmx (hviv
371Avgv‡`i ¯^vaxbZv Ges msweavb‡K wek¦vm K‡i bv) wePvicwZ‡`i AcmviY K‡i wePvi
372wefvM Z_v RvwZ‡K KjsKgy³ Ki‡eb| Zv bv n‡j Hme wePvicwZiv Avgv‡`i cweÎ
373msweavb‡K Zv‡`i ¯^vaxbZvwe‡ivax gvbwmKZvq B”QvgZ fyj e¨vL¨v K‡i Rvgvqv‡Z
374Bmjvgx bvgK `jwUi msweav‡b cwiYZ Ki‡eb|Ó
wePvicwZ Avey mv`vZ †gvnv¤§` mv‡qg wbe©vwPZ RvZxq msm`‡K evwZj K‡i Av‡iv fqsKi KvR K‡ib Ges 29†k b‡f¤¦i 1976 Zvwi‡L GKRb Avwg© iyjm f½Kvix miKvix Kg©Pvix †gRi †Rbv‡ij wRqvDi ingvb‡K †`‡ki ivó«cwZ evwb‡q †`b| Ae¯’v`„‡ó g‡b nq wZwb (mv‡qg) †hb ZLb B”Qv †cvlY Ki‡j GKRb WvKvZ‡KI †`‡ki ivó«cwZ evwb‡q w`‡Z cvi‡Zb| †`‡ki RbM‡bi ZLb †Kvb B”Qv Awb”Qv wQjbv| RbMb AevK n‡q †`L‡jv whwb msweavb I †`k‡K i¶v Kivi kc_ wb‡qwQ‡jb ev †h wefvMwU‡K msweav‡bi AwffveK wn‡m‡e `vwqZ¡ cÖ`vb Kiv n‡qwQj wZwb Ges Zviv msweavb ZQbQ K‡i‡Qb| hv‡K GK K_vq ejv hvq Rsjx kvmb| ……………………………………………………………………………………………. ……………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………. Avgiv Rvwb WvKvZiv msNe×fv‡e WvKvwZ K‡i| WvKvZ‡`i †h †bZ„Z¡ †`q Zv‡K WvKvZ m`©vi e‡j| WvKvwZ Kivi mg‡q WvKvZiv evwowU ev NiwU wKQy mg‡qi Rb¨ A‡¯¿i gy‡L `Lj K‡i Ges g~j¨evb `ªe¨vw` jyÉb K‡i| wePvicwZ Avey mvB` †P․ayix, cÖavb wePvicwZ Avey mv`vZ †gvnv¤§` mv‡qg, †gRi †Rbv‡ij wRqvDi ingvb Msiv †`‡k wbe©vwPZ cÖwZwbwa _vKv m‡Ë¡I A¯¿ Ges A‣ea Kj‡gi †LvPvq wbe©vwPZ RvZxq msm`‡K †f‡½ WvKvZ‡`i gZ A‣eafv‡e †Rvic~e©K RbM‡bi ¶gZv WvKvwZ K‡i `Lj K‡ib| †h wePvi wefvM Ges Gi wePviK‡`i Ici AvBbMZ `vwqZ¡ wQj mvsweav‡bi mvgvb¨Zg wePy¨wZ‡K i¶v Kiv, msi¶Y Kiv Ges wbivcËv cÖ`vb Kiv; †mB wePvi wefvM Ges Gi ZrKvjxb wePviKiv msweavb‡K GK K_vq nZ¨v Ki‡jb, RbM‡bi ivq WvKvwZ K‡i RbM‡bi wbe©vwPZ msm`‡K evwZj Ki‡jb| Aciw`‡K †gRi †Rbv‡ij wRqvDi ingvb wb‡R GKRb miKvix Kg©Pvix n‡qI Avwg© iyjm f½ K‡i RbM‡bi iv‡q wbe©vwPZ RvZxq msm`‡K nZ¨v K‡i †`‡ki msweavb‡K nZ¨v K‡i A‡¯¿I gy‡L Ab¨vqfv‡e Amrfv‡e nZ¨vKvix‡`i †`vmi n‡q RbMb‡K Pig AeÁv K‡i ¶gZv `Lj K‡ib| GKRb gyw³‡hv×v n‡q †gRi †Rbv‡ij wRqvDi ingvb gyw³hy‡×i we‡ivax Z_v ¯^vaxbZvwe‡ivax ivRvKvi, Avje`i, Avj kvgm Ges Rvgvqv‡Z Bmjvgx‡K G‡`‡k cyb©evmb K‡ib| Zv‡`i‡K ivRbxwZ Kivi AwaKvi †`b; Zv‡`i‡K bvMwiKZ¡ †`b| (†h bvMwiKZ¡‡K Avgv‡`i Z_vKw_Z RvgvqvZx Ges ¯^vaxbZv we‡ivax gvbwmKZvi wePviKiv •ea e‡jb) wZwb ¯^vaxbZvwe‡ivax Ges gvbeZvwe‡ivax Acivax‡`i msm` m`m¨ K‡ib Ges Zv‡`i‡K gš¿x evwb‡q Zv‡`i Mvwo‡Z evsjv‡`‡ki cZvKv w`‡q wÎk j¶ knx‡`i i‡³i mv‡_ Ges `yB j¶ gv †ev‡bi m¤£‡gi mv‡_ †eBgvbx K‡ib| Gic‡iI wK evsjv‡`‡ki RbMb †gRi †Rbv‡ij wRqvDi ingvb‡K gyw³‡hv×v ej‡Z cv‡i?
375…………………………………………………………………………………………….
376…………………………………………………………………………………………….
377………………………………………………………………………….
378ÒwePvicwZ Avey mvB` †PŠayix, cÖavb wePvicwZ Avey mv`vZ †gvnv¤§` mv‡qg, wePvicwZ dR‡j gywbg,
379wePvicwZ i“ ûj Bmjvgmn Ab¨iv msweav‡bi cÖ¯Ívebvq DwjøwLZ RvZxq gyw³i Rb¨ Avgv‡`i †h
380HwZnvwmK msMÖvg Ges †h mKj gnvb Av`k© Avg‡`i exi RbMb‡K RvZxq gyw³i msMÖv‡g
381AvZ¥wb‡qvM I exi knx`MY‡K cÖv‡YvrmM© Ki‡Z DØy× K‡iwQj †mB mKj gnvb Av`k© mg~n‡K Ges
382¯^vaxbZvi †PZbv‡K aviY Ki‡Z e¨_© n‡q‡Qb weavq msweavb‡K mvgwiK digv‡bi bx‡P g‡g© †NvlYv
383K‡iwQ‡jb| A_P Zviv mK‡j GB g‡g© kc_ MÖnY K‡iwQ‡jb †h, ÔAvwg evsjv‡`‡ki msweavb I
384AvB‡bi i¶Y, mg_©b I wbivcËv weavb KwieÕ Ges Aby‡gq Zviv e¨_© n‡qwQ‡jb Zv‡`i mvsweavwbK
385`vwqZ¡ cvj‡b Z_v ÔmycxÖ g RywWwmqvj KvDw›mjÕ m¤¦wjZ Aby‡PQ` 96 msweav‡bi g~j KvVv‡gv
386(basic structure), wePvi wefv‡Mi ¯^vaxbZv Ges msweav‡bi weavbvejxi cwicš’x g‡g© †NvlYv
387Ki‡Z|Ó
(underlines supplied)
388It appears from the above that the third Judge made the aforesaid comments out of sheer political motivation and personal biasness.
389In Bangladesh Vs. Professor Golam Azam and others 46 DLR(AD) (1994)-192 (popularly known as citizenship case) the apex Court comprising of Mr. Justice M.H. Rahman, Mr. Justice A.T.M. Afzal, Mr. Justice Mustafa Kamal and Mr. Justice Latifur Rahman unanimously dismissed the appeal and upheld the judgment of High Court Division. In the said case Professor Golam Azam was denied Bangladeshi citizenship by the Government. It has been alleged by the Government that he had been staying abroad since before liberation of Bangladesh as a citizen of Pakistan. On account of his antiliberation role and active collaboration with the Pakistan Army in raising irregular forces like the Rajakers, Al-Badrs and Al-Shams and placing his party, the Jamaat-e-Islami, at the disposal of the Pakistani Army, and because of his conduct during and after the liberation war, and his voluntarily residing in Pakistan as a citizen of Pakistan he could not be deemed to be a citizen of
Bangladesh. Ultimately, the citizenship of Professor Golam Azam was restored to him by the Supreme Court. In the case of Professor Golam Azam(ibid) Justice M.H. Rahman observed that-
“In considering a matter before it the Court will only consider
whether the aggrieved person has got the legal entitlement to the
relief claimed. Any consideration of his political antecedents
having no bearing on the questions of law involved in the matter
will be irrelevant. Equally, it will be irrelevant to consider to what
probable political consequences will follow if the relief is
granted.”
390The aforesaid judgment is the testament to the fact that our apex Court holds the view that a person belonging to Jamaat-e-Islami cannot be deprived of his legal right merely because of his political identity imputing him the stigma of anti-liberation force. But the third Judge in his separate opinion regarding against a particular political party i.e. Jamaat-e-Islami alleging it as a force against the liberation of our country and further observed that there are some Judges in the Supreme Court belonging to the said party. The third Judge, thus, stated that “(†h bvMwiKZ¡‡K Avgv‡`i Z_vKw_Z RvgvqvZx Ges ¯^vaxbZv we‡ivax gvbwmKZvi wePviKiv •ea e‡jb)|” thereby the authority of the apex Court regarding the case of Bangladesh Vs. Professor Golam Azam and others reported in 46 DLR (AD) (1994)-192 (popularly known as citizenship case) has been challenged. Those remarks are perverse and not according to the settled legal proposition inasmuch as a Judge should not reflect his political view while writing judgment. Moreover, upon taking oath a Judge will not bear his own political belief or identity which may have an adverse impact in case of arriving at decision on any particular matter.
391Apart from the above, the third Judge made some derogatory remarks against Mr. Justice Abu Sayed Chowdhury, Chief Justice Abu Sadat
Mohammad Sayem, Justice Fazle Munim, Justice Ruhul Islam and others Judges of the Supreme Court alleging them not upholding the supremacy of the constitution, which are not, at all, warranted by law. Simultaneously, the said action of the third Judge is violative of Article 111 of the Constitution. According to Article 111, the law declared by the Appellate Division shall be binding on the High Court Division and the law declared by either Division of the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts subordinate to it. But the third Judge in his separate opinion flouted the authority of apex Court which is clear violation of the Code of Conduct.
392Despite the third Judge is a Judge of the High Court Division, he showed utter disregard to the judgment regarding citizenship case (46 DLR(AD)-192) delivered by the apex Court of our country, and castigated the Judges of the apex Court while according to Article 111 the judgment of the apex Court is binding on the High Court Division as well as other Courts. The third Judge, thus, made the following observations in this regard-
393ÒGKRb gyw³‡hv×v n‡q †gRi †Rbv‡ij wRqvDi ingvb gyw³hy‡×i we‡ivax Z_v ¯^vaxbZvwe‡ivax
394ivRvKvi, Avje`i, Avj kvgm Ges Rvgvqv‡Z Bmjvgx‡K G‡`‡k cyb©evmb K‡ib| Zv‡`i‡K
395ivRbxwZ Kivi AwaKvi †`b; Zv‡`i‡K bvMwiKZ¡ †`b| (†h bvMwiKZ¡‡K Avgv‡`i Z_vKw_Z
RvgvqvZx Ges ¯^vaxbZv we‡ivax gvbwmKZvi wePviKiv •ea
e‡jb)……………………………………………………….Ó
(underlines supplied)
396In this regard, it is advantageous to extract the following observations made by this Division in Re: Special Reference No. 1 of 1995, 47 DLR (1995)
“25………………….Mr. Ahmed referred to a maxim of Judicial self-
restraint referred to in “The Judicial Process” 3rd Ed by Henri J.
Abraham P. 364 which says that the Court has been inclined to
defer to certain legislative or execute actions by classifying an
397issue otherwise quite properly before it as a political question –
398hence refusing to come to grips with it.
39926. It will be of advantage to quote the aforesaid author himself
400who poses the question -what really is a “political question”? and
401then quotes Mr. Justice Holmes. who once characterised it as “…
402little more than a play of words.” Nixon Vs. Herndon, 273 US 536
403(1927) at 540). The author says further – “However attractive in
404theory the “political question” maxim is a treadmill: perhaps to a
405fatal degree -its supporting logic is circular.” Seervai in his
406“Constitutional Law of India”. 3rd Ed.. P. 2212 adds: “It is
407circular for the U.S. Supreme Court will not decide a question
408because it is a „political question‟ and it becomes a „political
409question‟ because the Supreme Court will not decide it.”
410Therefore, a judge while deciding a case should refrain from entering into any controversial political issue which demoralizes him putting him under serious criticism. A judge should, thus, remain abstinent in expressing his political view which may have an anarchic impact on the image of judiciary and thereby affects the independence of judiciary.
411Plausibly, it has been remarked by Imran A. Siddiq in an article titled “The Judicial Appointments Process in Bangladesh: In Search of Transparency,” in The Rule of Law in Developing Countries: The Case of Bangladesh, edited by Chowdhury Ishrak Ahmed Siddiky, New York: Routledge that-
412“Chagla J., writing in the aftermath of supersessions in the
413appointment of Chief Justice of India in 1973, lamented that „the
414Judges in a court are expected to function as a team and be loyal
415to each other‟, but that „henceforth there will be a competition
416among the Judges as to who is more forward-looking and who has
417better imbibed the gospel of the ruling party‟. A concerned Chagla
418J. wrote,
Junior Judges of the High Court have started making
speeches and writing articles giving expression to ultra
socialistic views so as to catch the eye and the ear of the
authority that will ultimately select a Chief Justice when a
vacancy arises.
……………………………………………………………….
Judges are „more often bribed by their loyalities and
ambitions than by money. A strong desire to be elevated to
the highest court of the land opens up avenues for the
Executive to exercise coercion with the candidate Judge to
obtain favourable verdicts. Ambitious candidate Judges
may prefer to disregard some of the more onerous
provisions of their Code of Conduct in an attempt to secure
positions in the highest court of the land.”
(underlines supplied)
419It reveals from the above that a High Court Judge though may not be corrupt in terms of monetary affairs but may be intellectually corrupt. The third Judge made the aforesaid remarks mala fide with a view to getting a favour of the ruling party in future to secure some unfair advantages. Such manner is seriously deprecated.
420Again, on an overall reading of the third Judge‟s observation it is apparent that he used several words which are abusive, vulgar and indecent. In the above context, the third Judge is found to have been violated the code of conduct for the Judges of Supreme Court formulated by this Division as well as the Article 111 of the Constitution of the People‟s Republic of Bangladesh.
421In view of the above discussion, I conclude that despite the obiter dicta do not have any binding force or authority on other courts but the same can be cited as persuasive authority in future litigation. Taking into consideration of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the comments of the
third Judge as stated above made by him in his separate opinion dated 05.5.2016 in Writ Petition No. 9989 of 2024 are, hereby, expunged.
J.
COURT’S ORDER
422With the above separate observations as mentioned above, we, therefore, unanimously dispose of the Civil Review Petition. Resultantly, Article 96 of the Constitution stands restored in its entirety.
423However, there is no order as to costs.
C.J.
J.
J.
J.
J.
J.
424The 20thday of October, 2024 RRO; Total words 13,607
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