High Court Division · Special Original Jurisdiction
Md. Abdul Latif v Government of Bangladesh and others
Writ Petition 10167/2019 · Decided 12 March 2026
The petitioner was appointed a junior teacher at a non-government madrasha in 1988 and enlisted in the Monthly Pay Order (MPO). In 1993 his government salary portion was stopped after a survey found one teacher in excess of the staffing pattern. A civil appellate court later held that he had been removed without following the rules and remained in service, and that decision was not challenged. His requests for arrears went unanswered, and he challenged clause 18.4 of the 2018 MPO guidelines, which bars recovery from the MPO fund of salary left undrawn because of internal disputes or litigation. The High Court Division held that clause 18.4 was not attracted because the suspension arose from an administrative decision on excess staffing, not an internal dispute, so no declaration on its validity was needed. Holding that salary is not a bounty of the State, it made the Rule absolute in part and directed payment of arrears from November 1993 to May 2014, with festival bonuses and other benefits, within 60 days.
- Q1
Whether clause 18.4 of the 2018 Madrasha staffing pattern and MPO guidelines barred a teacher from recovering arrears of the government portion of his salary where his MPO was suspended for excess staffing rather than an internal dispute.
- Q2
Whether the teacher was entitled to arrears from November 1993 to May 2014 after a civil appellate court had held that he remained in service.
- Clause 18.4 of the 2018 MPO guidelines applies only where the government salary portion remains undrawn because of internal disputes between teachers or employees and the managing committee, or litigation between them.
- Suspension of MPO on the administrative ground of excess staffing is not an internal dispute, so clause 18.4 did not bar recovery of arrears and no declaration on its validity was required.
- Since the civil appellate court's decision that the teacher remained in service was not challenged, his exclusion from the MPO was arbitrary and he was entitled to back salary, salary not being a bounty of the State.
- A guideline or circular cannot curtail benefits conferred by previously sanctioned law.
- The respondents were directed to pay the government portion of salary from November 1993 to May 2014, with festival bonuses and other admissible benefits, within 60 days.
any guideline or circular cannot and should not have the prerogative of curtailing any benefit of previous sanctioned law, but rather increase those benefits and interests ensured the summum bonum of the due process of law.
In the court’s own words.
Writ Petition 10167/2019, as published by the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. 21 pages, with paragraph numbers for citing.
1IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BANGLADESH
HIGH COURT DIVISION
2(SPECIAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION)
3WRIT PETITION NO. 10167 of 2019
Present
4Mr. Justice K.M. Hafizul Alam
-And-
5Mr. Justice Abdur Rahman
6IN THE MATTER OF:
7An application under Article 102 of the Constitution of the
8People’s Republic of Bangladesh
-And-
9IN THE MATTER OF:
10Md. Abdul Latif.
…. Petitioner
-versus-
11The Government of the People’s Republic of
12Bangladesh, represented by the Secretary, Technical
13and Madrasha Education Division, Ministry of
14Education, Bangladesh Secretariat, Dhaka, and others
…. Respondents
15Mr. Md. Humayun Kabir, Advocate
… for the petitioner
16Mr. A.M. Masum, with
17Mr. Md. Nahiyan Ibn Subhan, Advocates
…for the respondents
18Date of Hearing: 10.02.2026, 17.02.2026, and
03.03.2026 A.D.
19Date of Judgment: 12.03.2026 A.D. Thursday, 27
Falgun 1432 B.S.
20Abdur Rahman, J:
21This Rule Nisi, at the instance of the petitioner, was issued on an application under Article 102 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, challenging the vires of the provision of the Clause No.18.4 of the বসরকাির িশ া িত ান (মা াসা) এর জনবল কাঠােমা ও এম.িপ.ও নীিতমালা-২০১৮, imposing condition to pay the arrear government portion of salary of the teachers and employees of the Non-government Madrasha not to from the Government Fund (Annexure-N) should not be declared to have been passed without lawful authority and is of no legal effect, and also seeking, why a direction should not be given upon the respondents to pay the arrear government portion of the salary of the petitioner from November, 1993 to May, 2014 including festival bonus and other financial benefits after proper assessment without making any delay and/or such other or further order or orders passed as to this Court may seem fit and proper.
22The gravamen of facts leading to issuance of this Rule Nisi are that: the petitioner in response to the advertisement published in Daily Dabanal on 14.08.1988 by the concerned authority, applied for the post of Junior Assistant Teacher, and the duly constituted selection committee recommended the petitioner to be
appointed for the said post by resolution dated 18.08.1988 and issued an appointment letter to him and consequently, he joined in the said Madrasha on 20.08.1988, and since then he has been discharging his duties honestly, sincerely and with satisfaction of the authority concerned.
23Subsequently, the petitioner was enlisted in the Monthly Pay Order (MPO) with Index No. 379457 in December 1989 and continued to receive the government portion of his salary and other benefits regularly until October 1993. In 1993, a survey of non-government educational institutions determined that the approved staffing pattern for the concerned Madrasha comprised 13 teachers, whereas 14 teachers were found to be employed, resulting in one excess post. Consequently, by letter dated 27.11.1993, the Assistant Director (Special Education), Directorate of Secondary and Higher Education, Dhaka, suspended the salaries of all teachers on the grounds of excess staffing and alleged irregular payment.
24Thereafter, the Managing Committee of the concerned Madrasha unlawfully pressured and threatened the petitioner to resign; however, he refused to comply. Consequently, the Committee arbitrarily withheld his salary, and while the
government portion of the salaries of other teachers and staff was released from November 1993, the petitioner was unjustly excluded.
25Being aggrieved by such illegal activities of the Managing Committee of the said Madrasha, on 07.05.1994, the petitioner filed an application before the respondent No.3 requesting him to take necessary steps against the illegal activities of the Managing Committee of the said Madrasha, but the said respondent remained silent without considering the claim of the petitioner.
26Thereafter, on 29.05.1994, the petitioner, unsuccessfully, filed an application before the Director, BANBEIS, BANBEIS BHAVAN, Palashi-Nilkhet, Dhaka, requesting him to justify the additional teacher in the staffing pattern and to release the salary in favour of the petitioner as a legal teacher.
27Thereafter, finding no other alternative, the petitioner was compelled to file a Title Suit No. 28 of 2004 (Other) before the Assistant Judge Court, Mithapukur, Rangpur, and upon perusal of the documents on record, the Senior Assistant Judge, Mithapukur, Rangpur, was pleased to dismiss the suit vide judgment and decree dated 31.03.2011 (decree signed on 05.04.2011).
28Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 31.03.2011, the petitioner filed an appeal before the District Judge, Rangpur being Other Appeal No.124 of 2011 and upon perusal of the documents on record, the District Judge, Rangpur was pleased to allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree dated 31.03.2011 in Title Suit No. 28 of 2004 (Other) vide judgment and decree dated 04.04.2013 (decree signed on 09.04.2013).
29Thereafter, the petitioner, by applications dated 11.09.2016 and 20.03.2019, respectively, approached respondent Nos. 3 and 1 seeking payment of the government portion of his salary for the period from November 1993 to May 2014; however, both respondents failed to take any action and remained silent without considering his claim. Hence, the petitioner, finding no equal efficacious remedy, invoked this jurisdiction.
30On the other hand, learned Counsel Mr. A.M. Masum, with Mr. Md. Nahiyan Ibn Subhan, on behalf of respondent No.4, made an appearance, and contested the Rule, filing a Wokalatnama without any affidavit-in-opposition.
31Mr. Md. Humayun Kabir, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that the impugned
provision of the Clause No.18.4 of the " বসরকারী িশ া িত ান (মা াসা)-এর জনবল কাঠােমা ও এমিপও নীিতমালা-২০১৮" is inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 27,29 & 31 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh and as such the impugned Clause No.18.4 is liable to be declared as ultra vires to the Constitution.
32Learned Counsel has further submitted that the impugned provision of Clause No.18.4 of the " বসরকারী িশ া িত ান (মা াসা)- এর জনবল কাঠােমা ও এমিপও নীিতমালা-২০১৮" has been set up by the Technical and Madrasha Education Division, Ministry of Education, (respondent No.1) without any basis or reason, which is illegal, arbitrary, and without jurisdiction, hence, the impugned provision of the Clause No.18.4 is liable to be declared as ultra vires.
33Learned Counsel has further submitted that the petitioner was the junior teacher (I.A.) of the said Madrasha and the name of the petitioner was enlisted in the MPO as junior teacher (I.A), but the respondent treated the petitioner as a science teacher, which is not sustainable in the eyes of law. In exercise of the powers conferred by section 38 of the Madrasha Education Ordinance, 1978 (Ord. No. IX of 1978) and in supersession of all
existing orders or regulations or any other instruments made in this behalf, the Bangladesh Madrasha Education Board, Dhaka, with the previous approval of the Government, is pleased to make the regulations, namely, "The Affilaited Non-Government Madrasha Teachers Terms and Conditions of Service Regulations, 1979" and such regulation was published in the Bangladesh Gazette, Part-VI dated 3 January, "1980 and the said regulation has not yet been amended or repealed, but by issuing Guideline, 2018 the respondents nullified the said regulation and deprived the petitioner to get the arrear government portion of salary of the petitioner and as such the impugned provision of the Clause No. 18.4 of the " বসরকারী িশ া িত ান (মা াসা)-এর জনবল কাঠােমা ও এমিপও নীিতমালা-২০১৮" is liable to be declared as ultra vires to the existing law.
34Learned Counsel has earnestly submitted that when a law regarding specific purpose specifying procedures have been enacted the respondents have no authority to make or issue any circular overruling the provision of the specific law and as such the impugned provision of the Clause No.18.4 of the " বসরকারী িশ া িত ান (মা াসা)-এর জনবল কাঠােমা ও এমিপও নীিতমালা-২০১৮" is liable to be declared as ultra vires.
35Learned Counsel has additionally submitted that the respondents with a mala fide intention refused to pay the arrear of government portion of salary of the petitioner by issuing Guideline, 2018, resulting the said Guideline, so far as it relates to the provision of imposition of condition not to pay the arrear government portion of salary of the teachers and employees of the Non-Government Madrasha is illegal, malafide, arbitrarily and discriminatory and as such the impugned provision of the Clause No.18.4 of the " বসরকারী িশ া িত ান (মা াসা)-এর জনবল কাঠােমা ও এমিপও নীিতমালা-২০১৮" is liable to be declared as ultra vires.
36Learned Counsel has further submitted that under the provision of the Clause No.18.4 of the " বসরকারী িশ া িত ান (মা াসা)-এর জনবল কাঠােমা ও এমিপও নীিতমালা-২০১৮", the petitioner is not getting the arrear government portion of his salary which is discriminatory and violation of Article 27 & 29 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the petitioner standing on a similar footing cannot deprived of the arrear government portion of salary which will be discriminatory and will offend the rights guaranteed under Article-27 & 29 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh and as such the respondents are required to be directed to pay the
government portion of the salary of the petitioner from November, 1993 to May, 2014 including festival bonus and other financial benefit without making any delay.
37Learned Counsel has finally submitted that it is settled principle of law that the salary is no more a bounty of state resulting the petitioner is entitled to his back salary and other benefits and as such the respondents are required to be directed to pay the government portion of the salary of the petitioner from November, 1993 to May, 2014 including festival bonus and other financial benefit without making any delay. More so, giving benefits to some and denying the same to others on the same footing is not only illegal, but also offends fundamental rights of the petitioner guaranteed under Articles 28 and 29 of the Constitution. He also provided some decisions referring to 16 BLC (HCD) 601 and 66 DLR (HCD) 575.
38On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondent No.4 submitted that the learned Senior Assistant Judge in Civil Suit No. 28 of 2004 rightly dismissed the suit and the learned Appellate Court without considering the legal proposition as to the principle from the " বসরকারী িশ া িত ান (মা াসা)-এর জনবল
কাঠােমা ও এমিপও নীিতমালা-২০১৮", reverse the said judgment which cannot be sustainable in the eye of law.
39He further submitted that it is an admitted position that the petitioner’s government portion of salary was discontinued by the Managing Committee of the concerned Madrasa. Following the judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge, Rangpur, in Other Appeal No. 124 of 2011, the Managing Committee neither reinstated the petitioner in service nor disbursed the arrears of the government portion of his salary. In such circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to claim arrears for the period from November 1993 to May 2014, and this respondent bears no responsibility regarding his reinstatement.
40The learned Counsel further contended that the petitioner’s appointment was made beyond the approved staffing pattern of the Madrasha, and accordingly, suspension of his MPO was lawful and justified. Therefore, the instant Rule is liable to be discharged with costs.
41Considering the above facts and circumstances, as well as submissions made by both parties, we need to take a look at the provisions of Clause 18.4 of the বসরকারী িশ া িত ান (মা াসা)-এর জনবল কাঠােমা ও এমিপও নীিতমালা-২০১৮, which runs as under:
42“১৮.৪ িত ােনর িশ ক-কমচারী ও ব ব!াপনা কিম"টর মধ কার
43অভ 'রীণ িবেরােধর কারেণ বা তােদর মেধ সৃ+ মামলার কারেণ বতন-
44ভাতািদর সরকাির অংশ উে.ালন সম্ভব না হেল পরবত1েত বেকয়া
45িহসােব তা এম.িপ.ও খাত থেক উে.ালন করা যােব না। সংি7+ িত ান
46এর আিথক দায়-দািয়9 বহন করেব।“, (underline supplied by us to
47emphasize the meaning)
48The aforesaid provisions unequivocally contemplate that where, owing to any internal discord between the teachers/employees of an institution and its Managing Committee, or as a consequence of litigation arising inter se, the government portion of salary and allowances remains undrawn, such amount shall not thereafter be recoverable as arrears from the MPO (Monthly Pay Order) fund.
49In the present case, however, the pivotal question that falls for determination is whether the factual matrix discloses any circumstance attributable to “internal disputes between the teachers/employees and the Managing Committee, or litigation arising therefrom,” as a consequence of which the petitioner’s MPO was withheld by the respondents.
50On a careful scrutiny of the materials on record, it transpires from Annexure-C that the MPO was, in fact,
suspended on the ground of excess staffing, as explicitly recorded therein- “D³ cÖwZôv‡b 13 R‡bi ¯’‡j 14 Rb wkÿK Av‡Q| weÁvb kvLv bvB|”. This clearly indicates that the suspension was occasioned by administrative considerations relating to surplus teachers, and not by any internal dispute or litigation between the িশ ক-কমচারী and the Managing Committee.
51Furthermore, Annexure-A to the writ petition demonstrates that the petitioner was duly appointed on 20.08.1988 as a Junior Teacher (I.A.), having no responsibility whatsoever in relation to the Science section of the concerned Madrasa. There is, therefore, no nexus between the alleged ground for suspension of MPO and any act or omission attributable to the petitioner.
52In such circumstances, it is manifest that the embargo contemplated under Clause 18.4 of the বসরকারী িশ া িত ান (মা াসা)-এর জনবল কাঠােমা ও এমিপও নীিতমালা-২০১৮ is not attracted in the instant case. Consequently, the said provision does not operate as a bar to the petitioner’s entitlement to realize the government portion of salary and allowances as arrears from the MPO fund.
53On perusal of the annexed documents to this writ petition, it is found that, on 07.05.1994, the petitioner filed an application
(Annexure-D) before the respondent No.3 requesting him to take necessary steps against the illegal activities of the Managing Committee of the said Madrasha, and on 29.05.1994, the petitioner, unsuccessfully, filed an application (Annexure-E) before the Director, BANBEIS, BANBEIS BHAVAN, Palashi- Nilkhet, Dhaka, requesting him to justify the additional teacher in the staffing pattern, and finding no other alternative, the petitioner was compelled to file a Title Suit No. 28 of 2004 (Other) before the Assistant Judge Cour, Mithapukur, Rangpur, and upon perusal of the documents on record, the Senior Assistant Judge, was pleased to dismiss the suit vide judgment and decree dated 31.03.2011 (Annexure-I), and then being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 31.03.2011, the petitioner filed an appeal before the District Judge, Rangpur being Other Appeal No.124 of 2011 and upon perusal of the documents on record, the District Judge, Rangpur was pleased to allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree dated 31.03.2011 in Title Suit No. 28 of 2004 (Other) vide judgment and decree dated 04.04.2013 (Annexure-J).
54On sifting the contents of Annexure I and J, it is presumed that the Secretary of the Ministry of Education, Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Directorate, Dhaka and Chairman,
Madrasa Shikkha Board, Dhaka have been made party to the Civil Suit No. 28 of 2004, and after due contest the suit was dismissed and then in Appeal No. 124 of 2011, after hearing on contest the learned District Judge allowed the appeal specifically mentioned that, “ যেহত< সংি7+ মা াসা কতৃপ বাদী আপীলকারীেক তাহার চাকুরীচ< িতর ব াপাের কান আইনগত কায@ম বা িসিডং Bহন কেরন নাই এবং চাকুরীচ< িতর কারণ উেCখ পূবক কান পE Fারা বাদী-আপীলকারীেক অবিহত কেরন নাই। এমতাব!ায় সংি7+ মা াসা কতৃক কতৃক বাদী আপীলকারীেক চাকুরীচ< ত করা Natural justice এর পিরপিG বিলয়া আমার িবHাস। যেহত< বাদী- আপীলকারীেক মা াসার িশ ক অপসারণ্ চাকুরীচ< ত িবধানাবলী অনুসরণ কিরয়া চাকুরীচ< ত করা হয় নাই সই কারেন বাদী-আপীলকারী উI মা াসার িশ ক িহসােব চাকুরীরত রিহয়ােছন মেম আিম িসKাে' উপনীত হইয়ািছ। বাদী আপীলকারী তাহার াথ1র িতকার এবং িনL আদালত মাকMমা"ট িডসিমস কিরয়া আইন ও ঘটনাগত ভ
55Madrasha Education Division, Ministry of Education, the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Dhaka, but all the pertinent authorities remained silent without taking proper steps in that regard.
56On perusal of the impugned letter Annexure-C it is evident that “D³ cÖwZôv‡b 13 R‡bi ¯’‡j 14 Rb wkÿK Av‡Q| weÁvb kvLv bvB|”, where there is no mention of any name of any teacher of the said Madrasha. Annexure-A confirmed that the authority issue an appointment letter in favour of the petitioner mentioning that “আপনােক ১৮.৮.৮৮ইং তািরেখর সা াৎকার বােডর সুপািরশ কেম মা াসার কিম"টর িসKা' মাতােবক AÎ gv`ªvmvi জুিনয়র িশ ক (আই, এ) পেদ AvMvgx ২০.৮.৮৮ ইং তািরখ হইেত সরকারী, বতন Rেল িনেয়াগ করা হইয়ােছ।”, and the learned Judge of the Appellate Court observed and ordered that Òev`x-AvcxjKvix bqbcyi `vwLj gv`ªvmvi beg Rywbqi wkÿK wnmv‡e †hvM`vb Kwiqv wkÿKZv Kivi Rb¨ weev`xi cÖwZ eva¨Zvg~jK wb‡`©‡ki (Mandatory Injunction) Gi wWµx nq|Ó, and the defendantrespondents did not invoke any higher forum against the said judgment and decree; consequently, it established the position of the petitioner that he was the teacher No.9 and he was not the 14th number teacher, i.e. out of staff pattern of the said Madrasa, and
the same indicates that the decision as to exclusion and stopping MPO of the petitioner was arbitrary and mala fide one.
57However, the learned Counsel for the petitioner referred to the decision cited in the case Abu Zafor Vs. Bangladesh and others [16 BLC (2011) 601], where a Division Bench of the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, held that –
58“As the competent Court has declared that the petitioner is
59still in service after setting aside the order of dismissal, and
60hence the petitioner is also entitled to get the arrears of
61salaries and other benefits. The respondents are directed to
62pay the arrear salaries and other benefits to the petitioner
63from May 1998 to June 2008 within three months from the
64date of receipt of this judgment…(8 & 10).”
65Therefore, it apparently ensured that this petitioner was not a teacher out of the staff pattern of the said Madrasa, and there were no internal disputes between the petitioner and his Madrasa. Now the question to resolve whether the matter falls under the provisions of Rule 18.4 of the said Nitimala, in this regard, we may have notice upon an unreported decision of the High Court Division, which was held in Writ Petition No. 9364 of 2021, their Lordship held that,
“Having read and examined the language of the Regulation
66No. 18.6 of the " বসরকারী িশ া িত ােনর (Rুল ও কেলজ) জনবল
67কাঠােমা ও এম,িপ,ও নীিতমালা-২০১৮", we are of the opinion that,
68the words "ব SIগত মামলায় িনেদাষ মািণত হেল" will apply to
69the finding of not guilty, by a court in a criminal
70proceeding as well to the finding of 'not guilty' recorded by
71a court as regards the allegations made in a departmental
72proceeding. Besides, a departmental proceeding drawn
73against the petitioner on the allegation of misconduct does
74not amount to a conflict between the Managing Committee
75and Teachers or employees.”
76Thus, the case in our hand, manifested that there was no allegation or even a departmental proceeding against the petitioner except an administrative decision. Accordingly, the provision of Clause 18.4 of the said Nitimala do not attract the right and entitlement of the petitioner.
77However, the learned Counsel for the respondent No.4 was constrained to submit that the Managing Committee neither reinstated the petitioner in service nor disbursed the arrears of the government portion of his salary as per the judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge, Rangpur, consequently, the
petitioner is not entitled to claim arrears for the period from November 1993 to May 2014. In this connection, we observed that in the case of Quari Abdul Haleem Vs. Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and others, reported in 50 DLR 472, held that-
78“It is the settled principle of law that the salary is no more
79a bounty of the State. The petitioner is entitled to his back
80salary and other benefits.”
81Additionally, we can examine the provisions of Clauses 18.5 and 18.6 of the বসরকারী িশ া িত ােনর (Rুল ও কেলজ) জনবল কাঠােমা ও এম,িপ,ও নীিতমালা-২০১৮, which runs as under:
82“১৮.৫ ব SIগত মামলায় িনেদাষ মািণত হেল আদালেতর িনেদশনা
83সােপে কািরগির ও মা াসা িশ া িবভাগ, িশ া মUনালয় বেকয়া বতন
84fvতািদর সরকাির অংশ দােনর িবষেয় িবেবচনা করেত পারেব।
85১৮.৬ এমিপও !িগত, বািতল এবং পূণরায় চালুর েE কািরগির ও
86মা াসা িশ া িবভাগ, িশ া মUণালেয়র অনুেমাদন েয়াজন হেব;”
87From a clear view of the above provisions of the Nitimala, it is understandable that the authority does not completely preclude the door to claim back salary and benefits; the foremost condition is to have the direction of the competent Court. The case in our hand has the Court’s direction to clear the conflicting
situation the petitioner was in, within the staff pattern of the said Madrasa.
88Considering the above facts and circumstances, as well as the proposition of law, we are of the view that any guideline or circular cannot and should not have the prerogative of curtailing any benefit of previous sanctioned law, but rather increase those benefits and interests ensured the summum bonum of the due process of law. The case of the petitioner is not conflicting with the provisions of Clause 18.4 of the বসরকারী িশ া িত ান (মা াসা)-
st
89এর জনবল কাঠােমা ও এমিপও নীিতমালা-২০১৮. Consequently, the 1 portion of the Rule containing “as to why the provision of the Clause No.18.4 of the বসরকাির িশ া িত ান (মা াসা) এর জনবল কাঠােমা ও এম.িপ.ও নীিতমালা-২০১৮, imposing condition pay the arrear government portion of salary of the teachers and employees of the Non-government Madrasha not to from the Government Fund (Annexure-N) should not be declared to have been passed without lawful authority and is of no legal effect”, does not stand or require to make any declaration so far as it relates to the instant writ petition. But the 2nd portion of the Rule relating to, “why a direction should not be given upon the respondents to pay the arrear government portion of the salary of the petitioner from November, 1993 to May, 2014 including festival bonus and other
financial benefits after proper assessment without making any delay”, stands on the good footing of settled facts and law. More importantly, provisions of the Clause No.18.4 of the বসরকাির িশ া িত ান (মা াসা) এর জনবল কাঠােমা ও এম.িপ.ও নীিতমালা-২০১৮, does not operate as a bar to the petitioner’s entitlement to realize the government portion of salary and allowances as arrears from the MPO fund ifso facto.
90Considering all aspects of the instant petition, and legal propositions, we are constrained to hold that the Rule has substance in the 2nd part as per the aforesaid observations and deliberations.
91As a result, the Rule is made absolute in part without any order as to costs. The respondents are hereby directed to disburse to the petitioner the arrears of the government portion of salary for the period commencing from November 1993 to May 2014, inclusive of festival bonuses and all other admissible financial benefits, upon due verification and assessment, within a period of 60 (sixty) days from the date of receipt of this judgment. In default of compliance within the stipulated period, the authorities concerned shall render themselves liable for
dereliction of duty, mala fide conduct, and proceedings for contempt of Court.
92Communicate this judgment and order straightaway.
( Abdur Rahman, J )
93K.M. Hafizul Alam, J:
I
agree.
( K.M. Hafizul Alam, J )
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