High Court Division · Civil Revisional Jurisdiction
Omar Kader Chowdhury v Principal Rafiqul Islam and others
Civil Revision 1739/2012 · Decided 14 July 2026
While a title suit was pending before the Assistant Judge, Banshkhali, two parties obtained two months' time to take steps for arbitration. The parties then made arbitration agreements, and the arbitrators made an award on 16.01.1997. The Assistant Judge refused the plaintiffs' application to make the award a rule of the court, but meanwhile the arbitrators, at a plaintiff's request, had applied to the Joint District Judge, 3rd Court, Chattogram, under sections 14(2) and 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, who made the award a rule of the court in 2010. A defendant sought revision after a delay of 540 days. The High Court Division held that where a suit is pending, arbitration must follow Chapter IV (sections 21 to 25); as the court made no reference, the award was no award in law and could not be treated as a compromise under section 47. Since no appeal lay under sections 17 and 39, revision was the remedy, and the delay was rightly condoned. The Rule was made absolute.
Rule made absolute
- Q1
Whether an award made by arbitrators without any order of reference from the court in which a suit on the same subject matter was pending could be made a rule of the court by a different court under sections 14(2) and 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.
- Q2
Whether a civil revision, rather than an appeal, lay against the order making the award a rule of the court.
- Q3
Whether the delay of 540 days in filing the revision was rightly condoned.
- When a suit is pending, arbitration of the matters in it must follow Chapter IV (sections 21 to 25) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which requires an order of reference by the court.
- Allowing the parties time to take steps for arbitration is not a reference to the arbitrators, so an award made without such reference during the pendency of a suit is no award in the eye of law.
- Such an award cannot be treated as a compromise under section 47 where it was not filed before the court in which the suit was pending, and arbitrators have no authority to refix the valuation of the suit so as to change the court's pecuniary jurisdiction.
- As the order did not fall within the appealable grounds in sections 17 and 39 and the award was a nullity, the petitioner's remedy lay in civil revision.
- Applying a liberal approach to condonation under section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay of 540 days was rightly condoned where the petitioner had pursued the case for years and lost communication with his advocate.
- The order making the award a rule of the court was set aside and the trial court was directed to dispose of the 1993 suit expeditiously.
When there is a suit pending before any court the Act provides for arbitration to follow the provisions under Chapter-IV (sections 21 to 25) of the Act.
In the court’s own words.
Civil Revision 1739/2012, as published by the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. 27 pages, with paragraph numbers for citing.
In the Supreme Court of Bangladesh
High Court Division
(Civil Revisional Jurisdiction)
Present:
Mr. Justice Md. Riaz Uddin Khan
Civil Revision No. 1739 of 2012
IN THE MATTER OF :
An application under section 115(1) of the Code of
Civil Procedure
-And-
In the Matter of:
Omar Kader Chowdhury
… Petitioner
Versus
Principal Rafiqul Islam and others
… Opposite parties
Mr. Abdul Momen Chowdhury, Advocate
… For the petitioner
Mr. Kamal-ul-Alam, Advocate with
Ms. Shahanaj Akther, Advocate
… For the Opposite Party No. 14
Judgment on: 14.07.2026
Md. Riaz Uddin Khan, J:
1This civil revision was filed in delay of 540 days which was condoned provisionally subject to any lawful objection to be raised at the time of hearing. The Rule was issued asking the opposite parties to show cause as to why the Order No. 107 dated 28.02.2010 passed by the Joint District Judge, 3rd Court, Sadar, Chittagong in Miscellaneous Case No. 41 of 2005 making the award dated 16.01.1997 rule of the Court should not be set aside and or such other or further order or orders should not be passed as to this Court may deem fit and appropriate.
2Succinct facts for disposal of this Rule are that one Halimun Nessa Chowdhurany along with her 3 (three) sons and one daughter (opposite parties 12-16
herein) filed Other Suit No. 168 of 1993 against the defendants (opposite parties 16-30 herein) including the present petitioner of this civil revision (defendant No.9) before the Court of Assistant Judge, Banshkhali (Satkania Chouki), Chattogram praying for declaration of title of the land of schedule No.2 of the plaint and for further declaration that the defendant Nos. 1-9 had got no title therein.
3At one stage of the suit the plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.1 filed an application before the court praying for allowing them 03 months time for settling the dispute through arbitration by arbitrators as mentioned in the margin of the application. The learned Assistant Judge, Banshkhali, Satkania, Chattogram by his order No.13 dated 30.11.1996 allowed 02 (two) months time for taking steps.
4Thereafter, the parties made arbitration agreements dated 07.11.1996 and 27.11.1996 for settling their dispute in respect of 99.49 decimals of land mentioned in the schedule of the plaint. Thereafter, the arbitrators make an award on 16.01.1997. Then on 27.02.1997 the plaintiffs of that suit filed an application in the Court of Assistant Judge, Banshkhali, Satkania, Chattogram (where the suit was pending) for making the arbitration award dated 16.01.1997 a rule of the Court by way of amendment of the pleadings against which the defendant No. 1 therein filed an objection and after hearing, the Assistant Judge by his order No.24 dated 15.06.1997 rejected that application against which the plaintiffs filed civil revision No. 3039 of 1997 before the High Court Division and the High Court Division initially issued
Rule and stayed the proceedings of the Other Suit No. 168 of 1993 and ultimately after hearing both the parties, the Rule was discharged vide judgment and order dated 25.06.2001 affirming the order passed by the trial court.
5In the meantime, on 15.04.1997 on the request of plaintiff No.4, Aminur Rashid Chowdhury (the present opposite party No.14), the Arbitrators filed an application under section 14(2) read with section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) before the Joint District Judge, 3rd Court, Chattogram for making the award dated 16.01.1997 a rule of the Court. Initially it was registered as other suit No.15 of 1997 and subsequently when the mistake was detected it was registered as Miscellaneous Case No.41 of 2005. In this Miscellaneous Case the opposite parties 1-5 and 6-21 appeared and filed two sets of separate written objections. However, after hearing, the Joint District Judge, 3rd Court, Chattogram long after 13 years allowed this application and was pleased to make the award dated 16.01.1997 a rule of the Court by his judgment and order dated 28.02.2010.
6Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said judgment and order dated 28.02.2010 the present petitioner filed the instant civil revision under section 115(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure before this Court and obtained the Rule as stated at the very outset.
7Mr. Abdul Momen Chowdhury, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner submits that the Joint District Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in making the award a rule of the Court as there was no agreement for
resolving the dispute through arbitration as earlier in Other Suit No. 168 of 1993 pending before the court of Senior Assistant Judge, Banshkhali, Chattogram by order No.24 dated 15.06.1997 rejected the similar application filed by the plaintiffs. Earlier on the application of the plaintiffs the learned Assistant Judge vide order dated 15.06.1997 categorically stated that the court did not give any permission to the parties or referred for arbitration and as per section 21 to 23 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 there cannot be any arbitration and hence the trial court rejected the same and the arbitrators have come before a different court having no jurisdiction for making the award a rule of the Court which is not sustainable in law and liable to be set aside. Since the dispute was pending in a suit namely Other Class Suit No. 168 of 1993 without the permission of that court there was no scope for Arbitration and the so-called arbitration having no basis in accordance with law, the Joint District Judge committed error of law in getting the so-called award and making the same a rule of the Court.
8The learned advocate next submits that the arbitrators cannot substitute their own assessment of pecuniary value in complete disregard of the value already determined by parties in the suit before the Assistant Judge, Banshkhali as Tk-50,000/- and as such enhancing and re-fixing a new valuation of Tk-120,000/by the Arbitrators is arbitrary and illegal, on the basis of which the arbitration award is liable to be set aside. The award should have been filed in the court of Assistant Judge, Banshkhali, Chottogram, where the Other Suit No. 168 of 1993 was pending between the
contending parties including the subject matter of the award without enhancing and refixing the valuation.
9Mr. Chowdhury finally submits that the impugned judgment and order of the learned Joint District Judge was passed in the misconception of law and facts resulting in total failure of justice.
10Per contra, Mr. Kamal-Ul-Alam along with Ms. Shahanaj Akther, the learned advocate appearing for the opposite party No.14 submits that admittedly this civil revision has been filed in delay of 540 days without any explanation, not to speak of each and every day delays as such the instant civil revision is liable to be discharged on that ground only. Only a statement has been made that the petitioner’s advocate did not inform about the impugned judgment in time causing 540 days delay. Such delay cannot be condoned because the fact remains the petitioner appeared and filed written objection in the said miscellaneous case and was getting/keeping information as to proceedings and result of said miscellaneous case. The Code of Civil Procedure deals with procedural laws grounded on principle of natural justice and equity will not come in aid of indolent party who is not vigilant like the petitioner. On this point he referred the cases reported in 35 DLR (AD) 51, 1994 BLD (AD) 234 and 1997 BLD (AD) 57.
11The learned advocate then submits that the application dated 15.04.1997 under section 14(2) and 17 of the Act before the Joint District Judge in Misc. Case no. 41/2005 is maintainable. Because, on the application dated 30.11.1996 of the parties the Assistant Judge, Banshkhali allowed 2 months time to
the parties to settle their dispute in the suit in Other Class Suit No. 168/1993 out of court through Arbitration. It is therefore apparent that although the matter in dispute between the parties was pending before Court of Assistant Judge, it could be presumed that the said Court impliedly treated the said application dated 30.11.1996 for time as application U/S 14(2) and 17 of the Act for referring the matter to Arbitrators. The Arbitrators in their application dated 15.04.1997 of Misc. Case No. 41/2005 duly made statement about the said permission granting 2 months time to the parties to settle their dispute in respect of the matter in Other Class suit no.168/1993 through Arbitration. The Arbitrators assuming that the parties were duly accorded permission by the Court to settle the dispute in suit out of court through Arbitration and duly arbitrated the matter and passed the Award. Since the Award was given in relation to the disputed immovable properties measuring 99.49 decimals the same was valued by the parties for registration at Tk. 1,20,000/-. Since the Award in respect of the land was valued Tk.1,20,000/- the Arbitrators at the request of one of the parties Aminur Rashid filed the application under sections 14(2) and 17 of the Arbitration Act before the appropriate court of the Joint District Judge having pecuniary jurisdiction of Tk. 1,20,000/as the same could not have been filed before the Court of Assistant Judge as it had pecuniary jurisdiction only up to Tk. 50,000/-.
12The learned advocate next submits that the petitioner Omar Kader has neither filed any objection nor contested in the Misc. Case no. 41/2005 and as such
the Court of the Joint District Judge is also empowered under the proviso of Section 47 to consider the Award obtained otherwise than under sections 21-23 as a compromise or adjustment of the suit by the court having pecuniary jurisdiction entertained the Arbitrators' application under section 14(2) and passed a Judgment thereon making the Award a rule of the Court under section 17 on the consent of the Parties. However, Opposite Parties 6 to 21 filed the written statement but ultimately they did not appear and contest the matter at the time of hearing of Misc. Case as was found by the Joint District Judge in the impugned judgment and order. The petitioner though filed Vokalatnama neither filed any W/Obj, W/S nor appeared and contested the matter at the time of hearing of the said Misc. Case but has filed the present Civil Revision. In this Revision the Petitioner has not made any statement that there was no Agreement for Arbitration between the parties but the Award shows Petitioner was opposite party 16 in the Arbitration proceedings and all the parties by Agreement dated 27.11.1996 conferred jurisdiction on the Arbitrators to arbitrate.
13Mr. Alam emphatically submits that the submission that there was no order of the Court of Assistant Judge in O.C Suit No. 168/1993 referring the dispute in the suit to the Arbitrators under sections 21 & 23 of the Act and as such the disputed Award of the Arbitrators without such reference cannot be made rule of the Court by the court of the Joint District Judge, is not correct on various grounds. Firstly, the foundation of an arbitration is the Arbitration
Agreement. Section 14(2) provides that on the request of any party to the Arbitration Agreement, the Arbitrators may file in the Court the Award which may pass a decree making the Award a rule of the Court under section 17 of the Act. Section 17 prescribed that Court on such an application under section 14(2), may pass a Judgment in terms of the Award upon fulfilling the conditions laid down therein. Secondly, the Petitioner has filed the present Civil Revision against the judgment and order dated 28.02.2010 passed by the Joint District Judge in Misc. Case No. 41 of 2005 filed by the Arbitrators at the request of a party under sections 14(2) & 17 making the Award dated 16.01.1997 a rule of the Court and not under section 21, as such the question of any reference under section 21 does not arise at all. Thirdly, the Petitioner has not filed any objection under section 33 against the application in Misc. Case no. 41/2005 filed by the Arbitrators on the request of one of the party. The petitioner also has not filed any appeal under section 17 against the impugned Judgment and order passed in Misc. Case no. 41/2005 filed under section 14(2) and 17 of the Act. The petitioner also has not agitated any ground that the order making the Award a rule of the Court by the Joint District Judge (i) is in excess of, or (ii) not otherwise in accordance with Award, the only 02 grounds as mandated in section 17 on which the judgment and order passed under section 17 making the Award a rule of the Court can be challenged. Fourthly, the said Misc. Case No. 41/2005 was filed under section 14(2) and 17 of the Act by the Arbitrators at the request of one of the party to the Arbitration Agreement for
14pronouncement of a Judgment under section 17 of the Act making the Award a rule of the Court and to draw decree thereon having pecuniary jurisdiction of the subject matter of the arbitration at Tk. 1,20,000/-. And as such the question of any reference of the dispute to the Arbitrators themselves under section 21 of the Act to draw an Award does not arise at all.
15The learned advocate strenuously submits that Order dated 15.06.1997 passed by the Assistant Judge in O.C Suit no. 168/1993 is without jurisdiction as the Judge held that the application for amendment of the plaint for making the Award a rule of the Court cannot be entertained on the ground that court did not refer the dispute to the Arbitrators to arbitrate under section 21 & 23(1) of the Act and as such it cannot be made a rule of the Court. But the selfsame court found & held that the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court is Tk.50,000/- but the value of the Award is Tk. 1,20,000/- which is beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court and as such the application for making the Award a rule of the Court by way of amendment cannot be considered. The Assistant Judge has himself found and decided that it has no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the application for making the Award of the Arbitrators a rule of the Court but still it went on into the merit of the matter holding that it cannot make the Award a rule of the Court as it was made without a reference under section 21 & 23 as such the said order is without jurisdiction and therefore void. The civil revision no. 3039/1997 was also misconceived and without jurisdiction which was filed against the Order dated 15.06.1997 passed by the Assistant Judge in
O.C Suit no. 168/1993 holding that: (i) Plaintiff’s application was not filed upon compliance of reference to Arbitrators by an order of the Court under sections 21 to 23 of the Act and (ii) The Court has pecuniary jurisdiction of Tk.50,000/- and as such has no jurisdiction to entertain an application in respect of the disputed matter valued at Tk. 1,20,000/-. In view of the above categorical finding of lack of Jurisdiction the Civil Revision against the Judgment of Assistant Judge on the merit of the dispute is misconceived. Consequently, the Judgment in the said Civil Revision no. 3039/1997 on the merit of the dispute by the Trial Court is without jurisdiction & misconceived. It is apparent there was no judicial adjudication of any application for making the Award dated 16.01.1997 a rule of the Court in the said O.C Suit no.168/1993 and Civil Revision no. 3039/1997. A Court which has got no jurisdiction over a matter shall not go into the merit of the case and as such any Order or Judgment passed by any such court is void. Failure to raise objection as to the jurisdiction of the court to try a suit or case cannot confer a jurisdiction to a court which lawfully does not have jurisdiction to hear the said matter and any decree or order passed by such court is without jurisdiction and is a nullity. Application dated 15.04.1997 under sections 14(2) and 17 before the Joint District Judge for making the Award a rule of the Court was not a res judicata only because of the application filed on 27.02.1997 in O.C Suit no.168/1993 for making the Award a rule of the Court by way of amendment, as no issue as to merit of the matter was decided and as such the subsequent application
16dated 15.04.1997 cannot be said to be barred by res judicata. Secondly, when the application dated 27.02.1997 was adjudicated on 15.06.1997 by the Assistant Judge the application dated 15.04.1997 was already pending before the Joint District Judge in Misc. Case no. 41/2005 (15/1997) which was however adjudicated long thereafter on 28.02.2010 against which the present Civil Revision No. 1739 of 2012 is filed before this Court. Thirdly, the Assistant Judge having admittedly no pecuniary jurisdiction the adjudication on merit of the legality of the Award without reference under section 21 of the Act is without jurisdiction and as such no question of Res judicata arises.
17The learned advocate for the opposite party No.14 also submits that admittedly the arbitration was not held with the permission of the court but the arbitration was held otherwise as per section 47 of the Act, the arbitration was rightly held and the court accepting that award and making it a rule of the court under section 17 of the Arbitration Act did not commit any mistake hence the rule is liable to be discharged.
18The learned advocate further submits that an application under section 30 of the Act can be filed in Court for setting aside the Award on any of the grounds mentioned therein. But in the present case no such application has been filed by the petitioner. Section 33 provides that any party to the Arbitration Agreement by filing application may challenge the existence or validity of the Agreement or an Award. And the Court can decide such question on Affidavit. But the proviso provides that no such application challenging the existence or validity of the Arbitration Agreement or
Award shall be entertained by the Court, unless the applicant furnishes security for fulfillment of any obligation by him under the Award. The Petitioner or any opposite parties of that Misc case did not file Application under section 33 in the Court of Joint District Judge. The petitioner also has not filed any Written Objection against the Plaintiff's application though some opposite parties have filed Written Statement and this may however be treated to be an objection under section 33 but since no security has been furnished by the same cannot be treated and adjudicated under section 33 which was also barred by Limitation. Any person who is a non-party to the Arbitration Agreement, denying the existence of any Agreement can bring a suit under section 33 of the Act for declaration that he is not a party to the Arbitration Agreement. The Petitioner having not filed any objection under section 33 his remedy lies in filing a suit under section 33 of the Act before appropriate court.
19Mr. Alam finally submits that the present civil revision is not maintainable as the impugned judgment and order dated 28.02.2010 passed by the Joint District Judge, 3rd Court, Chattogram in Miscellaneous Case No. 41 of 2005 making the award dated 16.01.1997 a rule of the Court under section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 against which an appeal lies under the provision of section 39(1) (i) and (vi) read with section 17 of the Act. However, Mr. Alam admits that this Court can convert the civil revision petition into Memorandum of appeal, if the Court thinks it fit and appropriate.
20I have heard the submissions advanced at the bar, perused the application, supplementary affidavit, counter affidavit, reply of the counter affidavit along with the annexures. I have also gone through the Lower Court Record of Miscellaneous Case No. 41 of 2005. I have carefully examined the impugned judgment and order.
21In this case both the learned advocates raised many questions before this Court referring many sections of the Arbitration Act, 1940 with citation of series of reported cases but the main contention of the petitioner is that since there was a suit pending before the Assistant Judge, Banshkhali, Chattogram and during pendency of that suit the plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.1 filed an application before that court seeking time to take steps for arbitration and time was allowed for taking steps and thereafter they hold the arbitration without permission of the court which is not permissible under law. According to the learned advocate of the petitioner the arbitration is to be dealt with as per Chapter-IV (sections 21 to 25) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 when a suit is pending before any court.
22On the other hand, the contention of the learned advocate for the opposite party No.14 is that the Arbitration Act, 1940 permits the parties for arbitration otherwise by obtaining permission from the court and the present civil revision is barred by limitation.
23In dealing with this main contention it would be profitable if the relevant sections of the Arbitration Act, 1940 are reproduced. Section 14 of the
Act deals with arbitration without intervention of a Court which states- Section-14. Award to be signed and filed-(1) When the arbitrators or umpire have made their award, they shall sign it and shall give notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing thereof and of the amount of fees and charges payable in respect of the arbitration and award.
24(2) The arbitrators or umpire shall, at the request of any party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming under such party or if so directed by the Court and upon payment of the fees and charges due in respect of the arbitration and award and of the costs and charges of filing the award, cause the award or a signed copy of it, together with any depositions and documents which may have been taken and proved before them, to be filed in Court, and the Court shall thereupon give notice to the parties of the filing of the award.
25(3) Where the arbitrators or umpire state a special case under clause (b) of section 13, the Court, after giving notice to the parties and hearing them, shall pronounce its opinion thereon and such opinion shall be added to, and shall form part of, the award.
26Section 17 also fall under the chapter which deals with the arbitration without intervention of a Court reads as under- Section-17. Judgment in terms of award- Where the Court sees no cause to remit the award or any of the matters referred to arbitration for reconsideration or to set aside the award, the
Court shall, after the time for making an application to set aside the award has expired, or such application having been made, after refusing it, proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow, and no appeal shall lie from such decree except on the ground that it is in excess of, or not otherwise in accordance with, the award. Section 20 under Chapter-III deals with the arbitration with intervention of a Court where there is no suit pending. Section 21 under Chapter-IV deals with arbitration in suits which is quoted below- Section-21. Parties to suit may apply for order of reference- Where in any suit all the parties interested agree that any matter in difference between them in the suit shall be referred to arbitration, they may at any time before judgment is pronounced apply in writing to the Court for an order of reference. Section 22 is also under Chapter-IV which reads as under- Section-22. Appointment of arbitrator- The arbitrator shall be appointed in such manner as may be agreed upon between the parties. Section-23 also under the same chapter reads as below- Section 23. Order of reference- (1) The Court shall, by order, refer to the arbitrator the matter in difference which he is required to determine, and shall in the order specify such
27time as it thinks reasonable for the making of the award. (2) Where matter is referred to arbitration, the Court shall not, save in the manner and to the extent provided in this Act, deal with such matter in the suit. Section 25 also under Chapter-IV provides- Section-25. Provisions applicable to arbitrations under this Chapter- The provisions of the other Chapters shall, so far as they can be made applicable, apply to arbitrations under this Chapter: Provided that the Court may, in any of the circumstances mentioned in sections 8, 10, 11 and 12 instead of filling up the vacancies or making the appointments, make an order superseding the arbitration and proceed with the suit, and where the Court makes an order superseding the arbitration under section 19, it shall proceed with the suit. Section 30 under Chapter-V deals with grounds for setting aside award is quoted below- Section 30. Grounds for setting aside award- An award shall not be set aside except on one or more of the following grounds, namely:- (a) that an arbitrator or umpire has misconducted himself or the proceedings; (b) that an award has been made after the issue of an order by the Court suspending the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under section 35;
28(c) that an award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid. Section-31 under same chapter deals with the jurisdiction of the Court is as follows- Section 31. Jurisdiction- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, an award may be filed in any Court having jurisdiction in the matter to which the reference relates. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force and save as other-wise provided in this Act, all questions regarding the validity, effect or existence of an award or an arbitration agreement between the parties to the agreement or persons claiming under them shall be decided by the Court in which the award under the agreement has been, or may be, filed and by no other Court. (3) All applications regarding the conduct of arbitration proceedings or otherwise arising out of such proceedings shall be made to the Court where the award has been, or may be, filed and by no other Court. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, where in any reference any application under this Act has been made in a Court competent to entertain it, that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that reference and the arbitration proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court.
29Section-33. Arbitration agreement or award to be contested by application- Any party to an arbitration agreement or any person claiming under him desiring to challenge the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement or an award or to have the effect of either determined shall apply to the Court and the Court shall decide the question on affidavits; Provided that where the Court deems it just and expedient, it may set down the application for hearing on other evidence also, and it may pass such orders for discovery and particulars as it may do in a suit; Provided that no application challenging the existence or validity of an award or for having its effect determined shall be entertained by the Court unless the applicant has deposited in the Court the amount which he is required to pay under the award or has furnished security to the satisfaction of the Court for the payment of such sum or for the fulfilment of any other obligation by him under the award. Section-39 under Chapter-VI deals with appeals which is quoted below- Section 39. Appealable orders- (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act (and from no others) to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order: An order- (i) superseding an arbitration;
30(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special
case;
31(iii) modifying or correcting an award;
32(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration
agreement;
33(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings
where there is an arbitration agreement;
34(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an
award:
35Provided that the provisions of this section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.
36(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.
37Section-47 under Chapter-VII (Miscellaneous) is quoted below- Section 47. Act to apply to all arbitration- Subject to the provisions of section 46, and save insofar as is otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, the provisions of this Act shall apply to all arbitrations and to all proceedings thereunder:
38Provided that an arbitration award otherwise obtained may with the consent of all the parties interested be taken into consideration as a compromise or adjustment of a suit by any Court before which the suit is pending.
39Now, the main controversy between the parties in the instant civil revision is that whether the award can be made a rule of the court, as has been made in
the instant case by the Joint District judge while a suit was pending before the court of Assistant judge on the same subject matter amongst the same parties. Admittedly, there was a suit being Other Class Suit No. 168 of 1993 pending before the court of Assistant Judge, Banshkhali, Chattogram and it is also admitted that an application was filed mentioning that the parties are willing to mitigate their dispute through arbitration further mentioning the names of the 7 (seven) arbitrators in the margin of the application and ultimately sought two months time and the court allowed two months time for taking steps. It is also admitted that the trial court did not give permission to the parties or did not make reference to the arbitrator(s) the matter to be resolved through arbitration. The learned advocate for the opposite party no.14 by his eloquent submissions tried to impress this Court that though there was a suit pending before the court but the arbitration held without permission of the court hence it will come under section 47 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and the Joint District Judge did not commit any wrong in making the award a rule of the Court. Section 47 of the Act has already been quoted above. From plain reading of the section it appears that it makes all the provisions of the Act applicable to all arbitrations and to all proceedings thereunder subject to some condition. It further provides that an arbitration award, otherwise obtained, may with the consent of all the parties interested be taken into consideration as a compromise or adjustment of a suit by any Court before which the suit is pending.
In the Arbitration Act, 1940 the legislature
40deals with different types of arbitration. Chapter-II (sections 3 to 19) deals with arbitration without intervention of a Court. Chapter-III (section 20) deals the arbitration with intervention of a court where there is no suit pending and Chapter-IV (sections 21 to 25) deals with arbitration in suits pending before court. Since admittedly, there was a suit pending before the Assistant Judge, Banshkhali, Chattogram and the plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.1 filed a joint application before that court for an arbitration but sought only time which was allowed by the court, it cannot be said that the Arbitrators were permitted or any reference was made to them by the court for arbitration. When there is a suit pending before any court the Act provides for arbitration to follow the provisions under Chapter-IV (sections 21 to 25) of the Act. In that case the parties can file an application under section 21 of the Act for arbitration and the court under section 22 may appoint arbitrator(s) by the court itself or as prayed by the parties and under section 23 the court finally refers the matter to the arbitrator(s) but in the present case there was no such reference made by the court to the arbitrators which was also conceded by the learned advocate of the opposite party. From the above facts it is clear that with a misconception of the facts and law the arbitrators thought they were empowered by the order of the court for arbitration but the record reveals that the arbitrators were not permitted or referred for arbitration by the court. In the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above, I am of the
view, that the learned Joint District Judge committed error of law in entertaining such an award making it a rule of the court when parties earlier sought permission from the court of Assistant Judge where a suit was pending.
41From plain reading of section 39 of Arbitration Act it appears that any order passed by the court superseding an Arbitration on an award stated in the form of special case modifying or correcting an award for filing or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an Arbitration agreement, appeal can be filed on 6 grounds against the order for setting aside or refusing to set aside the agreement and award. In the present case the impugned judgment and order passed under section 17 of the Act, which is in fact a decree, cannot be said passed which can be challenged in appeal in any of these 6 grounds. From section 17 of the Act it appears that any judgment passed under this section will be treated as decree of the court and no appeal shall lie against this decree except on two grounds, that is, on the ground that it is in excess of, or not otherwise in accordance with, the award. In the present case the impugned judgment is passed under section 17 of the Arbitration Act. Hence it is, as per section 17, a decree. This civil revision has been filed admittedly not challenging on the ground that it is excess of or not otherwise in accordance with the award. Hence the appeal under section 17 also does not lie in the present case. We have already noticed that the Arbitration was held without the permission or reference of the court during pendency of a suit. Hence this award is no award in the eye of law and in that
sense, in my humble opinion, the appeal does not lie and the petitioner’s remedy lies in civil revision. This view is supported by a series of decisions reported in AIR 1951 Madraj 665, AIR 1952 Calcutta 10, AIR 1949 Madraj 256, AIR 1949 Madraj 273. However, Mr. Kamal-ul-Alam frankly conceded that if this Court found that the appeal lies then a civil revision may be converted into appeal and the appeal may also be converted into civil revision as well by this Court. In that view, on this point no more elaborate discussion is necessary.
42The next point regarding the bar of present civil revision on limitation, it appears from record, that the delay of 540 days in filing the instant civil revision were provisionally condoned by this Court. Series of decisions have been cited before this Court regarding the condonation of delay under section 5 of the limitation Act.
43In condoning delay under section 5 of the limitation Act the Indian Supreme Court, AIR 1987 SC 1353, adopted a liberal approach condoning the delay which was approved by our court in 59 DLR (AD) 1 wherein it has been stated that- 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late, 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties, 3. “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every
second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner, 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay, 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of mala-fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by recording delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk, 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.
44I respectfully agree with the above principle in dealing with condoning delay and fully endorse it. In the light of above principle should this Court condone the delay occurred in the instant case which was earlier provisionally condoned by this Court? In the present case the petitioner explained the delay though a bit causal manner stating that the learned advocate did not communicate the result of the miscellaneous case and after knowing from the opposite party when they tried to mutate the land, the petitioner came before the court and obtained the certificate copy and filed this civil revision. I have examined all the order sheets of Miscellaneous Case No.41 of 2005 (previously Other Suit No. 15 of 1997) from date of filing in 1997 to the date of passing the impugned judgment and order in 2010 and it appears from the order sheets that the petitioner along with opposite parties 6 to 21 (who was opposite party no.21)
45was present by filing joint written statement all through up to 2009. So, it cannot be said that the petitioner was indolent or negligent in pursuing his cause as the record shows that the petitioner along with other opposite parties of the misc case was pursuing his cause for more than 10 years and the petitioner may have lost communication with the learned advocate and I find substance in the submission of the learned advocate of the petitioner that there was a communication gap between the petitioner and the learned advocate. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. Hence taking a liberal approach as enunciated by the Indian Supreme Court, approved by our Supreme Court, I am of the view, the delay was justly condoned by this Court at the time of the issuance of the Rule.
46On the submission of the learned advocate for the opposite party that the order dated 15.06.1997 passed by the Assistant judge is a nullity having no pecuniary jurisdiction and consequently the judgment and order dated 25.06.2001 passed by the High Court Division in Civil Revision No.3039 of 1997 is also a nullity is not necessary to be determined in disposing the instant civil revision. Because on that issue the result of this civil revision will not be affected in any way. Be that as it may, suffice is to say, that the jurisdiction of the court is a root and fundamental question and it is long settled that any order/judgment/decision passed by any Court or
authority having no jurisdiction is no order/judgment/decision in the eye of law. I have already opined that the arbitration award dated 16.01.1997 is no award in the eye of law as it was made by the arbitrators without referred by the court of Assistant Judge where a suit namely Other Class Suit No.168 of 1993 was pending. It cannot be even treated as compromise between the agreeing parties under section 47 of the Arbitration Act as it is not filed before the Court where the suit was pending rather filed before the court of Joint district judge enhancing the pecuniary valuation of the subject matter. When a suit is pending specifically mentioning the valuation of the suit, the arbitrators did not have any authority to enhance or refix the valuation changing the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court.
47In the facts and circumstances and the points of law as discussed above the instant civil revision merits consideration and I found substance in the instant Rule for which I am inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment and order dated 28.02.2010, which in fact a decree, passed by the Joint District Judge making the award, a rule of the Court which is no award in the eye of law.
48In the result the Rule is made absolute. However, without any order as to cost.
49The judgment and order, (in fact decree) dated 28.02.2010 passed by the Joint District Judge, 3rd Court, Chattogram in Miscellaneous Case No.41 of 2005 making the award dated 16.01.1997, a rule of the court is hereby set aside.
50This Court is informed that the suit is still pending before the trial court. In that view, the trial court is directed to dispose of the suit expeditiously as early as possible without affording unnecessary adjournments keeping in mind that the original suit is of the year 1993. Ziaul Karim Bench Officer
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