High Court Division
A. Awal and others v Md. Jaher Ullah and others
Civil Revision 3297/2022 · Decided 11 August 2026
The petitioners, who were defendants in a 1986 partition suit, applied in 2014 under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure to set aside the ex parte (one-sided) preliminary decree of 05.06.1991. They claimed summons was never served and that the plaintiffs had colluded with the process server and postal peon to obtain false service reports. The Assistant Judge dismissed the application and the District Judge affirmed. The High Court Division found that the process server's return, the postal receipts and the trial court's order of 21.10.1989 recording due service formed a consistent body of documentary evidence of service, backed by the presumption that official acts are regularly performed. Fraud and collusion needed cogent evidence, which was absent. The petitioners' own witness admitted earlier knowledge of the suit and gave inconsistent accounts of how and when he learned of the decree. Limitation was treated as an additional circumstance against them. Finding no perversity or error of law, the Court discharged the Rule and vacated the stay.
Rule discharged; refusal to set aside ex parte decree affirmed
- Rule absolute and Rule dischargedThe two final results of a Rule in the High Court Division: made absolute means the petitioner wins; discharged means the petition fails and the order below stands.Read the full explanation →
- Set asideTo cancel an earlier court order, decree, award, sale or conviction so that it no longer has legal effect, usually by a higher court or by the same court on a proper application.Read the full explanation →
- Ex parte (ektorfa)Done in the absence of one side. An ex parte decree is passed when a duly served defendant does not appear; it can be set aside for faulty service or sufficient cause.Read the full explanation →
- Decree (dikri)The formal order recording a civil court's final decision on the parties' rights in a suit, which can be appealed and is enforced by execution.Read the full explanation →
- Q1
Whether the petitioners established that summons was not duly served on them in the partition suit so that the ex parte preliminary decree should be set aside under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
- Q2
Whether the plaintiffs obtained the ex parte decree by fraud and collusion with the process server and postal authorities.
- Q3
Whether the concurrent findings of the courts below called for interference in revisional jurisdiction.
- Under Order V Rule 19A a declaration by the serving officer is received as evidence of service, so examining the process server is not indispensable where a duly recorded declaration is on the record.
- The fact that a plaintiff received summons on behalf of his own mother, a defendant, might question the regularity of that service but did not by itself establish collusion or fraud.
- The service return, the postal receipts and the order dated 21.10.1989 recording due service, together with the presumption under section 114 illustration (e) of the Evidence Act, supported due service, and the petitioners did not rebut them.
- The petitioners' witness admitted earlier knowledge of the suit and contradicted the application on the source and date of knowledge, which went to the root of their plea.
- Limitation under Article 164 of the Limitation Act was an additional circumstance against the petitioners, though not the sole basis of decision.
- The concurrent findings were based on evidence without perversity or error of law, so the Rule was discharged and the stay vacated.
Fraud and collusion are serious allegations and must be established by cogent evidence. In the present case the petitioners have not adduced any independent or convincing evidence
In the court’s own words.
Civil Revision 3297/2022, as published by the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. 17 pages, with paragraph numbers for citing.
1Bench:
2Mr. Justice Md. Ali Reza
3Civil Revision No. 3297 of 2022
4A. Awal and others
5……petitioners
6-Versus-
7Md. Jaher Ullah and others
9Mr. Palash Mallick, Advocate
10……for the petitioner
11Mr. Golam Rabbani, Advocate
12……for opposite parties
13Heard on: 30.06.2026, 05.07.2026,
1420.07.2026 and 28.07.2026
15Judgment on: 11.08.2026
16In the instant revision Rule was issued calling upon the opposite parties to show cause as to why the impugned judgment and order dated 21.06.2022 passed by the Senior District Judge, Kurigram in Miscellaneous Appeal Number 20 of 2017 affirming the judgment and order dated 06.09.2017 passed by the Assistant Judge, Burungamari, Kurigram in Miscellaneous Case Number 14 of 2014 should not be set aside and/or such other or further order or orders be passed as to this Court may seem fit and proper.
17The petitioners filed Miscellaneous Case Number 14 of 2014 on 18.08.2014 before the Court of the Assistant Judge,
Bhurungamari, Kurigram under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying for setting aside the exparte judgment and decree dated 05.06.1991 passed in Other Suit Number 86 of 1986.
18The case of the petitioners is that the present opposite parties as plaintiffs filed Other Suit Number 86 of 1986 for partition in which the present petitioners were impleaded as defendants 57, 58, 61, 62, 63, 75, 76, 81 and 82. According to the petitioners no summons was ever served upon them. It is alleged that in collusion with the process server and the postal peon the plaintiffs procured false reports of service and thereby practised fraud upon the Court by obtaining the exparte decree dated 05.06.1991 behind their back and without their knowledge. Had they received summons they would have appeared in the suit and contested the same. The exparte decree has caused them irreparable loss and injury. They further alleged that they had no knowledge of the decree until 10.08.2014 when opposite party 1 asked them to vacate the suit land claiming title under the decree. Thereafter they made enquiries in Court and came to know about the exparte decree and filed the present miscellaneous case.
19The present opposite parties contested the case by filing written objection denying all the material allegations made in
the application. Their case is that summonses upon the present petitioners were duly served in the original suit and the reports of service were duly accepted by the Court. Thereafter a preliminary decree for partition was passed on 05.06.1991. The contesting defendants preferred an appeal which was allowed. Against the appellate judgment the present opposite parties preferred a civil revision before the High Court Division and succeeded. The decree was thereby restored. The contesting defendants thereafter preferred Civil Revision for Leave to Appeal before the Appellate Division but failed. Subsequently a Commissioner effected partition by allotting separate saham to the respective parties. According to the opposite parties the present petitioners were fully aware of all these proceedings and the present miscellaneous case has been filed on false and fabricated allegations only to frustrate the decree.
20The Assistant Judge framed three issues for determination. The petitioners examined two witnesses and the opposite parties also examined two witnesses. Upon consideration of the evidence on record the Assistant Judge by judgment and order dated 06.09.2017 dismissed Miscellaneous Case Number 14 of 2014.
21Being aggrieved the petitioners preferred Miscellaneous Appeal Number 20 of 2017 before the District Judge, Kurigram.
22By judgment and order dated 21.06.2022 the appellate Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment of the trial Court.
23Challenging the concurrent findings of the Courts below petitioners 1 to 5 have preferred this revisional application and obtained the present Rule on 07.08.2022.
24Mr. Palash Mallick, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners submits that the Courts below committed serious error of law resulting in failure of justice by dismissing the miscellaneous case upon erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. He submits that collusion is apparent from the record itself inasmuch as plaintiff 1 of the original suit allegedly received summons on behalf of defendant 79. According to the learned Advocate the summonses were not duly served in accordance with the provisions of Order V Rules 12, 13, 17, 19 and 19A of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Rules 68. 82, 83 and 84 of the Civil Rules and Orders. Therefore the impugned judgments are illegal and liable to be set aside.
25The learned Advocate further submits that under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure once the defendants satisfy the Court that summons was not duly served the Court is under a legal obligation to set aside the ex parte decree. In such a case the question whether the defendants had knowledge of the
institution of the suit is wholly irrelevant. He further submits that the petitioners discharged their initial burden by adducing sufficient evidence and thereafter the burden shifted to the opposite parties to prove that summonses had in fact been duly served. According to him the plaintiffs of the original suit were legally bound to prove due service of summons but both the Courts below failed to appreciate this settled principle of law. He therefore prays for making the Rule absolute.
26On the other hand learned Advocate Mr. Golam Rabbani appearing for the opposite parties submits that both the Courts below concurrently found that the petitioners had been duly served with summons both through the process server and by registered post. He submits that upon proper consideration of the record and evidence both the Courts below rightly held that the summonses were duly served upon the defendants-petitioners and the allegation of fraud was not supported by any evidence adduced on behalf of the petitioners. Consequently the miscellaneous case was rightly dismissed and the Courts below committed no error of law occasioning any failure of justice.
27The learned Advocate further submits that the return of service contains the declarations made by the process server in due discharge of his official duty. Therefore there was no legal requirement to examine the process server as a witness. He
further submits that some of the defendants personally received the summonses from the process server while others received the same through their family members who acknowledged receipt by signing the service return. The postal receipts were also accepted by the Court. Accordingly there was no legal impediment for the trial Court to proceed with the suit after being satisfied that the summonses were duly served in accordance with the provisions of Order V Rule 19B(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure as inserted by the amendment of 1983.
28He next contends that under Sections 101-103 of the Evidence Act the burden squarely lies upon the defendantspetitioners to prove that the summonses were not duly served and a mere denial of service is wholly insufficient to discharge such burden. He further submits that under Section 114 illustration (e) of the Evidence Act the Court is entitled to presume that official and judicial acts have been regularly performed. Since the summonses were also sent by registered post and the postal acknowledgements were accepted by the Court such presumption clearly operates in favour of the validity of the service.
29He lastly submits that the petitioners had knowledge of the suit and service of summons was completed under Order 5 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the original decree was
ultimately affirmed by the Appellate Division after exhausting all appellate remedies by the contesting defendants. In such circumstances a bare allegation that summonses had not been duly served cannot entitle the petitioners to have the exparte decree set aside. He accordingly prays for discharge of the Rule.
30I have heard the learned Advocates for the parties and perused the revisional application, the written objection, the evidence adduced by the parties, the service return, the postal receipts, the orders passed in the original suit and the judgments of the Courts below.
31The principal question for determination is whether the petitioners have been able to establish that summonses were not duly served upon them in Other Suit Number 86 of 1986 and whether the ex parte preliminary decree dated 05.06.1991 is liable to be set aside under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
32It appears from the record that the opposite parties as plaintiffs filed Other Suit Number 86 of 1986 on 26.11.1986 for partition. In the said suit defendants 16/67-74/93 contested the suit. The plaintiffs claimed title as heirs of the C.S. recorded owner whereas the contesting defendants claimed title on the basis of settlement and auction. The suit was decreed on 05.06.1991in preliminary form.
33The contesting defendants thereafter preferred Other Appeal Number 77 of 1991. The appeal was allowed on 11.06.1997. Against the said judgment the plaintiffs preferred Civil Revision Number 4660 of 1997 before this Court. The Rule was made absolute by judgments dated 06.07.2009 and 07.07.2009 and the decree in the suit was maintained. Against the said judgment the defendants preferred Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal Number 2335 of 2009 before the Appellate Division and the same was dismissed on 20.04.2014. Thereafter the learned Advocate Commissioner submitted his report on 17.09.2014 and the final decree was passed on 12.10.2014. Subsequently Execution Case Number 2 of 2021 was filed on 07.02.2021 and the said execution proceeding is presently stayed by an order of this Court dated 07.08.2022.
34The petitioners have invoked Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the exparte decree.
35The provisions of Order V of the Code are relevant in this regard. Rule 18 requires the serving officer to endorse or annex to the original summons a return stating the time and manner in which the summons was served and the circumstances in which it was served.
36Rule 19 empowers the Court to examine the serving officer where necessary and to make such further inquiry as may be required. Rule 19A further provides that a declaration made and subscribed by the serving officer shall be received as evidence of the facts as to the service or attempted service of summons. Thus the law does not make the examination of the process server an indispensable requirement in every case where a duly recorded declaration of service is available on the record.
37It appears from the service return dated 29.12.1987 that the process server recorded the declaration in the return in accordance with law. The return further shows that summonses upon contesting defendants 67-74 were served upon their brothers defendants 68 and 70 who were found on their behalf. It also appears that summons upon present petitioner 58 namely defendant Abdur Rashid was served upon present petitioner 57 namely defendant Abdul Awal. Likewise summons upon present petitioner 81 namely defendant Danez Ali was served upon present petitioner 82 namely defendant Lal Mia. It shows that the concerned defendants were not strangers to the litigation and summonses were received on their behalf by persons connected with them. The petitioners have not been able to discredit the said return by any reliable evidence.
38The learned Advocate for the petitioners has relied upon the same service return and submits that collusion is apparent because plaintiff 1 of the original suit himself received summons on behalf of defendant 79. In my view the said circumstance may be relied upon to question the regularity of service upon defendant 79. But it does not by itself establish collusion or fraud.
39It is particularly significant that defendant 79 was the mother of plaintiff 1 of the original suit. Therefore the mere fact that plaintiff 1 received summons on behalf of his mother cannot without further evidence establish that the plaintiffs in collusion with the process server practised fraud upon the Court. The learned Advocate may legitimately question whether service upon defendant 79 was affected in strict compliance with the procedural requirements. But the said circumstance standing alone cannot establish the allegation of conspiracy or fraudulent manipulation of the judicial process.
40Fraud and collusion are serious allegations and must be established by cogent evidence. In the present case the petitioners have not adduced any independent or convincing evidence showing that the plaintiffs or the process server or the postal authorities acted in collusion or deliberately placed false service reports before the Court.
41There is another important aspect of the matter. The record contains postal receipts bearing Numbers 993, 978, 982, 983, 979, 992 and 990 showing that summonses were sent through the postal authorities to defendants 57 Abdul Awal, 58 Abdur Rashid, 61 Lablu. 62 Jahangir, 63 Rezia, 76 Mujibor and 75 Sarbesh respectively. Therefore the record does not merely contain the process server's return. It also contains contemporaneous postal materials showing that summonses were sent to the concerned defendants by post.
42Order V Rule 19B contemplates service of summons by registered post with acknowledgment due in addition to the ordinary mode of service. Where the acknowledgment purporting to bear the signature of the defendant or his agent is received or the postal article is returned with an endorsement of refusal the Court may declare that the summons has been duly served. The Rule further provides for a declaration of due service in the circumstances specified therein even where the acknowledgment has not been received within the prescribed period despite proper addressing with prepayment and dispatch by registered post.
43In the present case the postal receipts coupled with the orders passed by the original Court materially support the case of due service. The petitioners have not produced any evidence
to establish that the postal records are fabricated or summonses were never dispatched.
44It is also significant that in Order Number 30 dated 21.10.1989 passed in the original partition suit the Court recorded that summonses upon defendants 1-14/16-58/60-91 had been duly served. Thus the service return as well as the postal records and the order of the Court in the original suit when considered together form a consistent body of documentary evidence supporting due service.
45Section 114 illustration (e) of the Evidence Act also permits the Court to presume that judicial and official acts have been regularly performed. The petitioners have not adduced sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption arising from the official records in the present case. The plaintiffs have duly discharged their initial onus under Sections 101-103 of the Evidence Act.
46In examination-in-chief P.W.-1 stated that he knew nothing regarding service of summons and the petitioners had no prior knowledge of the exparte decree. He further stated that they came to know of the matter in about October 2014 when the Commissioner told them that the opposite parties had obtained land and asked them to vacate the same.
47But in cross-examination PW-1 stated that they had knowledge of the original suit earlier. He further stated that he came to know of the decree after the Commissioner went to his house at about noon. This evidence is materially inconsistent with the statements made in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the application under Order 9 Rule 13. In the application the petitioners stated that they came to know of the decree from opposite party 1 on 10.08.2014 when opposite party 1 disclosed the decree and asked them to vacate the suit land.
48Thus the petitioners have taken inconsistent positions regarding the source and date of their alleged knowledge. Such contradiction is not a minor discrepancy. It goes to the root of their plea that they had no knowledge of the decree until 10.08.2014.
49More importantly PW-1 admitted that they had knowledge of the original suit earlier. Such admission is wholly inconsistent with the broad assertion that the petitioners remained completely unaware of the proceeding until 2014.
50The petitioners have also not explained why they did not take any step to ascertain the progress of the litigation despite the service materials dating back to 1987 and despite the fact that the original partition suit was actively contested by other
defendants and subsequently travelled through the appellate process up to the Appellate Division.
51It is also noteworthy that the petitioners admittedly belong to the same locality and shared a common interest with the contesting defendants in respect of the subject matter of the original partition suit. This circumstance by itself may not establish knowledge. But when considered together with the service return, the postal records, the order dated 21.10.1989 and the admission of PW-1 it becomes a relevant surrounding circumstance which further weakens the plea of complete ignorance.
52As regards petitioner 2 namely Rezaul Karim I have not been able to ascertain from the record placed before me whether he was a party to the original suit. Therefore no definite finding regarding his service in the original suit can safely be recorded. This circumstance however does not affect the position of the other petitioners whose status as defendants and whose service are supported by the materials on record.
53The distinction between an allegation of irregular service and an allegation of fraud must also be maintained. Even assuming that some aspect of service upon a particular defendant could be questioned but such circumstance would not by itself prove that the decree was obtained by fraud or
collusion. The latter allegation requires cogent evidence which is absent in the present case.
54I therefore find that the principal factual foundation of the application under Order 9 Rule 13 is contradicted by the official records and the petitioners' own evidence. The allegation of nonservice has not been established.
55The question of limitation may also be considered as an additional ground. Article 164 of the Limitation Act prescribes 30 days for an application to set aside an ex parte decree. Where summons was duly served the period runs from the date of the decree. Where summons was not duly served the relevant period runs from the date of knowledge of the decree.
56In the present case the petitioners pleaded that they came to know of the decree on 10.08.2014 and filed the Miscellaneous Case on 18.08.2014. Therefore if that plea were accepted as correct the application could not be held barred merely on the basis of those two dates. But the evidence on record does not support that plea. Rather the service return and the other documentary evidence show knowledge of the original proceeding much earlier. PW-1 also admitted earlier knowledge of the suit.
57Although no separate issue on limitation was framed by the trial Court the question arises from the materials already on
record and is closely connected with the petitioners' own plea regarding the date of knowledge. It involves both questions of law and fact. Nevertheless I consider it unnecessary to make limitation the sole basis for disposal of the Rule because the petitioners have already failed to establish non-service of summons and fraud. The question of limitation therefore constitutes an additional circumstance against the petitioners.
58The original partition suit was filed in 1986. The contesting defendants actively litigated the matter and the dispute ultimately travelled to the Appellate Division. The present petitioners had an opportunity to contest the suit if they had wished to do so. The documentary materials indicate service and knowledge of the proceeding. Yet they did not contest the suit and waited until 2014 to invoke Order 9 Rule 13. Their explanation for such prolonged inaction is not supported by reliable evidence.
59Upon consideration of the entire materials on record it is found that the concurrent findings are based on evidence and do not suffer from any perversity or error of law warranting interference by this Court in its revisional jurisdiction.
60The submission that the Courts below committed error of law occasioning failure of justice therefore fails.
61Accordingly the Rule is discharged.
62The judgment and order dated 21.06.2022 passed by the District Judge, Kurigram in Miscellaneous Appeal Number 20 of 2017 affirming the judgment and order dated 06.09.2017 passed by the Assistant Judge, Bhurungamari, Kurigram in Miscellaneous Case Number 14 of 2014 is hereby affirmed.
63The order of stay passed by this Court stands vacated.
64Let a copy of this judgment be communicated to the Courts below forthwith and the Lower Courts' Records be sent down at once.
65Md. Ali Reza, J: Naher-B.O
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